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Abstract
This thesis seeks to explain the phenomenon of discretionary effort in Korean bank branches in 
terms of its antecedents and outcomes. Specifically, it has the following main objectives: First, it 
seeks to test whether or not discretionary effort in Korea can be explained in terms of the five 
motivation mechanisms identified by Benkhoff (1994)- need theories, positive work disposition, 
intrinsic motivation, behavioural commitment and social exchange theory by replicating her 
model, which originally functioned in the German context. The statistical results confirm that 
some of the motivation mechanisms function in the Korean context, such as the need for 
achievement, the need for esteem, and behavioural commitment, but others, such as work 
disposition, intrinsic motivation and social exchange theory, do not apply to the. Korean context. 
This implies that the universality of motivation theories can be affected by national culture.
Secondly, the thesis investigates the impact of group motivation mechanisms, in particular group 
norms and identification, on employees’ discretionary effort and performance in Korean bank 
branches. This is because group motivation is not the same as individual motivation, since there is 
more to a group than the sum of the individuals who comprise it, although norms and 
identification as group motivation mechanisms can partly be explained by the individual 
motivation theories identified by Benkhoff (1994). For this reason, group motivation mechanisms 
are here treated as having an alternative and independent explanatory power for discretionary 
effort. Statistical results confirm that group motivation mechanisms are indeed independent of the 
five individual motivation theories. With regards to the relationship with discretionary effort, 
multiple-regression analysis demonstrates that employees’ identification with their work 
organisation and some discretionary effort-promoting norms have a significant impact on 
discretionary effort of employees in Korea.
Thirdly, the thesis examines the relationship between discretionary effort and financial 
performance in the service context. It is shown that there is a significant link in the Korean 
context. Finally, this thesis seeks to investigate the similarities and differences between motivation 
mechanisms to ensure whether or not they have their own explanatory power.
It is concluded that employees’ discretionary effort and performance in Korean bank branches are 
strongly affected not only by individual motivation mechanisms, but also by group motivation 
mechanisms such as norms and identification.
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Chapter 1 The Phenomenon of Discretionary Effort
This chapter mainly focuses on (1) the explanation of why discretionary effort 
should be regarded as important in organisations; and (2) the conceptual clarification 
of discretionary effort which is similar to several relevant concepts in the literature: 
first, the relationship between discretionary effort and organisational commitment; 
second, the relationship between discretionary effort and pro-social behaviour and 
organisational citizenship behaviour.
1.1 Why is Discretionary Effort Important?
For many years organisational scholars have recognised the importance of the 
discretionary effort of employees which goes beyond delineated role expectations. 
Such effort clearly benefits the organisation and may be an important key to 
organisational effectiveness and success, (see for example, Barnard, 1938; Katz, 
1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). However, there have been little research on this 
subject. Only recently have the conceptual and empirical efforts of some authors 
concerning extra-role behaviour, including pro-social behaviour and organisational 
citizenship behaviour, proved extremely helpful in understanding discretionary effort 
(see, for example, Organ, 1988; Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Puffer, 1987). 
Discretionary effort may be seen as a subset of the broader category of behaviours 
labelled pro-social and thus involves spontaneous behaviour, including co-operative 
gestures, actions protective of the system, and behaviour that enhances the external 
image of the organisation.
Individual roles in organisations are crucial in thinking about work and work 
behaviour. Roles represent expected behaviours and form the foundation of job 
descriptions, expectations and stereotypes. They specify the basis for evaluating job 
performance and selection as well as for determining whether employees have met or
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exceeded role expectations. An implicit assumption in the study of work performance 
has been that performance outcomes are dependent on role behaviour associated 
with specific tasks and are governed by organisational appraisal and reward systems 
(see Iaffaldano and Muchinsky 1985). Yet a work role encompasses a diversity of 
behaviour. As Katz (1964) argues, the dependable performance of one’s prescribed 
role may not be a guarantee of organisational effectiveness. It must be supplemented 
by discretionary behaviours initiated by organisational members in reaction to 
unanticipated events. This is because for an increasing proportion of organisations 
the environment has become less stable, requiring a capacity for rapid adjustment and 
an ability to respond flexibly to specific and varied customer demands. To meet these 
demands swiftly and effectively organisations require employees’ discretionary effort 
which goes beyond the formal in-role description, especially in terms of the extent to 
which activity is intrinsically co-operative.
The concept of discretionary effort is similar to the notions of pro-social 
organisational behaviour (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Puffer, 1987) and 
organisational citizenship behaviour (Bateman and Organ, 1983), though it is 
different in the sense that it denotes various individual behaviours that contribute to 
the organisation but are not part of the more traditional performance-enhancing 
control mechanisms. Such work behaviours are beyond the scope of traditional 
measures of job performance but, since they hold promise for long-term 
organisational success, are now receiving increasing theoretical attention as the 
challenge of global competition highlights the importance of organisational 
innovation, flexibility, productivity and responsiveness to changing external 
conditions. Discretionary effort represents constructive or co-operative gestures that 
are neither mandatory in-role behaviours nor directly or contractually compensated 
by formal reward systems. The presumption is that many of these contributions, 
aggregated over time and persons, greatly enhance organisational effectiveness. 
However, this presumption seems to rest more on its plausibility than an direct 
empirical support. These behaviours, in effect, place more resources at the disposal 
of the organisation and obviate the need for costly formal mechanisms to provide 
functions otherwise rendered informally by discretionary effort. The theoretical
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significance of discretionary effort lies in the observation that it can not be accounted 
for by the normal incentives that sustain in-role behaviour.
In terms of management strategies, since discretionary effort is related to 
employees’ high involvement in their organisation, it can be regarded as a highly 
significant alternative to traditional control mechanisms (e.g. the rewards system and 
job description). This is because traditional control mechanisms are concerned with 
obtaining standard performance rather than maximising or continually improving 
performance. One of the merits of the traditional control system is its concern for 
fairness; but mechanisms for ensuring fairness, such as job specifications and job 
evaluation-based payment systems can in practice become mechanisms for 
reinforcing rigidity. As a result the system as a whole may prove to be inefficient and 
inflexible. According to Mintzberg (1983), any management imposes some systems 
of control to ensure the standardisation of performance. He cites five main systems: 
informal communication between workers, direct supervision, standardisation of 
work processes, standardisation of outputs and standardisation of knowledge and 
skills. This implies that a traditional control system is likely to emphasise direct 
supervision, work processes and outputs. This requires bureaucratic systems based 
on hierarchy, inspection, and mechanisms for standardisation, features reflected in 
their most refined form in the traditional assembly lines of large mass production 
organisations. These elements may represent inefficiencies, in the sense that if top 
management believe that they have employees who exert high discretionary effort, 
they can dispense with many of the formal controls. Thus the notion of discretionary 
effort raises critical issues relating to the management of human resources. Recently, 
some managers have attempted to make the transition from the use of traditional 
control mechanisms to high involvement management strategies (e.g. leading to 
enhanced commitment or pro-social behaviour) in managing human resources 
because those strategies which can lead employees to exert discretionary effort may 
have a significant impact on individual satisfaction and organisational effectiveness.
Since employment contracts cannot normally be phrased precisely to allow for every 
contingency, and since managers have only imperfect information about each
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subordinate’s work and working conditions, in practice employees have considerable 
scope to behave opportunistically. There are obvious advantages to be gained since 
employees who exert discretionary effort do not require expensive monitoring, and 
external control systems (e.g. quality checks, work flow, incentive pay) are 
diminished by the greater role of internal psychological mechanisms. Such internal 
control tends to be regarded as both more effective and potentially cheaper. 
Moreover, the absence of discretionary effort may result in considerable costs in 
terms of tardiness and extra supervision. For these reasons, much research focuses 
on discretionary effort as an indicator of performance which is quite different from 
traditional performance concepts such as that of individual job performance (or 
productivity). Staw (1984) has stressed the narrowness of much research on job 
satisfaction and performance while also suggesting re-formulations of these links 
that would guide researchers away from well-worn paths into more promising areas. 
He calls attention to discretionary effort such as co-operative or pro-social 
behaviours within the organisational context as a fruitful variation on the concept of 
individual performance. There has recently been a growing research interest in 
discretionary effort, e.g. in terms of important relationships between extra-role 
behaviours and other constructs such as satisfaction (Bateman and Organ, 1983), 
commitment (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986), perceptions of fairness (Farh, 
Podsakoff, and Organ, 1988; Folger, 1993), perceptions of pay equity (Organ and 
Konovsky, 1989), individual performance (George and Bettenhausen, 1990), global 
performance (Graham, 1991), leaders behaviours (Podsakoff et al., 1990), 
covenantal relationships (Van Dyne et al., 1994).
In service contexts like the banking industry, where the present research project was 
conducted, employees’ discretionary effort may be one of the most significant 
factors related to success in terms of high performance. This is because employees’ 
discretionary effort (e.g. as expressed in the active suggestion by employees of bank 
products or their polite behaviour) may have a considerable impact on customers’ 
satisfaction and behaviour and consequently may lead to high branch performance in 
the long run. Accordingly, what makes employees exert discretionary effort becomes 
an increasingly important issue. Once the mechanisms that create discretionary effort
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are known, organisations may use discretionary effort as a source of power or 
authority over individuals.
1.2 Conceptual Confusion
1.2.1 The Definition of Discretionary Effort
The concept of discretionaiy effort used here is rooted in Benkhoff s (1994) definition of 
work commitment: “the outcome of a set of motivational mechanisms, apart from 
calculation, which induces employees to act in support of their task or their 
organisation in a way that exceeds the requirements for keeping the job” (p. 185). 
This definition encompasses the following two main elements: (1) effort that exceeds 
the level required to maintain the job; (2) non-calculative and voluntary actions. This 
definition, which refers to extra effort, is re-conceptualised as work commitment by 
Benkhoff (1994). She argues that there is not much point in distinguishing between 
different commitment objects (e.g. work, job commitment, profession commitment) and 
that commitment should be treated in terms of behavioural aspects rather than attitudes. 
However, this approach does not seem to be convincing for the following main reasons:
(1) Benkhoff does not provide strong theoretical grounds for the view that organisational 
commitment is equivalent to work commitment, despite the fact that there is a clear 
conceptual difference between the two: her justification is based on a mean correlation 
coefficient ( .43) reported by Mathiew and Zajac (1990), which may imply that there is a 
certain degree of overlap between two concepts.
(2) Benkhoff s view is that work commitment should be treated with behaviour 
representing extra effort as one of the dimensions of organisational commitment: 
according to Porter et al., (1977), organisational commitment consists of shared 
values (identification), extra effort and the desire to stay in employment. However, 
concerning Porter et al.’s definition, it is not clear whether extra effort is included in 
their definition because the authors focus on “an individual’s identification with and 
involvement in a particular organisation ” (p-27). The problem of this definition
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may be due simply to the wrong assumption that identification expressed in attitudes 
always leads to subsequent behavioural results such as extra effort or the desire to 
stay in employment. Since attitudes are not always indicators of behaviour, this 
definition may not avoid internal contradictions because, although identification are 
more likely to lead to extra effort or the desire to stay in the organisation, they do 
not always lead to such extra effort. Hence, extra effort and the desire to stay are 
better characterised in terms of the results of identification or (they may be 
correlated), rather than as part of the actual definition of organisational commitment. 
This implies that identification may be correlated to extra effort or the desire to stay 
in the organisation, but may not be congruent with them. This argument is well 
supported Benkhoff s empirical research (1996) which suggests that the three 
assumed dimensions listed by Porter et al., do not have a strong underlying factor in 
common.
(3) Theoretically, Benkhoff s view that the definition of commitment should be 
treated as having a single behavioural dimension such as extra effort is based on 
Bern’s (1972) self-perception theory. This theory implies that individuals come to 
know their own attitudes and emotions by inferring them from their own overt 
behaviour and by considering the circumstances under which that behaviour occurs. 
The theory also suggests that some respondents infer their commitment from the 
way they behave towards the organisation. Questionnaire items referring to 
behaviour tend to give them cues as to how to respond to statements about their 
emotional relationship to the company. This implies that employees’ behaviour is 
influenced not so much by their emotions or opinions, but by their initial behaviour. 
Benkhoff s definition, in some sense, may be partly useful because in some cases 
human behaviour is not simply the result of attitudes, as suggested by self­
perception theory. However, Benkhoff s approach may not be helpful in defining the 
concept of commitment in terms of behaviour because: (a) attitudes or cognition can 
still be powerful, independent concepts in predicting human behaviour, rather than 
being inferred from human behaviour; (b) there may be no strong or convincing 
reason why it is necessary to relate the concept of commitment to the unhelpful 
classical debate about whether the attitude or behaviour comes first: another
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theoretical justification for Benkhoff s behavioural approach is based on the 
difficulty involved in measuring commitment in terms of attitudes.
(4) Benkhoff attempts to measure commitment in terms of committed behaviour, 
particularly towards work. This approach is supported by Weiner and Gechman 
(1977): “Commitment behaviours are socially accepted behaviours that exceed 
formal and/ or normative expectations relevant to the object of commitment” (p.48). 
However, the authors do not mention whether the concept of commitment is based 
on attitude or behaviour. According to the definition of Weiner and Gechman, the 
concept of commitment must be distinguished from that “commitment behaviour”. 
“Commitment behaviour” may be behaviour that exceeds formal normative 
expectations and refers to extra effort resulting from the concept of commitment 
itself.
(5) In a practical sense, since Benkhoff s definition of commitment is not clearly 
different from that of extra-role behaviour, the result is conceptual redundancy. 
Without analysing further whether or not Benkhoff s definition of commitment as extra 
effort is convincing, this research adopts the basic concept of extra effort as an important 
element of discretionary effort. Discretionary effort as extra effort can be interpreted in 
terms of (a) extra work effort or (b) extra-role behaviour. Even though Benkhoff 
seems to focus on extra work effort beyond the in-role job description, this research also 
includes extra-role behaviour as discretionary effort. Extra-role behaviour (including 
pro-social organisational behaviour and organisational citizenship behaviour) is 
defined as “behaviour which benefits the organisation and/ or is intended to benefit 
the organisation, which is discretionary and which goes beyond existing role 
expectations” (Van Dyne et al., 1995, p.218). Benkhoff s definition offers a broader 
concept than that of extra-role behaviour because it focuses on extra work effort, 
while the idea of pro-social behaviour and citizenship behaviour emphasise different 
extra-roles. For these reasons, the concept of discretionary effort can be defined in terms 
of extra-role behaviour and extra work effort (work commitment in Benkhoff s terms, 
1994). This conceptualisation, however, raises the following question: If it is not useful 
to equate work commitment with extra effort or discretionary effort, what exactly is 
the relationship between them (especially between commitment and organisational
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citizenship behaviour)? In order to answer this question, it is essential to establish 
the concept of commitment, to identify clearly the concept of discretionary effort, 
and thus to make it possible to identify the relationship between organisational 
commitment and discretionary effort.
1.2.2 The Integration of the Concepts of Organisational Commitment
What actually is organisational commitment and its relationship with discretionary 
effort? Although there has been much research on commitment over the last thirty 
years, there is still no consensus on its definition. As Morrow (1983) has pointed out, • 
“growth in commitment related concepts has not been accomplished by a careful 
segmentation of commitment’s theoretical domain in terms of the intended meaning of 
each concept or the concepts’ relationships among each other.” (p.486). Recently, 
Meyer and Allen (1997, p i2) have attempted to categorise various definitions of 
commitment suggested in the literature by highlighting three main elements (Table 
1-1): (1) affective orientation (affective commitment); (2) cost-based (continuance 
commitment); and (3) obligation or moral responsibility (normative commitment). 
However, this categorisation may not be very helpful for the following reasons:
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Table 1-1 The definition of commitment
_______________ (1) Affective Orientation__________________________________
-The attachment o f an individual fund of affectivity and emotion to the group.
(Kanter, 1968, p. 507)
-An attitude or an orientation toward the organisation which links or attaches the identity 
o f the person to the organisation. (Sheldon, 1971, p. 143)
-The process by which the goals o f the organisation and those, o f the individual become 
increasingly integrated or congruent. (Hall, Schneider, andNygren, 1970, p i 76-177)
-A partisan, affective attachment to the goals and values o f the organisation, to one's role 
in relation to goals and values, and to the organisation for its own sake, apart from 
its purely instrumental worth. (Buchanan, 1974, p. 533)
-The relative strength o f an individual’s identification with and involvement in 
a particular organisation. (Mowday, Porter, and Steers, 1982, p. 27)
 (2) Cost-based__________________________________________
-Profit associated with continued participation and a “cost ” associated with leaving. 
(Kanter, 1968, p.504)
-Commitment comes into being when a person, by making a side bet, links extraneous 
interests with a consistent line o f activity. (Becker, 1960, p. 32)
(3) Obligation or Moral Responsibility
-Commitment behaviours are socially accepted behaviours that exceed formal and/or 
normative expectations relevant to the object o f commitment. (Wiener and Gechman, 1977, 
p. 48)
-The totality o f internalised normative pressure to act in a way which meets organisational 
goals and interests. (Wiener, 1982, p. 421)
First, it is not clear whether there is any difference between affective commitment 
and normative commitment. For example, Meyer and Allen regard Hall, Schneider,
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and Nygren’s definition as one of affective commitment: “the process by which the 
goals of the organisation and those of the individual become increasingly integrated 
or congruent”. However, they treat Wiener’s definition as one o f normative 
commitment: “the totality of internalised normative pressure to act in a way that 
meets organisational interests”. The latter definition refers to the degree of 
internalisation of normative pressure exerted by an organisation. Here normative 
pressure appears to mean the same as organisational goals, values or norms. The 
internalisation of these goals, values or norms implies that the goals of the 
organisation and those of the individual become increasingly integrated or 
congruent.
Secondly, within the category of affective commitment, there are slight different 
approaches: one is that commitment refers to emotional attachment (e.g. Kanter; 
Sheldon; and Buchanan); and another is that commitment refers to integration, 
identification or internalisation of organisational values or goals (e.g. Hall, 
Schneider, and Nygren’s definition and Mowday, Porter, and Steers’). With regards to 
first approach, Kanter’s definition refers to purely emotional attachment towards the 
organisation (e.g. “the attachment of an individual’s fund of affectivity and emotion 
to the group”). Unlike affectivity towards people, affectivity towards a group or 
organisation may refer to those of group or organisational values or norms which 
make the existence of the group or organisation possible. Hence, Kanter’s approach 
is similar to Buchanan’s definition (1974), “...a partisan, affective attachment to the 
goals and values of an organisation, to one’s role in relation to goals and values, and 
to the organisation for its own sake, apart from its purely instrumental worth”.
However, these approaches, which focus on emotional aspects towards an 
organisation, may be different from the approach which refers to the integration or 
the internalisation of individual goals or values into those of the organisation. This is 
because people with emotional attachment towards their organisation may not 
always identify or internalise their organisational goals or values. It is interesting to 
see whether there is difference between the emotional attachment to organisational 
goals and values and the internalisation or the congruence of organisational values 
or norms (normative pressure). Is one the result of the other? Or do they go always
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together? These two approaches are not completely different since it is difficult to 
internalise or integrate organisational goals or values into those o f individuals 
without emotional attachment towards organisational values. For this reason, these 
two approaches have emotional attachment in common. However, since the degree 
of attitudes or emotional attachment vary, an individual may internalise the goals, 
values and norms of organisations when he/she has a strong emotional attachment 
towards them. These differences in the degree of emotional attachment may result in 
different behavioural implications, for example, in terms of work effort or citizenship 
behaviour, because a strong attitude can be a predictor of behaviour. For this 
reason, internalisation or identification with organisational values may be an 
expression of strong attitudes or emotions towards those values.
Accordingly, we may ask whether organisational commitment is simple emotional 
attachment towards the values of an organisation or internalisation of those values 
which is more likely to reflect commitment. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989), commitment is “an engagement; a liability”, “an absolute moral
choice of a course of action ; moral seriousness or social responsibility in
artistic productions” (p. 560). This definition clearly offers that the concept of 
commitment implies normative aspects (e.g. an engagement or liability may lead to 
an obligation or moral responsibility which is referred to as normative commitment). 
For these reasons, it may be appropriate to define commitment in terms of the 
identification or internalisation of organisational values which are more likely to 
imply normative aspects such as engagement or moral responsibility. For the same 
reason, we may not need to use the term “normative commitment”. It should be 
stressed that it is not appropriate to include simple or weak emotional attachment 
towards the goals or values of an organisation in the concept of commitment. For 
example, if a Buddhist has positive or emotional attachment towards Catholic beliefs 
or values, one can not say that he/she is committed to Catholicism unless he/she 
identifies or internalises Catholic goals or values. Furthermore, if organisational 
commitment is defined as purely emotional attachment, one may have the difficulty 
in distinguishing organisational commitment from other relevant concepts such as 
positive emotion, attitudes or liking towards an organisation. Hence, organisational 
commitment may refer to psychological, emotional engagement or obligation
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(commitment), which is seen in terms of compliance-based commitment, 
identification-based commitment and intemalisation-based commitment. This 
follows Kelman’s (1958) investigation into the basis for attitude change. According 
to Kelman, individuals can accept influence in three conceptually distinct ways: a) 
compliance or exchange, (b) identification or affiliation, and (c) internalisation or value 
congruence. Compliance occurs when attitudes and behaviour are adopted not because 
of shared beliefs but simply to gain specific rewards. Identification, in Kelman’s terms, 
occurs when an individual accepts influence to establish or maintain a satisfying 
relationship; that is an individual may feel proud to be a part of a group, respecting its 
values. Internalisation occurs when influence is accepted because the attitude or 
behaviour of group are congruent with one’s won values. These difference in three 
aspects of attitudes, according to O’Reilly and Chatman is suggested as representing 
separate dimensions of commitment.
These approaches are helpful in the sense that commitment is regarded as emotional 
attachment resulting from identification and internalisation. However, they are not 
completely convincing because (1) it is difficult to tell difference between 
internalisation and identification (2) instrumental commitment (in the terms of 
O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986) may be conceptually redundant since specific 
rewards can offer an important motive for employees to identify or internalise 
(commit) organisational values in certain circumstances where rewards are highly 
valuable. This may be due to a misunderstanding about the nature of the 
commitment concept (e.g. rewards-based commitment, identification and 
intemalisation-based commitment are not different dimensions of concept, but the 
former may be part of the latter definition because organisational values may exist in 
different forms, e.g. those values concerning rewards policy, values about work 
itself or values concerning a work group or trade union). Alternatively, these may be 
due to a wrong assumption that rewards only make employees comply.
However, rewards systems can also lead employees to identify or internalise 
organisational values (e.g. employees can have a strong emotional attachment 
because of rewards). Hence, rewards and shared values (by identification or 
internalisation) are not completely different dimensions, e.g. individuals who
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strongly believe that a performance-related pay system is good (implying individual 
values) may identify or internalise (commit) with organisations that have 
performance-related pay rewards policies as an expression of their values or norms. 
This provides good grounds for arguing that some authors who exclude rewards- 
based commitment as part of the concept of commitment are not convincing. For the 
same reason, the following authors’ definitions may not be regarded as inadequate: 
“commitment serves to maintain behaviour in the absence o f  rewards” (Scholl, 
1981); “...a partisan, affective attachment to the goals and values of an organisation, 
to one’s role in relation to goals and values, and to the organisation for its own sake, 
apart from its purely instrumental worth” (Buchanan, 1974 p.533); and
“ ............... apart from calculation, which induce employees to act in support of their
task or their organisation in a way that exceeds the requirements for keeping the 
job” (Benkhoff, 1994, p. 185).
The relationship between a rewards systems and commitment very much depends on 
circumstances or individuals’ values towards rewards. It is not useful to argue 
whether or not rewards-based commitment is part of commitment concept, but it is 
interesting to look at whether or not the rewards system affects commitment. 
Organisational commitment may be a broader concept including instrumental 
commitment (as defined by O’Reilly and Chatman) which results from rewards 
which require formal responsibility, contract or obligation. This argument is well 
supported by social exchange view conducted by Eisenberger, Huntington, 
Hutchison, and Sowa (1986). They suggest the integration of emotion-based and 
calculative theories of organisational commitment into a social exchange approach. 
The theory assumes that organisational commitment is the responsibility or 
obligation felt by employees in the process of an exchange relationship, (e.g. 
employees’ perception concerning the extent to which the organisation values their 
contribution and cares about their well-being (perceived organisational support).
In summary, above discussion demonstrates that it is appropriate to focus the 
concept of organisational commitment on emotional, psychological obligation 
towards organisations as represented by the identification or internalisation o f
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organisational values or goals. Hence this research adopts argument that equates 
commitment with identification. This definition does not contradict the general 
conclusion that commitment consists of attitudes which have both affective 
(emotions or feelings) and cognitive (beliefs) components, and thus emotional aspect 
is emphasised by affective commitment, while the cognitive aspect is emphasised by 
continuance or normative commitment. However, it remains to be seen how helpful 
the concept of organisational commitment is in the work context, since it is 
extremely difficult to identify organisations as single monolithic entities which have 
consensual goals, values or norms. There may not be a single, uniform and agreed 
set of organisational goals, values or norms, but rather a number of different goals, 
values or norms may exist. Different people may have different types, levels or 
objects of goals, values or norms in their minds (e.g. work itself, interpersonal 
attraction or rewards), and this may consequently lead to different outcomes of 
commitment. Hence, these abstract concepts of organisation or organisational values 
may lead to questions about the notion of organisational commitment since 
employees may have a conflictual, dual commitment between different objects (e.g. 
between commitment towards a work group and towards headquarters). In order to 
make the commitment concept helpful in a practical sense, as Reichers (1985) 
suggests, it may be a good idea to divide the abstract concept of organisational 
commitment into specific aspects in terms of objects, types and levels. These lead to 
different types of commitment (e.g. work commitment, occupational commitment 
and trade union commitment etc). Furthermore, it is critical to ensure validity in 
terms of measurement since this considerably affects research outcomes.
In conclusion, the concept of commitment, in this research, is defined as emotional, 
psychological obligation towards organisations as represented by the 
identification or internalisation o f  organisational values or goals. Since this 
definition of commitment may affect employees’ discretionary effort, it is regarded 
as one of antecedents of discretionary effort.
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1.2.3Discretionary Effort as Extra-Role Behaviour
Discretionary effort, in this research, implies innovative and spontaneous activity 
that goes beyond contractual role prescriptions, as opposed to the dependable 
performance of specific role requirements. Hence, the definition includes (1) extra 
work effort and (2) discretionary behaviours as expressed in extra-roles: acts of co­
operation, helpfulness, suggestions, gestures of goodwill and altruism. In some 
circumstances, it is difficult to distinguish between in-role and extra-role; it may 
depend on the nature of specific tasks and normative expectations within the 
organisation. Actually, many behavioural patterns defined as extra-roles can become 
in-role because of normative expectation or the nature of specific tasks (e.g. co­
operative behaviour is in-role behaviour in an interdependent task structure). Since 
many roles that employees perform in work-places can not actually be clear-cut in 
terms of their boundaries, this present research focuses on discretionary effort in 
terms of behaviours that exceed the requirements for keeping the job.
In work contexts, there are various forms of discretionary effort. Much of the 
research in the literature concerns the following two main concepts: pro-social 
organisational Behaviour (e.g. Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; O’Reilly and Chatman, 
1986); and organisational citizenship behaviour (e.g. Bateman and Organ, 1983; 
Organ, 1988, 1990; Smith, Organ and Near, 1983; Van Dyne, Graham, and 
Dienesch, 1994).
These concepts, however, are not clearly defined and have not yet been integrated 
into a systematic framework which clarifies the theoretical similarities and 
differences between their constructs. In order to identify the concept of discretionary 
effort as extra work effort and extra role behaviour, it is helpful to discuss the 
relationships between these concepts. First of all, the relevant definitions may be 
cited: Brief and Motowidlo (1986) define pro-social organisational behaviour 
(PSOB) as “behaviour which is (1) performed by a member of an organisation, (2) 
directed toward an individual, group, or organisation with whom he or she interacts 
while carrying out his or her organisational role, and (3) performed with the
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intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organisation toward 
which it is directed.” (p. 711)
Organ (1988) defines organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) as “behaviour that is 
discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that 
in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organisation.... the behaviour
is not an enforceable requirement of the role or the job description the behaviour is
rather a matter of personal choice” (p.4).
The first of these definitions shows that pro-social organisational behaviour appears to be 
a very broad construct. The only requirement of such behaviour is that it be “directed 
toward an individual, group, or organisation” with whom the individual “interacts while 
carrying out his or her organisational role” (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986, p.710). Given 
this definition, pro-social organisational behaviour appears to include all behaviour that 
occurs within an organisation which is directed towards others. These behaviours can be 
functional or dysfunctional in terms of organisational effectiveness (e.g. helping 
individual private matters in some case, may harm the effectiveness of a group). Pro­
social organisational behaviour can be conceptualized to include or overlap with 
organisational citizenship behaviour.
The definition of pro-social organisational behaviour specifies no qualifying 
condition that the behaviour must, even indirectly or ultimately, benefit the 
organisation; nor does it require that the behaviour go beyond the individual’s 
prescribed role. Thus, POB would include in-role behaviour in many instances (e.g. 
in case of those who help employees to manage their benefit programmes). POB is a 
more inclusive construct that OCB, since the latter restricts itself to extra-role 
behaviours which have a prospect of promoting organisational effectiveness.
The concept of discretionary effort used in this research has some similarities to the 
concepts of pro-social organisational behaviour in a sense that many forms of pro- 
social behaviour involve discretionary effort (e.g. complying with organisational 
values, policies, and regulations; suggesting procedural, administrative, or 
organisational improvement; and putting extra effort with the job (Brief and
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Motowidlo, 1986). However, discretionary effort focuses on criteria o f effective 
organisational performance, whereas PSOB can be functional or dysfunctional to the 
organisation, role-prescribed or not prescribed, and directed toward an individual or 
towards the organisation.
Discretionary effort overlaps partly with the concept of organisational citizenship 
behaviour, which is probably the best known and most heavily researched concept of 
extra-role behaviour. These differences very much depend on precise definition of 
OCB. According Organ (1988), two critical components of such definition are: (1) 
behaviour is not part of the employee’s job responsibilities and is not rewarded 
explicitly, and (2) behaviour is usually not obvious but does in general benefit the 
organisation. Hence, OCB is typically limited to incidental acts of good-will 
exercised by one organisational member toward another. In this sense, OCB is 
similar to discretionary effort. However, there is a difference between OCB and 
discretionary effort in the sense that OCB implies very specific aspects of 
discretionary behaviours, which, as Van Dyne et al.,(1995) suggest, are affiliative/ 
promotive behaviours; but it does not include challenging/ prohibitive behaviours 
which may hurt the relationship and consequently may do harm to organisations. 
Furthermore, while OCB is more likely to focus on discretionary behaviour as a 
different, extra-role, discretionary effort focuses on extra work efforts including 
discretionary behaviours. Therefore, discretionary effort is broader concept than 
OCB.
One unresolved issue in the research on extra-role behaviour is whether 
organisational citizenship should be expanded (as recommended by Graham, 1991) 
to include some of the more challenging aspects of citizenship or whether it should 
be limited to the more traditional and affiliative acts of helping. However, 
discretionary effort does include these challenging aspects, for example, making 
active suggestions for the organisation. This is because one can not simply assume 
that active and challenging behaviour always hurts the relationships between 
members. Some employers like active and challenging ideas to be suggested as long 
as they are seen to be helpful for their organisation.
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In terms of the construct of OCB, it varies according to authors. Based on prior 
research (Bateman and Organ, 1983; Smith et al., 1983), Organ (1988) enumerated 
five dimensions of organisational citizenship behaviour: (1) altruism is characterised 
by acts which help a specific person; (2) conscientiousness includes attendance, 
cleanliness and punctuality that go beyond the minimum required levels; (3) 
sportsmanship is characterised by maintaining a positive attitude; (4) courtesy 
includes keeping the boss and co-workers informed; and (5) finally civic virtue is 
characterised by responsible participation in the political life of the organisation by 
attending meetings and reading company mail. Although one can imagine 
circumstances in which each of these five dimensions could be construed as extra- 
role behaviour, it seems more likely that the examples often given for 
conscientiousness, courtesy, and civic virtue are in many cases in-role job 
expectations (e.g. conscientiousness becomes an extra role only when an employee 
comes to work early or stays late, and courtesy is often expected as in-role job 
characteristic).
Van Dyne et al., (1995) suggest five different dimensions of OCB: (1) loyalty 
(allegiance to and promotion of the organisation), (2) obedience (respect for rules 
and policies), (3) advocacy participation (innovation and proactively synergizing 
others), (4) functional participation (work-oriented effort and self-development), 
and (5) social participation (engaging in group meeting and activities).
Unlike the citizenship research, the pro-social organisational behaviour research has 
not specifically addressed the dimensionality of the construct. Occasionally, although 
the stated research construct is PSOB, scales have been drawn from those of OCB 
(e.g. George, 1991; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986). Conceptually, however, PSOB is 
a broader construct than OCB (Brief and Motowildo, 1986) and discretionary effort. 
With regards to the relationships between OCB and PSOB, Organ (1988) 
differentiates OCB from PSOB as follows: Pro-social organisational behaviour is a 
larger and more inclusive concept that includes behaviours that might actually hurt 
the organisation.
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In terms of construct of discretionary effort, it is different from those mentioned in 
literature (e.g. Organ, 1988; Van Dyne et al., 1995). In this research, two constructs 
of discretionary effort are used. One is discretionary behaviour, which focuses on 
organisational aspects as extra-role behaviour. Since it is difficult to distinguish 
between in-role and extra-role behaviour in certain work contexts, it may be better 
idea to identify extra-role behaviours which are displayed in actual work contexts 
than to use the existing constructs such as OCB. For this reason, the construct of 
discretionary behaviours used in this research derives from those identified by 
Benkhofif, which are clearly regarded as extra-role behaviours in bank branches. This 
construct is similar to that of Van Dyne et al., (1995) in the sense that it consists of 
loyalty, obedience and participation. Secondly a completely new construct focuses 
on specifically an extra work effort rather than those behaviours directed towards an 
organisation. It may be assumed that individuals who exhibit discretionary 
behaviours tend to exert extra work effort, However, these two constructs may not 
always go together. This is because that even though employees express loyalty, 
obedience and participation for their organisation, they may not display specific 
extra work effort where work or task itself is extremely boring. For this reason, 
these construct are treated as separate and independent in this research.
In conclusion, the new concept of discretionary effort may be helpful and may have 
some advantages compared with PSOB and OCB for the following reasons: First, 
the actual results of PSOB can be functional or dysfunctional for the organisation, 
so the key element is the intention to benefit others. Beyond this element, it is 
difficult to define pro-social organisational behaviour. PSOB is an extremely broad 
concept as illustrated by the usual definition. Furthermore, since there can be 
contradiction amongst the thirteen behavioural patterns of PSOB identified by Brief 
and Motowidlo (1986), the case of such extreme opposites does not provide a clear 
foundation for construct definition and empirical research. For these reasons, Van 
Dyne et al., (1995) suggest dropping the construct of PSOB and clarifying the 
conceptualisation of OCB to exclude behaviour which is challenging/promotive and 
affiliative/prohibitive.
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Secondly, the concept of discretionary effort takes into account the traditional 
performance concept (productivity) by focusing on extra work effort as well as extra 
role behaviours since extra work effort through hard work within the same job is 
very important. It is interesting to look at discretionary effort in terms of specific 
extra work effort separately from general forms of discretionary behaviours such as 
organisational citizenship behaviour. In addition, since performance in bank 
branches, may depend on employees’ general discretionary behaviour, which may 
have considerable impact on customer behaviours, discretionary behaviours are also 
considered as a separate variable.
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Chapter 2 Research Purposes, Model and Context
This chapter attempts (1) to introduce specific research purposes, scope and model; 
and (2) to explain specific research issues and agenda which are related to 
particular research context such as in Korea
2.1. Research Purpose and Model
This research aims to identify the antecedents and outcomes of discretionary effort 
in Korean bank branches. However, discretionary effort, in Korea, has not been of 
interest to academics or employers because of the widespread assumption that 
employees’ work effort is affected by mainly material rewards and is thus more 
likely to be regulated by the formal control system. It is true that until the 1970s a 
lot of Korean people suffered from poverty and had strong motives for monetary 
rewards. Hence, discretionary effort was not seen as an interesting issue because the 
hard work of employees was considered to be natural phenomenon and as part of 
social norms needed to survive and avoid poverty. However, with Korea’s recent 
rapid economic growth, there have been many changes in employees’ attitudes 
towards work and in life styles, especially since the 1980s. Employees’ general 
satisfaction with economic conditions means that material motives have become less 
influential for their behaviour. As result, employers have begun to raise questions, 
about what make employees work harder (e.g. discretionary effort) and about other 
motives.
With regards to more specific context, the banking industry in Korea, as part of the 
service sector, is different from its counterpart in other advanced countries (e.g. 
Germany) because it has its own characteristics resulting from unique historical 
patterns of development. Within the Korean economic structure, the banking 
industry belongs to the private sector and has traditionally been regarded as offering 
job security. Hence, it used to be one of the most popular areas of employment 
among university graduates. However, since the 1980s, with the rapid development 
of non-bank financial organisations, the popularity of the banking industry in terms
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of job positions has decreased. The main reason is relatively low pay and slow 
promotion compared with non-bank financial organisations. Many bankers have 
moved their job to newly established non-financial institutions because of better 
working conditions in terms of pay and promotion.
With regards to banking’s relationship with government, it is largely controlled and 
influenced by protective industrial policies, even though banks are private 
companies. This is because financial institutions in Korea was used for the purpose 
of supporting the economic development plan through the more efficient allocation 
of banking funds. The successful implementation of subsequent economic plans 
contributed remarkably to Korean development in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
as the Korean economy grew much larger and more complex, it reached a stage 
where the management of the economy under government’s strong control was 
believed to be less efficient than entrusting it to the market mechanism. It was 
widely accepted that the Korean economy could not progress much further without 
adequate development of the financial sectors. Moreover, government policies have 
hindered the development of the banking industry in terms of new financial products 
development and customer service, which are both very important within today’s 
competitive market. The weak infrastructure of the banking industry has led the 
government to pursue a restructuring strategy. Furthermore, the recent entry of 
foreign banks into the domestic market has added to the instability of the banking 
industry. Wide-ranging structural adjustment policies were therefore implemented 
from the early 1980s. In parallel with the change in the manufacturing sector, a 
number of measures were also taken for the liberalisation and promotion of 
competition in the financial sector. The government handed over the ownership of 
four nation-wide commercial banks to the private sectors:
With changes in external environments, such as the new banking industry policies of 
the government and subsequent changes in internal environments, such as low pay, 
slow promotion and job insecurity, the level of motivation of employees has rapidly 
decreased. Nevertheless, many employees in bank branches do work hard and put in 
more effort (discretionary effort) than is required. It is therefore interesting to
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investigate the motivators which account for the discretionary effort of these 
employees.
This research therefore offers analysis of Korean employees’ motives for their 
discretionary effort, an issue which has not been understood, especially by 
management writers and practitioners in Western countries. The findings of this 
study should provide valuable information for Western managers to learn how to 
work harmoniously with employees from Korea in today’s multinational business 
organisations. It should also contribute to reducing the cultural shock that managers 
in Western nations may face when moving to work in Korea. In the literature, there 
are many different motivational bases which are used to explain these discretionary 
efforts (e.g. job satisfaction, organisational commitment, etc.,). However, this 
research focuses on the following particular two aspects as shown in Table 2-1:
First, the aim is to replicate BenkhofFs (1994) work which attempted to explain the 
motives behind “extra effort” (work commitment in her terms) in terms of five 
motivation mechanisms in the German context. The reasons for doing this are as 
follows; (a) BenkhofFs model may be helpful since it focuses on extra work effort, 
which is one of the most significant aspects of discretionary effort because it may 
directly affect performance (productivity); (b) by replication of her model, it is 
interesting to see whether or not discretionary effort in Korea can be explained by 
Western motivation mechanisms (in other words, the aim is to test the universality 
of motivation theories).
Secondly, the emphasis is on the impact of group motivation mechanisms 
(organisational identification and group norms), which are one of strongest motives 
affecting human behaviour in relation to discretionary effort, especially in Korea 
which many authors have assumed to be highly group-oriented and collectivist 
society.
In addition to these two purposes, this research also has the following other 
purposes:
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Thirdly, to test the similarities and differences between motivation mechanisms, in 
other words, to test whether or not each of the motivation mechanisms identified in 
this research has its own independent explanatory power;
Fourthly, to investigate the relationships between discretionary effort (in terms of 
group characteristics) and its outcomes (referring to overall branch performance);
Finally, to improve several of the measures suggested by motivation theories, and in 
particular to develop a new approach to the measurement of group norms.
Table 2-1 Research model
(l)Need theories:_______
The need for achievement 
The need for esteem
(2) Work disposition Discretionary effort -► perform ance
(3) Intrinsic motivation — ►
(4) Behavioural commitment
p ) social exchange theory
Group motivation
Control variables
(6) Organisational identification
(7) Group norms
Active policy 
Superior’s sales ability 
Directing 
Good premises
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2.2 Replication of BenkhofTs Model and Universality of Motivation 
Theories
Benkhoff (1994) has identified the antecedents of discretionary effort in the German 
context in terms of five motivation mechanisms which are relatively less-calculative 
(instrumental): need theories, work disposition, intrinsic motivation, behavioural 
commitment and social exchange theory. These five motivation mechanisms are 
adopted in this research to explain discretionary effort in the Korean context. This is 
because it can be assumed that these five motivation mechanisms account for 
employees’ discretionary effort in the Korean bank branches in the sense that 
motivation theories attempting to explain universal human behaviour function 
across national/ cultural boundaries. However, this universality has been questioned 
on the grounds that human behaviour is a product of social interaction and is 
consequently affected by the context or environments in which a set of economic, 
political, cultural and social circumstances give it a unique character.
The replication of BenkhofFs model in the Korean context thus raises the following 
interesting question: are the motivators of discretionary effort universal across 
nations and cultures? The answer to this question will be sought by replicating 
BenkhofTs research on discretionary effort in terms of the five motivation 
mechanisms. The choice of Korea can be justified by the fact that there are marked 
cultural and institutional differences with German. In Korea, there is much stronger 
emphasis on relationships, work organisation orientation, respect for age and 
hierarchy, and more significance is placed on “face” than in “Western” countries. 
Moreover, in terms of economic development, Korea is still a developing country 
and strongly depends on a state-controlled economy. This is in marked contrast to 
Germany. These differences would therefore suggest that the motivational basis of 
discretionary may be quite different in Korea compared with Germany.
There have been widespread debates concerning the assumptions about human 
beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviour a cross nation or cultures in the academic 
areas of psychology, sociology and anthropology. Different schools are based on
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different assumptions according to their interests. In this research, the following 
major schools of thought are reviewed to help understand the motivation to work: 
(1) relativist; (2) absolutist and (3) universalist. These different schools advance 
different arguments in terms of the factors underlying behaviour, the role of culture 
in behavioural variance, and theoretical perspectives concerning similarities and 
differences in human behaviour and methodological perspectives (Berry et al., 
1992).
First, the relativists viewpoint was first identified in anthropology by Herskovits 
(1948). This assumes that explanations of psychological variations across the 
world’s people are to be sought in terms of cultural variation with little recourse to 
other factors. Theoretically, relativists do not show any interest in the existence of 
similarities across cultures, except for explaining any cultural differences that they 
do observe on basis of cultural contexts that influence an individual’s development. 
Methodologically, comparative studies are avoided because they are considered so 
problematic as to render valid conclusion impossible.
Secondly, in sharp contrast, the absolutist viewpoints assume that psychological 
phenomena are considered to be basically the same across cultures: the essential 
character of, for example, “intelligence”, “honesty”, or “ depression” is assumed to 
be the same everywhere, and the possibility is ignored that the researchers’ 
knowledge is rooted in their own cultural conceptions of these phenomena. 
Methodologically, comparisons are considered to create not essential problems and 
are carried out easily and frequently, based on the use of the same instruments in 
different cultures. Theoretically, this approach is based on the view that 
psychologically people a cross nations and cultures are very much alike. Where 
differences do occur, they are quantitative differences on the assumed underlying 
common construct; different people are just “less intelligent”, “less honest,” or 
“more depressed”.
Thirdly, universalists adopt the assumption that basic psychological processes are 
likely to be a common features of human life everywhere, but that their 
manifestations are likely to be influenced by culture. That is, variations are due to
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culture “playing different variations on a common theme”; basic processes are 
essentially the same, but they are expressed in different ways. Methodologically, 
comparisons are employed. Theoretically, interpretations of similarities and 
differences are made, starting from the belief that basic psychological processes are 
pan-human and that cultural factors influence their development (direction and 
extent) and deployment (for what purposes, and how, they are used). Thus, the 
major questions are to what extent and in what ways cultural variables influence 
behaviour.
In summary, relativists believe that there can only be context-bound definitions of 
psychological concepts in such areas as personality, cognition, and social behaviour. 
It follows that context-free psychological measurement should not even be 
attempted. In the universalist perspective which are adopted in this research, the 
context-free definition of psychological concepts is seen as a goal that has to be, and 
can be, achieved through the modification of culture-specific concepts.
2.2.1 Cross-Culture Issues in Work Motivation
In terms of the basic understanding of human behaviour, at the more practical level, 
industrial psychologists (particularly cross-cultural psychologists) and comparative 
management theorists (Dore, 1973; Cole, 1979; Adler, 1983; Drenth, 1985; Child, 
1981; Hofstede, 1982; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Redding, 1994) have focused 
more on organisational behaviours resulting from differences in organisational 
practices (e.g. organisational structure) and human resource management practices 
(e.g. rewards system) across nations and cultures, arguing that there are no 
universally applied management practices or motivation theories (see especially 
Hofstede, 1982).
Other authors (particularly McClelland, 1961; Hui, 1990;) consider motivation 
theories cross-culturally. Motivation is described as a readiness to exert high levels 
of effort, contingent upon the success with which this effort satisfies some individual 
needs. Some authors (e.g. Jaeger and Kanungo, 1990; Hofstede, 1980) assume that 
employees from different countries may not share similar needs and motivational
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systems. Countries may differ in the level of importance that employees attach to 
different needs, values, attitudes or motives and how well these are met through 
work.
Jaeger and Kanungo (1990) state, in relation to attribution theory, that an external 
locus of control is characteristic of basic assumptions of human nature in developing 
countries, in contrast to the prevalent belief in an internal locus of control in the 
developed countries. Along with this argument, Berry et al., (1992) point out that 
studies have indicated that persons from the Far East are more externally attributed 
than those in Western countries. Based on this assumption, it is interesting to see 
mechanisms of behavioural commitment in Korea which are operationalised by the 
attribution approach in relation to discretionary effort.
McClelland (1987) argues that needs are not necessarily universal as Maslow 
suggests, and after forty years of research on human motivation, he identifies four 
major motivational needs systems: achievement motives, power motives, affiliative 
motives and avoidance motives. He devoted considerable time in India, developing 
achievement motivation in entrepreneurs through training programmes, and but 
found that achievement motives do not work in India, unlike in an achievement 
society like the United States. This is a question which Hofstede (1980 and 1991) 
addresses. His research concerning McClelland’s three motives argues that these 
needs have not been shown to be universal, demonstrating that there is a high 
correlation between the level of the achievement motive and national culture (work- 
related values: “uncertainty avoidance” and “masculinity”). In other words, 
countries with a high need for achievement have a high need to produce (masculinity 
dimension) and a strong willingness to accept risk (Hofstede’s weak uncertainty 
avoidance). Anglo-American countries such as the United States, Canada and Great 
Britain (weak uncertainty avoidance combined with masculinity) follow the high 
achievement motivation pattern, while countries such as South Korea, Chile and 
Portugal (strong uncertainty avoidance combined with femininity) follow the low 
achievement motivation pattern. Hofstede, again, in his research into Herzberg’s 
two factor theory (hygiene factors and motivators), points out that culture influences 
factors that motivate and demonstrate behaviour, suggesting that Herzberg’s two-
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factors theory is not universal across cultures. The latter has also been tested outside 
the United States. Results in New Zealand failed to replicate those in the United 
States. In New Zealand, supervision and interpersonal relationships appear to 
contribute significantly to satisfaction and not merely to reducing dissatisfaction. It 
is interesting to consider how need theories (need for achievement, need for esteem) 
work in the Korean context, which is assumed to be characterised by strong 
uncertainty avoidance and femininity.
Work dispositions such as “work as a central life interest” (Dubin, 1955) and “the 
Protestant work ethic”, reflecting work-oriented values have been discussed cross- 
culturally discussed by some authors as important work motivation mechanisms. 
Weber (1930, 1951) argued that the development of capitalism (implying high work 
effort) in the West was premised on a Protestant ethic which allowed the Puritan to 
“dissolve everything into the pure business relation”. However, he was negative 
about the compatibility of the Confucian mentality with capitalist development (hard 
work effort). By contrast, some scholars (Shepard et al., 1989) have attempted to 
demonstrate how Confucianism provides the ideological or spiritual underpinnings 
for capitalist development. They accept Weber’s (1930) assumption of a cultural 
basis of economic activity, but reject any notion that Protestantism is the only, or 
the best, religious foundation for capitalism. The Confucianist was “bound in the 
first place to maintaining the harmony of the divine and to an ideal of self-perception 
which precluded the more means-end calculation of utilitarian advantage” 
(Schroeder, 1992, p.48). Confucianism has been established as both a religion and a 
philosophy in Korea for the last 600 years, following its introduction from China. 
There are two viewpoints concerning the links between the Korean work disposition 
and Confucianism: first, Liu (1959) and Song (1990) maintain that Korean people’s 
hard work culture is basically derived from the teachings of Confucius, in which 
diligence, thrift and hard work are emphasised; secondly, Woronoff (1983), argued 
that Korean economic growth was dependent on “shedding much of its Confucian 
heritage”. Recent work done by Lee (1994) shows that more than half the sample of 
Korean managers rated their work and career as the most important factor in their 
lives and subsequently worked long hours.
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With regards to intrinsic motivation, in contrast to extrinsic motivation, research 
evidence shows that it contributes to job satisfaction in all countries, but that the 
contribution of extrinsic factors to satisfaction is a function of the country and 
occupational level (e.g. Padaski and Dolke, 1970). In the Korean context, such 
intrinsic motivation mechanisms may work in explaining job satisfaction or 
discretionary effort.
Research evidence concerning job satisfaction demonstrates that there are consistent 
national differences (e.g. there are differences in job satisfaction between America 
and Germany; see Katona, Strumpel and Zahn, 1971). From Harris and Moran 
(1987), we also see that different factors are more likely to influence what Kelly et 
al. (1991) call life goals (generalised measures of work motivation), depending on 
the specific national and regional culture. Harris and Moran distinguish broadly 
between East Asian culture (equity, group, highly disciplined/motivated workforce 
and protocol, rank and status) and Western culture (wealth, individual, decline in 
work ethic and hierarchy and informality and personal competence). They believe 
this classification holds, despite differences between national cultures, across these 
two broad regions. It may be that factors such as those described here result in 
different motivational influences on job satisfaction.
To illustrate the influence of cultural factors on motivation in particular, job 
satisfaction, Hui (1990) describes a discrepancy model of job satisfaction. The 
degree of dissatisfaction with work derives from the perceived discrepancy between 
actual outcomes of the job and the job holder’s expectations. Where there are 
insufficient resources to ensure that the job is done well, as in technologically 
backward or impoverished countries, there may be low job satisfaction (e.g. in India 
and Philippines, according to DeBoer, 1978). Conversely, where workers’ 
expectations are very high and the outcomes do not match the desired and expected 
high results, job satisfaction may be low (Japan and France according to DeBoer, 
1978). Sweden has the highest proportion of the total population who were satisfied 
with their jobs (63 %), with Japan having the smallest proportion of satisfied 
workers (20 %). For these reasons, the degree of job satisfaction in Korea may be
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different from that of other countries, and subsequently may affect the motivation 
level, in particular, discretionary effort.
2.2.1 Individual Work Behaviour and National Culture
Many comparative management theorists are more likely to focus on difference in 
individual behaviours, organisational practices or human resources practices 
deriving from differences in national cultures and institutions rather than similarities. 
Central to this approach is the belief that each society is clearly different from any 
other society, and that this distinctiveness is reflected in the way organisations are 
structured and function. It is important, however, not to equate national differences 
with cultural differences. Culture is an extremely difficult concept to define, and it is 
also generally accepted that it can vary considerably within national borders and can 
be the same in different nations. There have been two different schools which seek 
to explain the impact of these national difference on individual behaviour: 
institutionalists or structuralists (societal effect approach) and culturalists (ideational 
perspective).
The first approach has been primarily concerned with the structural aspects within 
organisations, such as the division of labour and career, status and reward structures 
which are affected by national institutions, such as the educational and professional 
training system, the system of industrial relations, and the overall organisation of 
industry in a society (Maurice et al., 1980). It also emphasises continuities with the 
pre-modem world in its accounts of organisational practices, but the independent 
variable is a set of social and political arrangements rather than merely a belief 
system.
Secondly, the culturalist approach (e.g. Hofstede, 1980) focuses on the ideational 
perspective, which draws attentions to cultural difference in terms of the values, 
ideas and beliefs shared by people in a society. It posits causal links between 
traditional religious (or other fundamental) beliefs or values and modem 
organisational forms and behaviour. This school tends to focus on cultural
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dimensions that are situated at the level of the personality. Values and ideas form the 
core of a societal culture. Cultural values or norms shape national institutions which, 
in turn, reinforce and perpetuate dominant value patterns. Work organisations are 
also seen to reflect culturally-based preferences.
These two approaches, however, do not seem to be completely different in the sense 
that institutions of nations can also be products of traditional cultural values. The 
two approaches seem to complementary in explaining national differences in 
organisational practices: e.g. culturalists face a difficulty in explaining differences in 
organisational practices between Korea, Japan and Taiwan under the influence of 
the same Confucian ethical codes without the help of institutionalists, while 
institutionalists cannot explain why a humanistic management style is predominant in 
these three countries. The above discussion implies that employees’ work-related 
values, attitudes and behaviours in a certain country may be greatly influenced by 
country’s political, economic and social-cultural characteristics.
Regardless of whether or not individuals’ values and behaviours within organisations 
are products of the institutions or traditional cultural values of a nation, one can 
assume that there exist national-based distinctive values (so-called national cultures). 
This does not mean that these values are congruent with traditional cultural values 
(Buddhism or Confucianism in the case of Korea). These values can also derive from 
educational, political or economic systems. Giddens (1987) has made the point that 
individual behaviour and social structure are in principle reciprocal. However, there 
is a possibility that different social inducements and sanctions make the same type of 
individual behave in different ways. Hence, national values systems (national 
cultures) may something result from the complex interaction between traditional 
cultural values and institutions.
Some individuals may be more affected by traditional cultural values, while others 
may be more affected by the institutions surrounding them. The important point here 
is that employees’ behaviours are basically products of the situational context 
(institutions or cultures). Individual employees may always be free to choose any 
preferable values among a number of values (e.g. traditional values that elderly
34
people are more likely to embrace; and modem values that younger people are more 
likely to embrace). These features of values make it difficult for a nation to have 
homogeneous culture. However, that concept may still be meaningful in terms of the 
average value of national cultures. Clearly, this raises a number of methodological 
issues.
Ronen (1986) focuses on distinctive national value systems as an appropriate and 
potentially useful method for defining and comparing national cultures. Research 
over the past two decades has produced fairly convincing evidence that values differ 
significantly among countries, and that these differences can, in fact, be measured. 
As such, several “national value profiles” have been developed (see, for example, 
Hofstede, 1980; Ronen, 1986; Trompenaars, 1993). However, there is little 
agreement regarding any definitive value scale suitable for measuring cultural 
differences among nations. A typical example of categories of national culture is 
provided by Hofstede’s four dimensions which explain the differences in work- 
related values: (1) power distance; (2) uncertainty avoidance; (3) individualism 
versus collectivism; and (4) masculinity versus femininity. Hofstede (1993) is 
particularly associated with the contention that there are no such things as universal 
management theories or management practices. He argues that the validity of many 
management theories (including motivation theories) stops at management borders. 
He argues that for example, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is not universal across 
national cultures. In countries with high levels of uncertainty avoidance (such as 
Greece and Japan), as compared with lower uncertainty avoidance countries (such 
as the United States), security motivates most workers more strongly than does self- 
actualisation. More workers in high uncertainty avoidance countries consider job 
security and life-time employment to be more important than a very interesting or 
challenging job. Social needs tend to dominate the motivation of workers in 
countries (such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark) that stress the quality of life 
(Hofstede’s femininity dimension) over productivity (Hofstede’s masculinity 
dimension). Workers in more collectivist countries, such as Pakistan, also tend to 
stress social needs over the more individualistic ego and self-actualisation needs.
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It is interesting to consider whether or not these differences in national value 
systems (cultures) affect the universal principles of motivation theories. In other 
words, how do universal principles of motivation theories function in the case of 
Korean national values? Most motivation theories are based on human values, i.e. on 
what an individual regards as good or beneficial. Human values vary according to 
individuals and are affected by situational factors such as social structure 
(capitalism, socialism) and religion and this makes it possible to discuss national 
difference of values. For this reason, some authors argue that there are differences in 
value systems across cultures (e.g. Hampden-Tumer, 1997, who distinguishes 
between Western values and Eastern values). Clearly, value system vary according 
to the situation, not only across cultures but also across industries or time.
However, most Asian countries’ political systems, economic systems and even 
religions are imported from western countries, and since the world has become 
globalised, these Western systems have already affected the value systems of Asian 
countries. Besides, the rapid development of communication and transportation 
systems across countries and the increasing movement of people seem to have 
accelerated the pace of convergence in social value systems across countries. 
Luthans (1989) and Huczynski and Buchanan (1991) maintain that Korean and 
Japanese cultures have become Westernised, and that Anglo-Saxon culture has 
moved closer to Eastern culture. For example, the recent widespread labour strikes 
in South Korea, in which workers demanded their share of economic gains, were an 
indicator of such rapidly shifting attitudes and values. Therefore, in the case of 
Korea, people’s values systems have been greatly affected by Western values 
systems as well as by their own traditional value systems (e.g. the principles of 
Confucianism). The reason why the motivation mechanisms identified in this 
research function in the Korean bank branches may be that these values, which 
provide the basis for the five motivation mechanisms identified by Benkhoff, do not 
contradict traditional Korean values. They are thus relatively well supported by the 
characteristics of the Korean banking industry which consists of well educated 
employees who regard Western values as important, and also similar task structures, 
technology and management practices (e.g. reward systems) imported from 
Western countries. However, it is not clear whether these assumptions about
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motivation theories function in those Korean industries (e.g. small and medium size 
clothing industries) where employees are attached to more traditional values.
Considering this perspective, this present research examines several contemporary 
Western motivation theories to see whether they apply to the case of Korea in 
explaining employees’ discretionary effort, and may thus be considered “universal”. 
However, the term “universal” is used in different ways. The absolutist suggests that 
“invariance across both cultures and methods” (Johoda, 1981 p.42) is a requirement 
for universality; but relativists do not accept a dichotomy between universal and 
culture- specific phenomena. They argue that it seems meaningful “to consider the 
degree of invariance of data across cultural groups as a function of the similarity in 
cultural patterns or background variables between them” (Van de Vijver and 
Poortinga, 1982, p.393). This argument fits with the idea of universalism as an 
approach that tries to move towards invariant definitions of behaviour cross- 
culturally. Even though it is not clear whether most comparative management 
theorists base their ideas on absolutist or relativist viewpoints, this research accepts 
the assumption of universalists that the principles of motivation theories function 
cross-culturally. Therefore, the five motivation mechanisms are regarded as potential 
of antecedents of discretionary effort.
However, so far, research evidence does not provide clear-cut answers to cross- 
cultural issues. One possible reason is that research methodologies and conceptual 
foundations have not been sufficiently developed to permit an unambiguous 
interpretation of findings. Some caution is needed in using these authors’ results to 
interpret the behaviour of specific individuals of teams within a country. There may 
be a certain variation of values or culture across a country, but it is extremely 
difficult to categorise a country as having certain homogeneous value systems, since 
all countries exhibits substantial cultural diversity. At the methodological level, 
Hofstede’s (1984) research may be very limited because of its restricted sample. It is 
difficult to deduce a country’s managerial cultural values from the responses of a 
very few individuals (especially individuals working in the same organisation). For 
example, managerial values can vary according to industry (e.g. between the public 
sector and the private sector) and location (urban or rural).
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2.3 Group Motivation in the Korean Context
It must be noted that Benkhoff (1994) did not consider group motivation 
mechanisms, such as organisational identification and group norms, in her own 
model. Therefore, this research attempts to introduce group motivation mechanisms 
as an alternative and independent explanation of the phenomenon of employees’ 
discretionary effort. For this purpose, this research first of all investigates whether 
these group motivation mechanisms are independent from, or interrelated with, the 
five individual motivation mechanisms. In the Korean context, employees’ 
discretionary effort may be greatly affected by group motivation expressed, for 
example, in organisational identification and group norms. The concept o f group in 
Korea is one of significant motivators in the sense that employees’ work behaviour 
may be affected by (1) the degree of identification with the organisation according 
to social identity, and (2) the existence of work group norms as interpersonal 
behavioural rules. This assumption is congruent with some authors’ argument that 
some Asian countries such as Korea and Japan have relatively strong group-oriented 
societies (Hofstede; 1993 Hampden-Tumer, 1993).
One can assume that a variety of groups exist in any society (e.g. community-based 
groups, class-based groups, religion-based groups or race-based groups etc.,). Since 
different society may have different kinds of group values, group influences on 
individual behaviour may vary according to the kind of groups. For example, class- 
based groups, community- or religion- based groups do not have any strong 
influence on individual behaviour in Korea. This is because these groups, do not 
reflect individuals’ interests. However, in Korea, people highly value work 
organisations as important groups since they represent individuals’ social status and 
thus affect their social identity. Hence, a very prestigious work organisation may be 
an important vehicle for individuals to achieve their self-esteem. For these reasons, it 
may be difficult or meaningless to categorise a society into a generalised group- 
oriented society. For example, a work organisation-based group in Korea or class- 
based group in England may be a reflection of individual interests linked to the need 
for positive social identity. Since the concept of group may be meaningful when a
38
group can provide benefit for individuals, it may not be meaningful to contrast 
individualism and collectivism. There may in fact be several significant groups 
reflecting individual interests in any society. This will not necessarily be the product 
of traditional culture. It may therefore not be reasonable to categorise Korea as 
collectivist. However, since work organisations are valuable groups in Korea, the 
degree of identification with work organisations may have a significant influence on 
organisational behaviour. For these reasons, the choice of organisational 
identification can be justified as a variable explaining discretionary effort.
People tend to help those who are considered to be part of one’s in-group, e.g. co- 
members of the same social group. Cross-cultural research has shown that in 
collectivist societies, the in-group is considerably more important than in 
individualist cultures such as North America (Triandis, 1972). Members of 
collectivist societies are more likely to share personal resources with in-group 
members than are members of individualist cultures. In collectivist cultures, the 
interests of the individual are often subjugated to the needs of the in-group. It thus 
seems reasonable that greater help would be directed towards in-group members in 
collectivist societies than in individualist societies. In other words, it implies that 
there is stronger group cohesiveness in collectivist society than in individual society. 
In high cohesive groups, individuals are more likely to attach and conform to their 
group norms.
Some authors argue that some Asian countries such as Korea or Japan are 
culturally “group-oriented societies” while Western countries such as America or 
Britain are more likely to be “individualistic” (e.g. Hampden-Tumer, 1993; and 
Hoftsede, 1993). For this reason, they suggest that individual behaviour in some 
Asian countries is more likely to be influenced by group expectations than by 
individual values or motives. However, this argument does not seem to be 
convincing in the sense that work group norms which are based on group 
expectations can exist even in Western countries where “individualism” dominates.
Even though there are a lot of problems involved in to categorising Korea as 
collectivist, rather than individualist, it may be possible to say that groups to which
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people belong are important for individual motives in terms of social identity. 
Perhaps, current Korea society may be characterised as having a combination of 
traditional values and modem values: traditional values refer to an emphasis on 
group-orientation which derived from agriculture society and its need for absolute 
mutual co-operation, while modem values refer to individual achievements and 
expectations deriving from industrialisation and internationalisation. Many authors 
assume that individualism and collectivism are contrasting concepts. Is it, however, 
really impossible for individuals to have two sets of values? In many cases where 
individual values and group values are congruent, individuals values can be achieved 
by belonging to groups. One cannot simply assume that individual values should be 
victimised by group values. In particular, in work organisation, most work group 
values may involve hard working and do not therefore contradict employees’ 
individual values (values for achievement).
Apart from the argument about whether Korea is collectivist or individualist, work 
group norms may function as important motives for individuals in the sense that they 
have a direct impact on individual behaviour. This is because work group 
organisation as groups may be particularly important for individuals’ interests in 
Korea. Different countries may have different norms as interpersonal rule, and 
different degrees of conformity to these norms which indicate the extent of 
importance or values of norms. In Korea, unwritten interpersonal rules (norms) have 
a considerable effect on individual behaviour. For example, employees’ long 
working hours in Korea are not based on formal contractual or rules, but on implicit 
contract or interpersonal behavioural rules among group members. In some sense, 
Korean society seems to be dominated by unwritten rules (norms) rather than formal 
contract rules or laws. This phenomenon is reflected in work organisations in the 
sense that many work behaviours are affected by norms.
The reason for this is that many social, political, economic and organisational 
activities are based on social networks, which may make formal rules less influential. 
Consideration of these social network is greatly regarded as important for formal 
political, economic or business activities. In work organisations, individual work 
behaviour or much decision-making is affected by social networks (e.g. between
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superior and member or between members). Such aspects of Korean society tend to 
strengthen the conformity of work group norms. Conformity to group norms, 
particularly in Korea, may not be attributed to exact calculation o f short-term 
rewards like promotion or pay, but to making social networks with long- term 
relationships or rewards. For these reasons, the choice of work group norms in 
explaining discretionary efforts in Korea is justified.
Discretionary effort in the work context can vary from country to country in terms 
of its precise content and degree and causes. In the German context, discretionary 
effort (in terms of extra work effort) was explained by Benkhoff (1994) as the 
results of the five motivation mechanisms, deriving from employee’s various 
individual values, attitudes and cognition towards work or the organisation. In the 
Korean context, it has been assumed that discretionary effort also can result from 
the same five motivation mechanisms because these values are more likely to be 
universal across cultures. Additionally, this discretionary effort may be the result o f 
group motivation, which is one of the strongest motivators in the Korean society.
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Chapter 3 Antecedents of Discretionary Effort
This chapter aims to (1) investigate the reasons why employees exert discretionary 
effort by reviewing literature; and (2) attempts to justify overall rationale for choice 
of particular variables for this present research in terms of antecedent of 
discretionary effort.
3.1 A Theory-based Approach
Discretionary effort may not be governed by the same motivational dynamics that sustain 
in-role. Since these behaviours are inherent in the effective functioning of any form of 
organisation, it is very important to elaborate upon the motivational basis.
Many authors have attempted to find out the reasons why employees exert discretionary 
effort. Benkhoff (1994) has attempted to explain extra work effort (one of aspects of 
discretionary effort) in terms of motivation theories: in particular non-calculative 
motivation theories which seem to focus on non-situation-based cognitive approach, 
regarding extra effort as an equivalent concept to be work commitment. She argues that 
most of the variables frequently used in research on antecedents do not represent a 
motivating force themselves, and many variables may work as proxies for motivational 
mechanisms (e.g. age, tenure). The greater the number of proxies that work for one 
motivational mechanism the more their coefficients or weights get diluted by other 
related factors represented by the proxies; the fewer there are, the stronger their effects 
will appear.
This argument is convincing since a theory-based approach which is based on 
fundamental motives helps to eliminate omnibus variables in explaining human 
behaviour. Using a theoretical basis would prevent extreme fluctuations in the 
coefficients of variables across studies, caused by unknown implications hidden behind 
variables and by the different situational effects associated with them, and hence make it 
easier to collect robust results for further research. Therefore, it may be a good idea to
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link specific motivation theories (e.g. need theories, social identity theory) and 
discretionary effort rather than using “omnibus” variables.
BenkhofPs rationale for the choice of particular variables as antecedents which is based 
on a theory-based approach, has an obvious advantage in avoiding the use of “omnibus” 
variables. However, the five motivation theories she identifies may not be all theory- 
based e.g. behavioural commitment, work disposition and intrinsic motivation. These 
variables can also be seen as proxies of motivation mechanisms. For example, 
behavioural commitment can be a proxy of the need for esteem, and intrinsic motivation 
can be the proxy of the need for achievement. Many variables which are frequently used 
in work psychology may be proxies of motivation theories or other motivational 
variables. For example, overall job satisfaction can be a proxy of high salary or high 
social identity as a prestigious group member. Commitment, job involvement, overall job 
satisfaction as independent motivational variables have something in common in the 
sense that employees may be proxies of social exchange relationships. Accordingly, these 
may not be much point in seeing direct links between commitment, overall job 
satisfaction, job involvement and work-related behaviour unless these mechanisms are 
shown to have independent explanatory power.
This proxy issue raises two important questions: (1) Can these motivational 
variables representing proxies of motivation theories be treated as having 
independent explanatory power? Even among motivation theories which exist in a 
number of forms, one theory can function as the proxy of another. This is because 
the various theories involve different levels of analysis and thus deal with different 
stages of the motivation process (e.g. expectancy theory can be a proxy of social 
exchange theory in that it can be explained within a framework of social exchange 
theory). It is crucial point to discuss the inter-relationships between theories in terms 
of whether they overlap or are independent. This issue will be discussed in Charter 
4. (2) Is it useful to explain any motivational phenomenon (e.g. discretionary 
effort) in terms of fundamental motives which are not proxies (e.g. human needs, 
emotion, values or goals).
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It is obvious that it is very useful to examine any phenomenon taking place in work 
organisation in terms of human fundamental motives such as values or needs. Besides, 
although it is not possible to avoid proxy between motivation mechanisms, it may be 
meaningful to link these motivation mechanisms and any organisational phenomenon if 
one can be sure that these mechanisms have independent explanatory power. For these 
reasons, even if the motivation theories that Benkhoff identified can be proxies of each 
other, it is assumed that these motivation mechanisms have their own independent 
explanatory power. This is one of the purposes of this research: to investigate similarities 
and differences between the motivation mechanisms which are identified.
3.2 Less-Instrumental Motivation Mechanisms
The concept of discretionary effort used here focuses on specific behavioural patterns 
which may be seen as, “effort that exceeds the level required to maintain the job, apart 
from calculation” (Benkhoff, 1994). This definition emphasises non-calculative (non­
instrumental) action towards the organisation. However, the concept of “calculation”, 
even in Benkhoff s definition, is rather unclear in the sense that there are no precise 
criteria for non-calculation. There are two possible way to interpret this. First, this 
argument seems to be in line with the notion of non-situational cognitive motivation 
sources which stress internal cues of motivation (e.g. needs, emotion and attitudes). In 
other words, this implies that employees may exert discretionary effort based on their 
needs or work dispositions or satisfaction without cognitive calculation. For this reason, 
Benkhoff excludes the expectancy theory, which is strongly based on cognition, in her 
model. However, this interpretation is problematic in that job satisfaction is not totally 
based on affect, but also on situational cognition which involves exchange relationship. 
Even though this approach is useful in understanding discretionary effort in the work 
context, it is limited since discretionary effort can also be affected by other cognitive 
motivational sources.
The second approach interprets “non-calculation” in terms of being non-instrumental in 
relation to direct and explicit rewards or formal sanctions. The reason is that it is almost 
impossible for a person to recognise whether or not human behaviour is based on
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calculation. This is related to the limitations of content theories o f motivation. It is almost 
impossible to test whether or not a person has particular needs or emotional states, 
except through inferring their behaviour. Furthermore, there may be no human behaviour 
without calculation.
Much human behaviour as suggested in social cognitive theory (Wood and Bandura, 
1989), involves situational cognitive motivation as well as internal motivation sources. 
As motivation theorists argue, since it is limiting to explain human behaviour only in 
terms of internal dispositions, this research is based on a social cognitive approach which 
stress reciprocal determinism, behaviour, cognitive, and other personal factors and 
environmental events operating as interacting determinants that influence each other bi- 
directionally. In the work context, many behaviours may involve less-situation cognitive 
motives, especially formal rewards system or sanctions by formal rules.
The definition of discretionary effort adopted in this research implies specific effort which 
is voluntary and self-reinforced rather than being driven by the formal rewards systems 
based on contractual responsibility, and thus it focuses on behaviours which are less 
instrumental to rewards. However, it excludes a thorough going basis of contractual 
exchange (e.g. economic exchange) in which every desired form of contribution is 
specified, weighted, rigorously measured, and systematically rewarded by formal 
systems.
In line with the concept of discretionary effort identified above, this research adopts 
relatively less instrumental motivation mechanisms for explanatory purposes. If one 
wants to explain everyday work behaviour, which to a large degree consists of impulsive 
and habitual action, one needs to explore less-calculative motivation theories. 
Mechanisms can thus be identified which account for such effort. These mechanisms may 
also explain patterns of behaviour which are difficult to justify in terms of expectancy 
theory, such as sustained effort over time when circumstances and incentives change 
(e.g. while the supervisor is absent). These are as follows: (1) need theories (need for 
achievement and need for esteem; (2) positive work disposition; (3) intrinsic motivation; 
(4) behavioural commitment; (5) social exchange theory; (6) group motivation 
(organisational identification; and group norms). The theoretical framework for this 
present research in choosing particular variables of antecedents o f discretionary effort is
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based on (1) BenkhofFs (1994) work which tested discretionary effort in terms of the 
first five motivation mechanisms in the German context, and (2) the results of in-depth 
interviews with bank employees and managers in which the concept of the group 
emerges as a strong motivator in Korean bank branches (This issue was discussed in 
detail Chapter 2).
Justification for selecting some variables (positive work disposition, social exchange 
theory) is supported by much of the research into organisational citizenship behaviour 
(OCB) as discretionary effort which tested its potential antecedents. Two approaches are 
commonly used to identify the motivational origins of OCB: first, OCB is seen in part as 
a function of stable dispositions and traits; secondly, that OCB is seen to depend on the 
individual’s cognitive satisfaction. Hogan (1983) argues that personality factors such as 
service orientation signify the disposition to be helpful, thoughtful and co-operative. 
Some authors (e.g. Organ, 1988) suggest that the psychological state which may be 
characteristic of some persons (such as a pleasant mood state, or positive affect) 
enhances the likelihood that a person will render help to a distressed person, or 
cooperate with someone requesting such cooperation. Research evidence shows that 
these mood states are seen as a stable dimension of personality (e.g. Watson and Clark, 
1984). In this research, disposition is operationalised in terms of positive work 
disposition, such as the Protestant work ethic or work as a central life interest, because 
discretionary effort is more likely to imply active work extra effort.
Other authors (e.g. Barnard, 1938) argue that “willingness to cooperate... is the 
expression of the net satisfactions or dissatisfactions experienced or anticipated...”. In 
this present research, social exchange theory has been operationalised in terms of job 
satisfaction. In literature, job satisfaction has frequently been explained in terms of two 
important elements: disposition aspect and cognition aspect: The first viewpoint is that 
job satisfaction is regarded as partly reflecting disposition or trait factors (Staw, Bell, and 
Clausen, 1986); the second cognitive approach argues that job satisfaction responses ire 
the result of a person’s cognitive evaluations of job components such as pay, promotion, 
work itself (Brief and Roberson, 1987). Hence, OCB is a function of cognitive versus 
disposition control. For example, Organ and Konovsky (1988) found that OCB relaes 
more closely to cognitive appraisal than it does to typical mood state (affect). It is argued
46
that these close relationships between satisfaction and OCB are due to a sizable 
“fairness” component in responses to satisfaction scales (Organ, 1990). Conceptions of 
fairness represent cognitive evaluations. Fairness of job conditions treatment implies 
comparisons of what those outcomes are with respect to some standard or frame of 
reference. Smith, Kendall and Hulin (1969) remarked that “satisfaction can be regarded 
as an evaluation of equitableness of treatment or conditions” (p. 166). To summarise: a 
robust correlation between job satisfaction and OCB reflects the dominant cognitive 
component in measures of job satisfaction; and job cognition relate to OCB to the extent 
that they reflect fairness judgements.
Many authors (e.g. Bateman and Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ and Near, 1983; Puffer, 
1987) have tested these relationships. Interestingly, this correlation coefficients are 
higher than those usually found between satisfaction and measures of “performance” or 
“productivity” (Vroom, 1964; Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985). The key understanding 
lies in recognising different causal models of OCB and individual productivity. Individual 
productivity does not follow directly from effort. Rather, the relationship between effort 
and productivity is moderated by other important factors, such as ability, technical skill 
and availability of the appropriate resources (Porter and Lawler, 1968). However, OCB 
pertains to gestures and actions that are more likely to be a direct function of effort.
There are other variables which are frequently used to explain discretionary behaviour: 
perceived organisational support, procedural justice (see Chapter 4) and organisational 
commitment (Chapter 5).
Perceived organisational support refers to employees’ global beliefs concerning the 
extent to which the organisation values their contributions and cares about their well­
being. Beliefs in organisational support may be fostered by employees’ ascription of 
human dispositional traits to the organisation itself. Levinson (1965) notes that 
employees tend to view actions by agents of the organisation as actions of the 
organisation itself. The personification of the organisation, Levinson suggests, is 
supported by the following factors: (a) the organisation has a legal, moral, and financial 
responsibility for the actions of its agents; (b) organisational traditions, policies and 
norms provide continuity and prescribe role behaviours; and (c) the organisation,
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through its agents, exerts power over individual employees. The personification of the 
organisation is assumed to represent an employee’s essential views concerning all the 
other members who control that individual’s material and symbolic resources.
In order to determine the personalised organisation’s readiness to reward increased work 
effort and to meet the needs for praise and approval, employees develop global beliefs 
concerning the extent to which the organisation values their contributions and cares 
about their well-being. Such perceived organisational support may depend on the same 
attributional processes that people use generally to infer the obligation felt by others 
towards social relationships. Perceived organisational support tends to be influenced by 
the frequency, extremity and judged sincerity of statements of praise and approval (Blau, 
1964). Other rewards such as pay, position, job enrichment, and influence over 
organisational policies will affect perceived support (e.g. Brinberg and Castell, 1982).
Perceived organisational support will be influenced by various aspects of an employee’s 
treatment by the organisation and will, in turn, influence the employee’s interpretation of 
organisational motives underlying that treatment. This implies that there will be general 
agreement about the degree of support that the employee can expect of the organisation 
in a wide variety of situations. This includes the organisation’s likely reaction to the 
employee’s future well-being and it’s desire to pay a fair salary and make the employee’s 
job meaningful and interesting. Perceived organisational support raises an employee’s 
expectancy that the organisation will reward greater effort toward meeting organisational 
goals. To the extent that the perceived support also meets the employee’s needs for 
praise and approval, the employee may incorporate organisational membership into self- 
identity and thereby develop a positive sets of emotions or attitudes towards the 
organisation (see, for example, Buchanan, 1974; Stees, 1977; Cook and Wall, 1980).
In relations to work effort, Eisenberger et al., (1986), using a social exchange 
framework, argue that employees who perceive a high level of organisational support are 
more likely to feel an obligation to “repay” the organisation in terms of work-related 
behaviour. For the majority of organisations that stress diligence in conventional job 
activities, increasing one’s work effort may provide approved and publicly identifiable 
ways of reciprocating perceived organisational support. The employee’s strong
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involvement in the organisation has been noted to include performance that goes beyond 
the formal /contractual duty (Mowday et al.,1982), including behaviours for which “the 
individual receives no immediate reward and which benefit the larger organisation 
(O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986, p.495 Bateman and Organ, 1983; and Puffer, 1987). 
Despite the fact that perceived organisational support has a strong theoretical grounding 
as an antecedent of discretionary effort, it is not incorporated as an independent variable 
in this present research. This is because some variables which are already identified in this 
research (such as intrinsic motivation and social exchange theory) reflect the notion of 
perceived organisational support. That is, the enjoyment of work itself (intrinsic 
motivation) or the satisfaction with various working conditions (social exchange theory) 
may be an expression of an essential part of perceived organisational support.
One might suspect that linking discretionary effort to conceptions of fairness and 
sanction resulting from norms violation might lead to an internal contradiction in the 
framework we have constructed. The definition of discretionary effort refers to non­
compensated, non-instrumental and voluntary contributions to organisational 
effectiveness. With regards to social exchange theory, the extent of a member’s 
discretionary effort depends on the person’s sense of fairness in the organisation, 
thereby, apparently, implying that non-cognition of discretionary effort in job conditions 
causes the individual subsequently to reduce or withhold discretionary effort. This 
apparent contradiction becomes clear when one distinguishes between relationships 
based on social and economic exchange in the manner described by Blau (1964). 
Economic exchange has a contractual character: the respective parties (e.g. the individual 
participant and the organisation) agree in terms of a specific exchange over an articulated 
domain of behaviour and a precise time span; the respective obligations are finite and do 
not depend on trust, since the terms are enforced by third parties. Social exchange 
theory, by contrast, involves difiuse, ill-defined obligations in terms of the value, and 
timing of the benefits rendered and received by the parties.
Either type of exchange can be described in terms of fairness, but according to different 
ways of reckoning fairness. Economic exchange is unfair to the extent that one or the 
other party uses coercion or exploitive means (e.g. monopoly power) to dictate 
unreasonable terms of the contract or to the extent that one of the parties violates the
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terms of the contract, and manager to do so without some form of sanction. Fairness of 
social exchange, however, rests on a more global, intuitive assessment.
To the extent that an individual’s work attendance exceeds the minimal contractual level, 
without guaranteeing any extra benefits for doing so, we would regard the person’s 
contributions in this instance as discretionary effort. Clearly, this form of “going beyond 
what is required,” when added to a variety of other “extra” contribution over a period of 
time, may well lead to some form of additional outcomes, whether in the form of a 
higher base salary, special privileges, greater informal status in the group, or promotion 
to a higher official grade. The point, however, is that the individual could not have 
known, either at the time of providing the contribution or at the time of receiving some 
incremental benefit, whether there was any specific connection between the two events. 
In the case that the organisation offers an incentive (e.g. tickets for a restaurant) for 
attendance beyond the minimum required level, the incremental contribution in the form 
of attendance now has a contractual or economic exchange basis. This particular 
contributions would thus not be considered as discretionary effort.
With regards to group norms, it seems that the concept of norms as normative control 
mechanisms is not compatible with discretionary effort. In other words, this implies that 
employees may exert discretionary effort because of rewards or sanctions resulting from 
conforming to or violating norms. However, since norms are unwritten, informal 
interpersonal rules accepted by members and are based on a normative psychological 
contract, they are not related to formal rewards or formal sanctions (but they may have 
informal long-terms rewards or sanctions) even though they comply or violate their 
norms. Since conforming to norms is not part of the employment contract, employees 
can easily ignore the norms when they feel uncomfortable. Once employees recognise 
certain informal rules as norms which are beneficial for their group, they tend to enter a 
psychological contract and subsequently conform to norms. Normative contracts occur 
when members (e.g. colleagues or leaders) agree on the terms of their individual 
psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1995). Schneider’s (1987) model of Selection- 
Adaptation-Attribution demonstrates how people in organisations become similar in their 
beliefs, values and behaviour by conforming to such norms. When new members are 
recruited, they often seek a person who fits the norms (Selection). People who do not fit
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that mould initially can be socialised to change their behaviour through training and 
performance management (Adaptation). Those failing to assimilate over time will leave 
because they are uncomfortable behaving differently or because the organisation forces 
them to (Attribution). This similarity creates a shared view of the group and people’s 
roles in it. For these reasons, the existence of discretionary effort-promoting norms may 
have a significant impact on individual discretionary effort (These issues will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5).
3.3 Strongly Instrumental Motivation theories
There are many different kinds of motivation theories to explain general human 
behaviour (e.g. instinct theory: James, 1890, Freud, 1915; drive and reinforcement 
theories: Woodworth, 1918, Cannon, 1939, Skinner, 1953; cognitive theories: 
Lewin, 1938, Tolman, 1959 ). In particular, some of them have been applied to 
industrial organisations and are frequently used to explain various organisational 
behaviours, (expectancy theory: Mitchell, 1974; equity theory: Greenberg, 1986; 
intrinsic motivation: Deci and Ryan, 1980; job characteristics theory: Hackman and 
Oldman, 1976). Some motivation theories, such as expectancy theory and goal- 
setting theory, which are the most frequently used in explaining individual behaviour 
are not incorporated in this present research. The reason for this is that these 
theories, in some circumstances, may imply that (1) individual efforts are strongly 
linked to the expectation of rewards and this is not part of the concept of 
discretionary effort; (2) at the practical level, these theories do not seem to apply to 
the Korean context; and (3) some elements of these theories are already 
incorporated in this research model. These all issues will be discussed in detail as 
below.
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3.3.1 Expectancy Theory
According to expectancy theory (Vroom,1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968), 
individuals evaluate the possible outcomes of different behaviours or levels of effort 
and then act to maximise their own overall utility. The theory assumes that 
individuals are rational/economic agents who conserve energy and regard effort as a 
form of cost. This implies that cognitive processes are major determinants of 
behaviour and that individuals are able to calculate the costs and benefits of potential 
courses of action. The results of those calculations are supposedly used to choose 
among alternatives. In this sense, the theory assumes that individual behaviour in 
most circumstances, is strongly instrumental to rewards and thus may be controlled 
by formal rewards system.
The assumed calculation of expectancy theory is similar to the assumption of social 
exchange theory, which is part of the concept of discretionary effort, in the sense 
that both theories are based on cognitive processes. Hence, expectancy theory may 
be explained in terms of social exchange theory since employees may put in 
discretionary effort because of the expected satisfaction with exchange relationships 
based on calculated rewards in the future. Social exchange theory does not confine 
the exchange relationship to the present, but it accommodates the past and future 
(e.g. the degree of satisfaction of an exchange relationship in past can affect the level 
of individual effort). However, the difference between the two theories may be as 
follows: expectancy theory seems more likely to focus on economic /material 
rewards which are strongly instrumental, rather than social exchange relationships 
which are based on long-term trusts.
There are some problems with the expectancy theory, as research suggests. This 
approach applies only to certain individuals (Landy and Becker, 1987). Its strength 
lies in predicting discrete choices, and it works best where individuals have a period 
for reflection on the optimal outcome (Wanous, Keon and Latack, 1983). However, 
in the work situation employees rarely have si fficient time to do this and are 
normally faced with too many outcomes to be able to conduct comparative
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evaluations. Furthermore, the theory may not apply in the Korean bank branches where 
there are no clear links between performance and subsequent rewards. The forms of 
performance of employees in the banking sector are various and rather ambiguous and, 
furthermore, rewards are independent of the performance of employees. For example, 
one of the most important rewards systems involving financial rewards such as pay and 
promotion, based on an employees’ performance. Financial rewards mainly depend on 
tenure or position, while the promotion of ordinary employees relies on the results of 
special examinations for promotion.
Another problem is that expectancy theory is not useful in explaining variations in 
effort between individual workplaces. Managers find it difficult to stipulate in detail 
the kind and level of performance that is to be rewarded. Nor is it easy to judge the 
size and combination of rewards that make the extra effort worthwhile in the eyes of 
employees. A further problem with the application of incentive systems as suggested 
by expectancy theory is how to monitor and control performance in order to 
discourage workers from choosing the apparently favourable option of shirking. It 
is difficult for the theory to work in actual work context because performance 
outcomes are various and links with rewards are unclear.
3.3.2 Goal Setting Theory
Goal setting theory is one of the most frequently used motivation theories in 
explaining individual behaviour. It is based on a cognitive approach, like expectancy 
theory, and thus emphasises the role of intentions or deliberate determinations to act 
as major causes of motivated behaviour. Many research investigations (see Locke 
and Saari, 1981) show that specific and challenging goals (assigned goals rather than 
participative goals) lead to higher performance than easy goals, “do your best” goals 
or no goals. Goals affect performance by directing attention, mobilising effort, 
increasing persistence, and motivating strategy development. Goal setting is most 
likely to improve task performance when the goals are specific and sufficiently 
challenging, when feedback is provided to show progress in relation to the goal,
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when financial rewards are given for goal attainment, and when assigned goals are 
accepted by the individual.
A goal is what an individual is trying to accomplish; it is the object or aim of an 
action. The concept is similar in meaning to the concepts of purpose and intent 
(Locke, 1969). Other frequently used concepts that are also similar in meaning to 
that of goal include performance standard (a measuring rod for evaluation 
performance), quota (a minimum amount of work or production), deadline (a time 
limit for completing a task), and budget (a spending goal or limit). The setting of 
these goals by managers seems to be related to the “stimulus control” of employees. 
Hence, the idea of assigning employees a specific amount of work to be 
accomplished is not new. The notion of goal setting has basically similar attributes to 
ideas of scientific management (along with those of time and motion study and 
incentive pay) founded by Taylor (1911), and management by objectives (MBO) in 
the sense that these are all based on traditional management control mechanisms. 
However, goal setting does not necessarily have to be part of a wider management 
system to motivate performance effectively. It can be used as a technique in its own 
right.
Although goal setting may provide the immediate regulators of individual behaviour, 
it does not seem to be helpful for explaining discretionary effort, which refers to 
employees’ involvement or less calculative and spontaneous behaviours rather than 
those driven by formal control systems. According to the theory, people with 
challenging or difficult goals work harder than those who have easy goals. This 
mechanisms can be explained by two aspects: Firstly, because of the enjoyment 
resulting from the achievement of difficult goals or tasks (intrinsic motivation), goals 
setting (self-set goals) can be a force for discretionary effort. Goals help to build 
people’s beliefs in their capacities. Without standards against which to measure their 
performances, people have little basis either for judging how they are doing or for 
evaluating their capacities. Sub-goals serve this purpose well (Bandura and Schunk, 
1981). Success in attaining challenging sub-goals increases people’s beliefs in their 
own capacities. Accomplishing challenging goals also creates self-satisfaction and 
increases one’s interest in what one is doing. From this perspective, the theory partly
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relies on intrinsic motivation, achievement needs and group norms which are already 
incorporated in this present research model. People with a need for achievement are 
motivated to work harder if their assigned goals are difficult or challenging. Also, 
challenging and difficult tasks or goals make people become intrinsically motivated. 
Goals assigned by managers can also be work group norms, which are standards of 
acceptable behaviour defined by a work group.
Secondly, goal setting can be a pulling force for high efforts because of the 
expectation of rewards following goals attainment (exercised by formal control 
mechanisms). Setting goals is more likely to involve management control 
mechanisms which are based on formal rewards. It is important to note that most 
research on incentives and goals has focused exclusively on prescribed role 
behaviours such as performance, specifically in terms of objective numbers of units 
produced (Jenkins, 1986; Larson and Callahan, 1990; Mento et al., 1987). Hence, 
goal setting may not be a contributory factor to discretionary effort (e.g. Patrick et 
al., 1993) show, that goals are negatively related to extra role behaviour among 
individuals committed to the goals). On a practical level, the theory can only be 
tested where the appropriate management techniques are applied. Korean bank 
branches do not use goal setting techniques which assign individual goals. For these 
reasons, this research does not include goal setting theory in the model.
In conclusion, cognitive motivation theories (e.g. expectancy theory and goal setting 
theory) stress the importance of clear and specific goals and of performance-reward 
expectancies for individual motivation. They are useful in situations where goals can 
be clarified, where there is an abundance of rewards, and where those rewards can 
be closely linked to performance. This is simply not the case in many situations, for 
instance in the public sector (Perry and Porter, 1982) or in cultures where rewards 
are less abundant (Hofstede, 1980) and where there is less tendency or cultural 
sanction to differentiate among individuals on the basis of their work performance. 
Furthermore, humans are not only goal-oriented but also self-expressive. This 
means that behaviour is not always goal-oriented, instrumental but is also 
expressive of feelings, attitudes and self-concepts. People are motivated to enhance 
their self-esteem or self-worth, increase their sense of self-consistency, consolidate
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their social identity, and reduce environmental uncertainty by conforming 
unconsciously to their group norms, and this provides a basis for less-instrumental 
motivation theories. Such theories are likely to be particularly useful for the 
explanation of behaviour in weak situations, i.e. where: (1) goals are not clearly 
specified (in many cases they cannot be clearly specified due to the nature of the task 
or the organisation); (2) the means for achieving goals are not clear or not 
established; (3) external rewards are not clearly related to performance or goal 
attainment due to difficulties in performance evaluation, or to cultural and 
organisational restrictions imposed on the rewards distribution system.
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Explanation I: BenkhofFs Individual 
Motivation Mechanisms
The purpose of this chapter is (1) to offer a theoretical background to an 
understanding of why the individual motivation mechanisms identified by Benkhoff 
(1994) are linked to discretionary effort; (2) to investigate the similarities and 
differences between these motivation mechanisms in order to determine whether they are 
actually independent mechanisms; and (3) to introduce the research hypotheses which 
are to be tested. In particular, the second purpose is important because these 
motivation mechanisms are theoretically interrelated and overlap in some respects. 
The motivation mechanisms included in Benkhoff’s (1994) research are as follows:
(a) need theories: the need for achievement and the need for self-esteem; (b) 
disposition; (c) intrinsic motivation; (d) behavioural commitment; and (e) social 
exchange theory. These mechanisms are included in this present research and are 
considered below in detail.
4.1. Need Theories
One of the fundamental motivational concepts is that of needs. Locke and Henne (1986) 
define needs as “a requirement of the organism’s survival and well-being” (P.l). There 
are two kinds of needs: physical and psychological needs. The former refer to the 
requirements for the body to function properly (e.g. food and temperature), and the latter 
refer to the requirements which ensure that the consciousness is healthy and functioning 
properly (e.g. self-esteem, sense of competence). When these psychological needs are 
not satisfied, individuals may experience pain, depression, anxiety or guilt, and are 
consequently motivated to act in order to satisfy these needs.
Need theories assume that needs are common to every one as innate requirements of 
survival and well-being. Needs are distinguishable from the values, which refer to what a 
person wants, considers good and acts to get. Value is that which one acts to gain and 
/or keep (Rand, 1964, p. 15). Values is not innate,, but are acquired through thought and
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experience and are what guide a person’s specific choices and actions. However, in 
particular, psychological needs may be latent and vary in strength among individuals. For 
example, according to the learned needs theory developed by McClelland and his 
associates (1961), needs are learned and acquired by the kinds of events people 
experience in their culture (e.g. the need for achievement, the need for affiliation, and the 
need for power). This makes the concept almost synonymous with the values which 
individuals possess to varying degrees. Ignoring these conceptual disputes, the needs that 
are considered and analysed in this research are strictly speaking values. The “need” label 
is nevertheless adopted here in line with common use in the literature.
Several theorists (e.g. Murray, 1954; Alderfer, 1969) have proposed various need 
categories. Murray writes about affiliation and achievement needs, and Alderfer about 
relatedness and growth needs. Amongst the various need categories defined and 
examined in research, the particular needs that are relevant in understanding work 
commitment are “need for achievement”, “need for affiliation” and “need for esteem” 
(Benkhoff, 1994, p. 107). The first two concepts are taken from Murray’s categories and 
are investigated further by McClelland and his associates (1961). The third concept, 
“need for esteem”, is emphasised by Maslow (1954) and subsumed under growth needs 
by Alderfer (1969). These needs are described as follows:
The need for achievement is supposed to be the driving force in individuals who (1) 
have a strong desire to assume personal responsibility for performing a task or finding a 
solution to a problem; (2) tend to work alone rather than with others; (3) tend to set 
moderately difficult goals and take calculated risks; and (4) have a strong desire for 
performance feedback. Individuals seeking to satisfy this need may exert discretionary 
effort because their work challenges their knowledge and abilities and promises to 
provide learning opportunities, regardless of the financial rewards anticipated or 
awarded.
The need for affiliation is defined as a desire to establish and maintain friendly and 
warm relations with other individuals (McClelland et al, 1970). Individuals with a high 
need for affiliation have the following characteristics: (1) a strong desire for approval and
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reassurance from others, and (2) a sincere interest in the feelings of others. Individuals 
with a high need for affiliation seek opportunities at work to satisfy this need; hence they 
prefer to work with others rather than to work alone and tend to perform better in 
situations in which personal support and approval are tied to performance. Since 
Benkhoff s research (1994) did not reveal a significant link between the need for 
affiliation and discretionary effort, the need for affiliation is excluded in this research.
The need for self-esteem:
The need for self-esteem has been approached and conceptualised in various ways: 
e.g. ego strength, (Hartmann, 1950); effectance or competence (White, 1959); 
removal of all standards of judgement when evaluating the self (Ellis and 
Whitelyey,1979); and genuine self-esteem deriving from an integrated sense of self 
based on the fulfillment of other need (see Deci and Ryan, 1994). Since it is well 
recognised that self-esteem is a global self-evaluation, this research follows 
Coopersmith’s (1967) definition: “the evaluation which the individual makes and 
customarily maintains with regard to the self: It expresses an attitude of approval or 
disapproval, and indicates the extent to which the individual believes the self to be 
capable, significant, successful and worthy” (p.4-5) . It includes the desire for self- 
respect, self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. It can be focused either internally 
or externally (Cherrington, 1989). When focused internally, esteem needs include 
the desire for achievement, adequacy, confidence, independence and freedom. 
When focused externally, the need for esteem consists of a desire for reputation or 
prestige, status, recognition and dignity.
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In work contexts, the needs for self-esteem may have significant impacts on 
employees’ attitudes or behaviour. Many correlates (which may be causes and/or 
consequence) of self-esteem have been identified in the workplace (e.g. decision 
making, job search, goal choice, job characteristics, job satisfaction, and 
performance; see Locke et al. 1996). Thus, the need for self-esteem as a basic 
motivational concept may have a moderate role in liking variables (e.g. satisfaction, 
behavioural commitment, identification and discretionary effort).
Not much research has been done on links between the need for esteem and 
discretionary effort. Martin and Murberger’s (1994) study shows the effect of self­
esteem and assigned goals on both actual and perceived performance. They found 
significant differences in how high and low self-esteeming individuals perceived their 
performance. The high self-esteeming individuals perceived their performance to be 
better than did the low self-esteeming individuals, and the actual performance of 
those high in self-esteem was indeed better than that of those in low self-esteems.
Theoretically, the needs for self-esteem may affect discretionary effort as a 
consequence of the generalised efficacy dimension of self-esteem. In the long term, 
people who think most effectively are most likely to acquire the needed skills (within 
the limits of their ability) and also come to expect that they can cope with new 
situations. Thus, self-esteem (especially the efficacy part) could show some 
correlation with extra effort across many tasks. But in any single task, task-specific 
self efficacy and goals should show the stronger, direct relationship to high efforts 
(Bandura, 1986; Locke and Latham, 1990) Furthermore, people with a high need 
for self esteem may be more likely to show discretionary behaviour that those with 
low need for self-esteem because the former will view a discretionary behaviour as a 
deserved opportunity which he/she can do and benefit from, whereas the latter is 
more likely to view it as an undeserved opportunities.
Though need theories may provide some insight into why employees exert discretionary 
effort, needs as a universal motivation force seem largely to have lost their appeal for 
organisational psychologists (Locke and Henne, 1986). The most serious concerns with 
regard to need theories are as follows. Since the models of need theories are ambiguous,
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there are problems with testing them. Needs are inferred from behaviour, and there is 
therefore no way of establishing whether needs exist at all. This problem is overcome 
here because needs are treated as values and are taken to measure individual differences.
4.2 Work Disposition
In explaining work motivation, another important concept is “disposition”, which is 
linked to a personality-based approach. The concept of disposition as an individual 
characteristic is based on the observation that sets of attitudes within an individual often 
show some consistency, and that certain attitudes tend to be stable over time and across 
situations. Applied to the work context, this implies that individuals may have a positive 
or negative disposition to their work resulting from long-term socialisation. This 
approach emphasises the impact of non-cognitive individual differences on work 
behaviour. During the 1970s this perspective was relatively unpopular in the 
organisational psychology literature. Criticisms of dispositional approaches during the 
situation-versus-trait debates of the 1970s (e.g. Mischel, 1973) and the poor evidence of 
many personality measures in predicting performance (e.g. Guion and Gottier, 1965) 
contributed strongly to this trend.
During the past few years, however, conceptual and empirical advances in psychology 
and in theories of performance have prompted renewed interest in disposition 
determinants of work behaviour. Initial investigations of personality in the organisational 
context have focused on the study of dispositional determinants of job satisfaction (e.g. 
Levin and Stokes, 1989; Staw, Bell and Clausen, 1986). Also, researchers have begun to 
explore the association between personality dimensions and different dimensions of 
performance (e.g. Barrick and Mount, 1991; see Kanfer, 1992).
As potential antecedents of discretionary effort, Benkhoff (1994) mentions two kinds of 
work disposition: (1) “work as a central life interest”, and (2) “the Protestant work 
ethic”. Work as a central life interest (Dubin, 1955) identifies individuals who regard 
their job as their preferred setting for carrying out a wide range of activities. The 
Protestant work ethic is often used to imply high work effort, irrespective of the
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enjoyment or satisfaction deriving from the content of the work itself or working 
conditions.
One may assume that employees who have a positive attitude towards work will be more 
likely to exert themselves beyond the minimum task requirements. If work disposition 
can be shown to have this effect, organisations may get committed employees, not only 
by treating them in a particular way, but also by selecting people with the relevant 
personal characteristics (Benkhoff, 1994).
4.3 Intrinsic Motivation
Intrinsic motivation has been approached and conceptualised in many ways. Two 
popular approaches described below are those based on either individual needs or affects 
and emotions. The first approach is that intrinsic motivation is explained by individuals’ 
needs, in particular the need for competence and self-determination (Deci and Ryan,
1985). The authors assume that individuals may seek the satisfaction of these two needs. 
The need for competence refers to the belief that individuals have the needs for free and 
effective interactions with the environment and the subsequent feelings of enjoyment 
that are involved with these needs. The need for self-determination refers to the fact that 
individuals like to feel free from pressures, such as rewards or contingencies.
Competence, according to White (1963), is the accumulated result of one’s interaction 
with the environment, of one’s exploration, learning and adaptation, and develops over 
time. The need for competence provides the energy for this learning. The reward for 
competence-motivated behaviour is the inherent feeling of competence that results from 
effective functioning. The motivation seems to result only when there is some continual 
stretching of one’s capacities. Deci (1975) suggested that the need for competence 
leads people to seek and conquer challenges that are optimal for their capacities.
The approach based on the need for competence has highlighted the significance of 
competence. However, many non-intrinsically motivated behaviours may be
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competence-oriented. Hence, to be truly intrinsically motivated, a person must also feel 
free from pressures such as rewards or contingencies. Since self-determination or 
freedom from control is necessary for intrinsic motivation to be operative, several 
theorists (e.g. DeCharms, 1968) have proposed that intrinsically motivated activity is 
based on the need for self-determination. Thus, it can be suggested that intrinsic 
motivation will be operative when action is experienced as autonomous, and it is unlikely 
to function under conditions of controls or reinforcement. The need for self- 
determination is closely related to the need for competence in the sense that to be self­
determining one ought to have the skills to manage various elements of one’s 
environment.
Another important perspective on intrinsic motivation is represented by theories that 
focus on affects and emotions as either initiators or concomitants of intrinsically 
motivated behavior. Affective theorists place interest, enjoyment and direct involvement 
with one’s environment at the core of their explanation of intrinsic motivation. Izard 
(1977) proposed that there are ten basic human emotions. Among these emotions, 
interest-excitement is said to be the basis of intrinsically motivated behavior. Other 
theorists (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) place greater emphasis on enjoyment. Intrinsically 
motivated activities are ones characterized by enjoyment, those for which the reward is 
the ongoing experience of enjoying the activity.
The affective approach is itself related to the need for competence in that when one 
engages in an optimally challenging activity with respect to one’s capacities there is the 
maximal possibility for task-involved enjoyment. This approach, however, is problematic 
in that many non-intrinsically motivated behaviours may be characterized by enjoyment 
and interest.
In this research, the conceptualisation of intrinsic motivation is integratively offered as 
follows: The emotion of enjoyment and excitement accompanying the experiences of 
competence and self-determination represents the rewards for intrinsically motivated 
behaviour. These rewards, however, are not properly called reinforcements, since they 
neither reduce a tissue deficit (Hull, 1943) nor are operationally separate from the 
activity itself (Skinner, 1953).
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Tasks at work that have the potential for arousing intrinsic motivation are proposed 
to be: (1) those which are neither too easy nor too difficult (i.e. there is a high 
probability that employees will gain the feeling of enhanced competence), and (2) 
those whose employees can feel free from pressures resulting from rewards and 
outside contingencies.
4.4 Behavioural Commitment
Behavioural commitment, according to Kiesler and Sakumura (1966), refers to “the 
binding of the individual to behavioural acts.” (p.349). Individuals tend to commit 
themselves to a particular course of conduct. The reason why individuals display 
behavioural commitment has been explained by the following two theories: side-bet 
theory (Becker, 1960) and attribution theory (Kiesler, 1971).
4.4.1 Side-bet Theory
Becker (1960) attempts to explain why, in some cases, individuals reject certain courses 
of action in favour of the single action that is in line with previous behaviour. He argues 
that a consistent choice is made in order to minimise losses on side-bets which would act 
as a penalty if an individual changed behaviour. “Committed lines... are sequences of 
action with penalties and costs so arranged as to guarantee their selection. The penalty 
may be formal or informal. The penalty may range from the pangs of conscience to 
criminal prosecution” (p. 12). It is reasoned that these side-bets, which are considerations 
of the long-term or perhaps indirect consequences or costs of changed behaviour, may 
serve as incentives to stabilise behaviour. Committed individuals feel they cannot behave 
in a different way, even though they would prefer to do so.
The issues on which side-bets can be made vary from responding to cultural norms and 
maintaining one’s self-image to financial considerations such as pension contributions, 
specific skills, reduced mortgage rates, lack of job alternatives or status (Benkhoff
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1994). For example, individuals may try to present themselves as being truthful, reliable 
and competent in order to gain desired esteem from others or to enhance their own 
employment opportunities. In a particular situation, then, an individual may feel inclined 
not to meet a deadline, but, considering the implications this may have for his/her 
reputation, which represents a side bet, the individual may decide to ignore his/her 
tiredness or forego a more rewarding alternative activity.
In the organisational context, there are reasons, apart from pay or working conditions, 
that may induce individuals to stay with their organisation given other alternatives. One 
reason may be behavioural commitment, which, as described above, is based on the 
tension between at least two mutually exclusive courses of action. For example, 
individuals may feel that getting a new job would be a good idea, but that in practice 
there are certain constraints. The course of action is chosen because of the unacceptable 
penalties associated with the alternative. Individuals may be unconscious of the side-bets, 
or they may be consciously calculated. Since commitment, as defined in this research 
refers solely to non-calculating motivation, only some of Becker’s examples of side-bets 
fit the concept.
According to Becker (1960), people’s preferred self-image is a side-bet that explains 
consistent behaviour. Some authors (e.g. Rizer and Trice, 1969) have attempted to test 
Becker’s side-bet theory in terms of the employee’s intention to stay in the organisation, 
but the treatment in the commitment literature of side-bet theory does not seem to do 
justice to Becker’s ideas. Becker’s theory is not only about turnover, but is also about 
consistent behaviour in general.
4.4.2 Attribution Theory
Attribution theory, as developed by Kiesler (1971), is another approach used to explain 
behavioral commitment. Kiesler views commitment as a form of consistency, suggesting 
that it is based on previous behaviour and constrains subsequent behaviour. Explicit 
behaviour is something that an individual must accept as integral to the self. The 
motivation force of commitment is presumed to be the striving force behind consistency
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(or, alternatively, the reduction of inconsistency). Furthermore, the degree of 
commitment tells us how closely the behaviours are tied to the self.
To the extent that a person is bound to some explicit and attitudinally relevant behaviour, 
he/she must accept it as integral to his/her self-view, and other attitudes and beliefs must 
be accommodated accordingly (Kiesler, 1971). This explanation of behavioural 
commitment assumes that attitudes are derived from behaviour and that individuals try to 
establish a self-image of being competent and in control by being consistent and 
committing themselves to discretionary effort. Heider (1958), Kelly (1967), and Bern 
(1965) also argue that individuals make inferences about the self through observation of 
their own behaviour.
A self-image of being competent and in control could also work as a side-bet in 
Becker’s (1960) terms. For example, people who previously worked hard continue to 
work hard for fear of losing their self-image as hard-working persons. While Becker 
assumes that consistent behaviour can be the result of behaviour or attitudes, Kiesler’s 
model is confined to the commitment that comes from a particular kind of behaviour, 
“the performance of an overt act” (Benkhoff, 1994, p. 16).
Kiesler and Sakumura list a number of conditions under which behaviour may have 
implications for future behaviour and attitudes:
“We may hypothesize, for instance, that one may increase the degree of commitment by 
increasing one or more of the following:
(1) the number of acts performed by the subject;
(2) the importance of the acts for subject;
(3) the explicitness of the act, for example, how public or otherwise unambiguous the act 
was;
(4) the degree of irrevocability of the act;
(5) the degree of volition perceived by the subject in performing the act. In turn, we 
hypothesize that the degree of volition may be increased by: an increase in the degree of 
perceived choice in performing the act; a decrease in the degree of external pressure 
exerted upon the subject to perform the act.” (Kiesler and Sakumura, 1966, p.350).
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A wedding ceremony is an obvious example where most of these factors are 
employed to work towards maximum consistency and stability.
4.5 Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory has a long tradition within the social sciences (Homans, 1961; 
Blau, 1964; Greenberg, 1986; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959) and has undergone many 
changes over the years. However, at the heart of the theory are a few simple ideas. First, 
every relationship generates rewards and costs for its participants. The balance between 
these rewards and costs is a critical factor in determining a relationship’s value. 
Secondly, the participants in most relationships are motivated to maximise their rewards 
and minimise their costs. These goals can be accomplished in several ways such as by 
increasing the rewards and/or decreasing the costs actually generated by the relationship, 
by re-evaluating rewards and costs so that the relationship seems more valuable, or by 
becoming more involved in other relationships whose value seems greater. Finally, 
people can participate in several relationships simultaneously, so the relative value of a 
given relationship depends in part on the value of any other relationships that are 
available to the participants.
Evaluation of a relationship’s value can focus on the past, the present or the future. 
One’s discretionary effort may depend on the three important comparisons. First, people 
compare the value of their past relationships with the value of other prior relationships in 
which they were or could have been involved. Secondly, they compare the value of their 
present relationship with the value of other relationships in which they are or could be 
involved. Finally, individuals compare the expected value of their future relationships in 
which they will or could become involved. One’s discretionary effort thus increases 
when (a) their past relationship is remembered as more valuable than prior alternative 
relationships; (b) their present relationship is perceived as more valuable than current 
alternative relationships; and (c) their future relationship is expected to be more valuable 
than future alternative relationships (Moreland, Levine and Cini, 1993).
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Hence, social exchange theories are based on the assumption about human behaviour: 
there is an assumed similarity between the process through which individuals evaluate 
their social relationships and economic transactions in the market. Social relationships 
can be viewed as an exchange process in which individuals make contributions 
(investments) for which they expect certain outcomes. Individuals are assumed to have 
expectations about the outcomes that should result when they contribute their time or 
resources in interaction with others. In this sense, the basic notion of expectancy theory 
may be included in social exchange theory.
The theory concerns the process through which individuals decide whether or not a 
particular exchange is satisfactory. Most exchange theories assign a central role to social 
comparison processes in terms of how individuals evaluate exchange relationships. For 
example, individuals may compare their outcomes and contributions in an exchange with 
the outcomes and contributions of the person with whom they are interacting. Where 
there is relative equity between the outcomes and contributions of both parties to an 
exchange, satisfaction is likely to result from the interaction.
Social exchange theory assumes that individuals seek and maintain relationships which 
allow them to maximise their utility. In an organisational context, when one observes 
employees supporting their organisation without getting an obvious financial reward, this 
may be only a partial. The rewards may be there, but are indirect and usually self- 
administered non-financial (social) rewards, e.g. in the form of need satisfaction or 
intrinsic motivation. Social exchange is different from economic exchange, as Blau 
(1964) argues that economic exchange is very limited and based on the fairness of 
contractual demands and predetermined obligations, such as pay. Fairness in social 
exchange is much more general, determined by a broad consideration of factors that go 
beyond contractual obligations, such as trust in the overall systems used by the 
organisation.
Social exchange theory is widely applicable because it is not restricted to marketable 
goods. Rather it includes pride in group membership, status, affection or security, which 
are desirable to the employees and which can be exchanged for benefits the employer 
may appreciate (e.g. compliance and flexibility). For example, as exchange for the
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satisfaction with their membership, employees may increase the level of effort and 
generate different kinds of behaviours beneficial to the organisation.
The important point in application of social exchange theory is that it does not make 
sense for the partners in the exchange to take a strongly instrumental stance, because 
social exchange theory is based on the following rules: (1) there is no explicit price 
attached to the benefits being exchanged, and (2) the exchange does not have to take 
place simultaneously. A partner who provides benefits, be it money from the company or 
extra effort from the employees, cannot be sure that the other side will “pay” or receive 
later (Benkhoflf, 1994). The exchange relationship is based on trust rather than certainty. 
This highlights the crucial difference between social exchange theory and expectancy 
theory, the most widely applied motivation theory, which proposes that effort is 
triggered by expectation of rewards (Benkhoflf 1994, p. 117).
One prominent theory of social exchange processes is Adams’ (1963, 1965) theory of 
equity, which is perhaps the most rigorously developed statement of how individuals 
evaluate social exchange relationships. Equity theory postulates that in their exchange 
relationships people seek to achieve a situation where all parties receive outcomes that 
are a fair reflection of their inputs. The theory implies that individuals feel tension if their 
own ratio of outcomes (money, status, intrinsic rewards, etc.) relative to inputs (skill, 
effort, reliability, etc.) is not balanced with the other side in the exchange relationship. 
Individuals feel angry when they feel under-compensated and guilty when the rewards 
seem to be overgenerous. Equity theory considers fairness, mainly distributive justice: 
employees determine whether they have been treated fairly at work by examining their 
own payoff ratio of outcomes (e.g. size of a raise) to inputs (e.g. level of performance) 
and comparing that ratio with the corresponding outcome-input ratio obtained by others 
such as their co-workers.
Another sense of fairness that employees may feel is based on procedural justice, which 
does not focus on the results of any compensation decision or other administrative 
decisions that involve allocations of scarce resources among employees, but instead 
focuses on the fairness of the decision-making process itself. Hence, procedural justice
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refers to “the perceived fairness of the procedures used in making decisions” (Folger 
and Greenberg, 1985, p. 143). In other words, the focus shifts from what is actually 
decided to how the decision is made. Procedural justice has been seen as a supplement to 
equity theory. Although equity theory has received broad support, it has also been 
criticized as not being particularly useful (see, for example, e.g. Locke and Henne,
1986). A major limitation to equity theory’s usefulness is the difficulty of specifying what 
type of action an aggrieved employee will take. Some serious consequences for 
organisations can arise when perceived unfair treatment leads to retaliation by 
employees. In defining unfair treatment by outcome-inputs ratios, equity theory provides 
grounds for predicting that retaliation (e.g. work slowdowns as a way of lowing 
employee inputs) might accompany underpayment. The same principle also provides a 
basis for the opposite prediction: If the inequity is resolved via cognitive adjustment (e.g. 
by the employee perceptually raising his/her own outcomes), then the underpaid 
employee might well work harder.
Equity theory’s failure to resolve these opposing predictions may stem from its tendancy 
to place too much emphasis on the outcomes of reward allocations and to ignore the 
process that led up to them. The research done to test equity has focused only on 
distributive justice issues and has neglected procedural justice issues. Two people may 
respond differently to the same inequity if they believe different things about how that 
inequity was created (e.g. if two different decision-making processes were used). 
Procedural justice involves mainly structural aspects. For example, individuals may 
decide fairness by evaluating procedural rules, such as bias, consistency, and/or accuracy 
(Greenberg, 1986; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry, 1980), or by how much influence or 
“voice” they have in determining the actual outcome they receive (Folger, 1977).
Tyler and Bies (1989) has found evidence for three aspects of concern about procedural 
fairness: (1) the extent to which the decision maker exhibits neutrality, (2) the extent to 
which the intentions of the decision maker can be trusted, and (3) the extent to which 
the decision maker shows respect for the rights of the parties to a decision (those whom 
the decision affects). These three types of considerations represent the central features of 
what it means for decisions to be made in a procedurally fair manner. In general, when 
individuals determine that the structural characteristics of the decision making process
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are fair (e.g. procedures have no bias, and they provide an opportunity for “voice”), they 
will also determine whether the outcome received from this decision making process is 
fair. Research concerning the structural characteristics of procedural justice has identified 
individuals’ ideas about procedural fairness in performance appraisal contexts 
(Greenberg, 1986), day-to-day managerial operations (Sheppard and Lewicki, 1987), 
and compensation systems (Folger and Konovsky, 1989).
Since fairness in social exchange is based on long-term trust towards organisations, 
Organ and Konovsky (1989) suggest that discretionary effort (especially organisational 
citizenship behaviour) is reflected more through social exchange. These authors argue 
that if people believe they are being treated fairly, and trust that they will continue to be 
treated fairly, they are more likely to judge that they are in a reciprocal social exchange 
relationship with that organisation, and will not worry too much about being rewarded 
for discretionary effort.
Distributive justice and procedural justice may have a direct influence on employees’ 
attitudes or work behaviour. In particular, distributive justice may predict satisfaction 
with the outcome received, whereas procedural justice may influence satisfaction of 
outcomes or the evaluation of organisation. According to Martin’s (1988) research, both 
distributive and procedural justice determine satisfaction, while organisational 
commitment is more likely to be determined by perceptions of procedural fairness. Organ 
(1988) has argued that a determination of fairness is a key cognition in estimating job 
satisfaction, based on the assumption that attitudes have both an affective (emotions or 
feelings) and a cognitive (beliefs) component.
In relations to work behaviour, Organ and Konovsky (1989) suggest that organisational 
citizenship behaviour is reflected more directly through social exchange. The authors 
argue that if people believe they are being treated fairly, and trust that they will continue 
to be treated fairly, they are more likely to judge that they are in a reciprocal social 
exchange relationship with that organisation and will not worry about being rewarded for 
extra-role behaviours. If treated inequitably, people will shift their perceptions to a more 
economic exchange view and only perform actions for which they are compensated in
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some way. Being treated fairly, then, means that discretionary effort is more likely to 
occur.
4.6 A Comparison of the Five Motivation Mechanisms
Benkhoff (1994) tested these five motivation mechanisms described above to examine 
whether or not they are distinctive and independent of each other. This test was 
important because the author considered the five mechanisms to be conceptually 
interrelated. The inherent similarities and differences in the theoretical construction of the 
original five motivation mechanisms are explained below as a basis for replicating 
Benkhoff s (1994) approach.
Table 4-1 illustrates the relationships between the five motivation mechanisms. The 
arrows symbolise the relationships in terms of the similarities and the differences, but do 
not imply a cause-eflfect relationship between the five variables.
Table 4-1 Relationship between motivation mechanisms
Need for achievement □ * = [
Intrinsic motivation
> 1 Social exchange theory 1 <
Disposition
Need for esteem
Behavioural commitment
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As illustrated in Table 4-1, relationships seem to exist between the various theories 
as follows:
(1) the need for achievement and the need for esteem, (2) the need for achievement 
and intrinsic motivation, (3) the need for esteem and intrinsic motivation, (4) the 
need for esteem and behavioural commitment, (5) disposition and intrinsic 
motivation, (6) intrinsic motivation and social exchange theory. Each of these 
relationships will be considered in turn.
4.6.1 The Need for Achievement and the Need for Esteem
There is a similarity between the need for achievement and the need for self-esteem, 
even though each theory tends to be treated as a different category. People with a 
high need for esteem are more likely to have a need for achievement, because the 
need for esteem in most circumstances is associated with achievement, competence 
and independence, when focused internally. However, the need for esteem may also 
be satisfied in other ways than achievement, such as physical attractiveness or social 
status.
4.6.2 The Need for Achievement and Intrinsic Motivation
The need for achievement and intrinsic motivation may be similar in the sense that 
intrinsic motivation can partly be explained by the need for achievement. According to 
Deri and Ryan (1985), individuals have a need for free and effective interactions with 
the environment, and they experience feelings of enjoyment as they perceive that these 
needs are satisfied. The enjoyment and excitement accompanying the experiences of 
competence and self-determination represent the rewards for intrinsically motivated 
behaviour.
Hence, intrinsic motivation can be explained by the need for competence which is similar 
to need for achievement. However, intrinsic motivation is different from the need for 
achievement in that: (1) need theory is based on the assumption of an inner
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disequilibrium or deficit, whereas intrinsic motivation does not focus on reducing one’s 
deficits; (2) intrinsic motivation is inferred when individuals are involved in particular 
activities under particular circumstances. For example, people with a need for high 
achievement are not intrinsically motivated by all types of work. The enjoyment resulted 
from intrinsic motivation is moderated by one’s values and experiences.
4.6.3 The Need for Esteem and Intrinsic Motivation
There are similarities between intrinsic motivation and the need for esteem in the sense 
that they are both related to the need for competence and control. Intrinsic motivation is 
based on the enjoyment resulting from control and competence experienced. Esteem 
needs are also partly related to the feeling of one’s confidence or competence and 
achievement.
Intrinsic motivation differs from the need for self-esteem in an important respect. 
Whereas intrinsic motivation is inferred during or after an activity, the need for self­
esteem generates tension in an individual striving to be successful. Insofar as people are 
putting themselves under pressure, feeling anxious, and working with great urgency, one 
may assume that intrinsic motivation is not the only driving force behind an individual’s 
behaviour.
4.6.4 The Need for Esteem, Work Disposition and Behavioural Commitment
The need for esteem is clearly associated with behavioural commitment. One may be a 
moderator of the other. It could be argued that the need for achievement and the need 
for recognition are important conditions which make employees susceptible to 
behavioural commitment (Benkhoff, 1994). Behavioural commitment implies that people 
maintain consistency in their behaviour in order to satisfy their own and other people’s 
expectations in terms of competence or control (Kiesler, 1971). Inconsistency in terms of 
their attitudes and behaviour and in terms of their behaviour over time would undermine
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their perception of themselves. Hence, some employees may tend to exert discretionary 
effort because of their fear of damage to their reputation or self-esteem. In this sense, 
behavioural commitment is an expression of the need for esteem.
However, behavioural commitment is different in scope from the need for self-esteem in 
that the consistency of behaviour depends on factors other than self-esteem. It is part of 
an attribution process theory in which individuals derive their attitudes from their 
behaviour. Esteem need, on the other hand, can be satisfied in various ways other than 
behavioural commitment.
Positive work disposition and behavioural commitment may often go together. People 
with a positive work disposition are more likely to allow themselves to be committed 
than others because work performance tends to be very important for their self-image.
4.6.5 Intrinsic Motivation and Disposition
Intrinsic motivation at work is similar to positive work disposition in the sense that they 
both stress work itself as an important issue. The difference between intrinsic motivation 
and disposition is that (1) intrinsic motivation can be inferred by everybody in a 
particular situation under certain conditions, and (2) dispositions exist independently of 
the enjoyment of the job as individual characteristics. The two motivational mechanisms 
may frequently coincide, however. Employees with a positive work disposition are more 
likely to be intrinsically motivated by their work.
4.6.6 The Need for Achievement, Disposition, Intrinsic Motivation and Social 
Exchange Theory
Intrinsic motivation is similar in certain respects to social exchange theory in the sense 
that both refer to enjoyment or satisfaction with the work situation. Intrinsic motivation 
explains the activity in the absence of a reward contingency or control. According to 
intrinsic motivation theory, some people work harder than others not because of high 
pay or supervisor’s control, but because of the challenge and scope of the work itself.
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Social exchange theory, on the other hand, basically implies that people’s behaviour 
depends on their degree of satisfaction with monetary and non-monetary outcomes such 
as pay or personal development. While intrinsic motivation refers to the reward as 
enjoyment derived from work itself) the scope of rewards of social exchange theory is 
much broader, including such rewards as recognition and promotion opportunities.
With regards to the relationship between positive work disposition and social exchange 
theory, people with a positive work disposition and a high need for achievement are 
more likely to view more favourably the social exchange situation because they will 
not focus so much on the costs as on the benefits, and will therefore be more likely 
to be satisfied with the overall rewards.
The implication of the above arguments for this research is that one cannot be sure that 
each theoretical approach represents a separate motivational mechanism (Benkhoff) 
1994). In other words, the similarities and differences between theories outlined above 
will affect the clustering among variables in factor analysis, which shows whether or not 
these variables have independent explanatory power. In BenkhofFs (1994) research, the 
five motivation mechanisms were entered simultaneously in the same model of factor 
analysis. The results showed that the measures of each theory (the need for achievement, 
the need for esteem, a positive work disposition, behavioural commitment and social 
exchange theory) represent independent mechanisms, with the exception of intrinsic 
motivation and disposition, whose measures formed one factor. In a replication of this 
approach, it will be interesting to see whether the same picture emerges when using a 
completely different sample from a different industry and a different culture. The five 
motivation mechanisms will be entered into the same model of factor analysis. The 
results will show that where there is a significant difference in the theories the variables 
will appear in different clusters. However, where there is considerable overlap in the 
motivation mechanisms, the variables will appear in the same cluster.
4.7 Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses o f this research are based on the argument that work commitment 
(discretionary efforts) may be explained by the five independent motivation
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mechanisms as discussed above. The specific hypotheses that will be tested in this 
research are as follows:
(1) BenkhofFs motivation mechanisms are independent mechanisms.
(2)Work commitment (discretionary efforts) from employees is high when 
employees have:
(a) a high need for achievement
(b) a high need for esteem and work in a setting where they are expected to meet 
high work standards or where the expectation for achievement is high.
(c) a strong positive work disposition.
(d) a high degree of intrinsic motivation.
(e) a high level of behavioural commitment.
(f) a high level of satisfaction with their working conditions. These working 
conditions are as follows: pay, promotion opportunities, training opportunities, task 
area and position.
(3) The motivation mechanisms work together in an additive fashion. Therefore, 
each additional motivation mechanism working on an individual adds to his/her level 
of discretionary effort.
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Chapter 5 Theoretical Explanation II: Organisational 
Identification and Group Norms
Group motivation such as organisational identification and group norms may be further 
explanatory mechanisms for discretionary effort, though these variables are not 
considered in Benkhoff s (1994) research model in relation to discretionary effort. These 
two additional mechanisms, unlike the five motivation mechanisms, are based on group 
motivation rather than individual motivation and thus they may provide an alternative or 
additional explanation for discretionary effort.
This chapter focuses on answering the following two questions: (1) Why should group 
motivation be treated as independent from the five motivation theories in understanding 
individual behaviour? (2) On what basis can one argue that group norms affect 
individuals’ discretionary effort?
5.1 Group Motivation
In addition to the individual motivation mechanisms, there is an important motivation 
mechanism, such as group motivation (e.g. organisational identification and group 
norms), to explain human behaviour within work organisations. These additional 
mechanisms as group motivation may provide a different explanation of human 
behaviour within work organisations (discretionary efforts), other than that offered by 
Benkhoff s five motivation mechanisms which are based on an individual motivation. 
The distinction of group motivation from the individual motivation is rooted in 
traditional arguments with regard to the individual-group relationship: is there more to 
groups than the sum of the individuals that comprise them? Some authors, particularly, 
reductionists (e.g. Allport, 1962) argue that the group phenomenon may ultimately be 
reduced to individual psychological processes. Also, Steiner (1986) concurs with 
Allport’s (1962) point, adding that “there are no groups without individuals, and there 
are very few individuals who are not also functioning parts of groups’ (Steiner, p.285).
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However, groups emerge out of people’s common perceptions of themselves as 
members of the same social unit and in various relations to one another within that unit. 
These perceptions of themselves are associated with various group attributes such as 
norms and values, and these can become internalised and hence serve to guide people’s 
behaviour. For these reasons, Allport’s (1962) conclusion that the concept of “group” 
has no place in a social psychology is not very convincing. Hence, in this research, 
Sherif s (1966) views are adopted: “We can not do justice to events by extrapolating 
uncritically from man’s feeling, attitudes, and behaviour when he is in a state of isolation 
to his behaviour when acting as a member of a group. Being a member of a group and 
behaving as a member of a group have psychological consequences. These are 
consequences even when the other members are not immediately present.” (p. 8-9)
Much of traditional social psychology is reductionist in that it explains the social 
group in terms of properties of the individual; that is, it is individualistic, and has 
been ever since the time of Allport (Cartwright 1979; Pepitone 1981; Sampson 
1977,198 l).By dissolving the group into individuals, the concept of group no longer 
has any separate conceptual status from that of the individual, and social psychology 
no longer studies the social group; it merely focuses on interactions between 
individuals. The social identity approach has developed as a spearhead of the attack 
on such individualism in social psychology. Its initial focus was the study of inter- 
group relations. Over the years the approach has broadened out to include a wide 
variety of group phenomena and as an attempt to reintroduce the concept of group 
as a distinct explanatory tool in social psychology (e.g. Turner et al. 1987). The 
explanation of group behaviour requires articulation of the uncertainty-reduction 
motive with more specific group-based motives that derive from inter-group 
relations. The mediating construct is social identity.
5.2 The Definition and Formation of a Group
One of the interesting debates in social psychology has centred on the nature of a group. 
A group is defined as any number of people who (1) interact with each other and/or (2)
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perceive themselves to be a group. This definition encompasses two aspects: the first is 
“the existence of some formal or implicit social structure, usually in the form o f  statis 
and role relationships” (Sheriff 1969, p. 8 ); and the second is the view that a group exists 
when “two or more individuals perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category” (Tajfel, p. 15, 1981; see also Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987).
The first of these two observations implies that a group consists of people in face-to 
face interaction with one other (e.g. Bales, 1950; Homans; 1950). This is certairly 
true for many small groups to which one belongs, such as the family and work 
groups. This approach, however, would seem to exclude large-scale socal 
categories such as ethnic groups or large organisations. This problem can be solvjd 
by adopting the second element of the definition that focuses on the more subjecti/e 
perception of groups in terms of an individual’s self-categorisations (Tajfel, 1981; 
Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987).
For the purpose of generating hypotheses, it is important to consider why groups fom. 
Answers to this question have been put forward from two different angles: one is the 
social cohesion approach and the second the social identity approach. The former is 
based on the idea that group formation results from mutual interpersonal attractbn 
which fulfills interpersonal needs satisfaction (e.g. through co-operative interaction, 
interdependent goals, a system of interpersonal exchange, positive interpersonal 
reinforcement and interpersonal similarity). The second approach, on the other hard, 
implies that groups are formed by self-categorisation in order to achieve social identity (a 
mechanism that will be explained further in Chapter 5.3). Accordingly, groups may 
generate intragroup attraction, which is the affinity between individuals who ere 
members of the same group, in different ways (Hogg and Turner, 1985; Turner, 1984).
Social identity theory and the social cohesion approach provide different 
explanations for the formation of groups, but they are not necessarily contradictory 
because the concept of attraction or affinity is part of both approaches. The social 
cohesion approach by definition explains the formation of groups in terms of 
interpersonal attraction. With respect to the social identity approach, a distinction 
can be made between psychological groups and those based on formal structures.
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Where individuals do not have any choice about belonging to certain formal groups 
(e.g. race or gender), they can still cognitively justify their membership by inferring 
that it is based on interpersonal attraction and can feel psychological belongings. A 
collection of individuals can also become a group to the extent that they exhibit the 
same patterns of behaviour. Identification with other groups (e.g. male feminists, 
pragmatic businessmen trade union officials) is a matter of choice. It is likely then 
that individuals perceive themselves to be part of the group if they have a positive 
attitude or attraction towards that social category. When the category is not 
attractive, individuals are reluctant to classify themselves into this social category or 
to commit themselves psychologically to the group. Since both approaches assume 
that the formation of a group is associated with the individuals’ affinity or attraction, 
they are compatible. The social identity approach is the more comprehensive and 
will be used for subsequent analysis and measurement.
5.3 Group Motivation and Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory, as described by Tajfel and Turner (1979), attempts to explain 
inter-group relations from a group perspective. As implied by the name given to the 
theory, “social identity” is defined as “ ...that part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
organisation) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel 1978a, p.63). The theory assumes that people desire to have a 
positive social identity. This desire will influence individuals to make social 
comparisons between their own group and other groups in order to achieve both a 
favourable and a distinct position for their own group. That is, it attempts to explain 
inter-group behaviour by referring to psychological processes such as social identity, 
social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness.
Social identity theory is concerned with all aspects of relations between groups, 
especially groups having unequal power. Specifically, it maintains that society comprises 
social categories which stand in power and status relations to one anther. Social 
categories refers to the division of people on the basis of occupation, nationality, race,
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class and sex. The theory attempts to predict the conditions in which people will feel 
motivated, individually or collectively, to maintain or change their group relationship and 
their inter-group situation. It also assumes that individuals are motivated to maintain or 
achieve a positive self-identity. In the context of oiganisations, this implies belonging to 
organisations that enjoy high status.
According to social identity theory (SIT), inter-group relations and group behaviour 
are analysed in terms of two separate processes (see the overview by Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988): (1) the cognitive process of categorisation which assigns individuals 
to social categories; and (2) the motivational process of self-enhancement or self­
esteem which causes individuals and groups to strive for a relatively positive social 
identity.
The first process means that people like to perceive themselves and others as belonging 
to various psychological groups through organisational membership, religious affiliation, 
and gender identity, etc. (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) in order to simplify their complex 
environment. The expected benefit of stereotyping other people is that it makes their 
behaviour more predictable. Self-categorisation at once accomplishes two things: it 
causes one to perceive oneself as “identical” to, and to have the same social identity as, 
other members of the category - it places oneself in the relevant social category, or 
places the group in one’s head; and it generates category-congruent behaviour on 
dimensions which are stereotypic of the category. Self-categorisation is the process 
which transforms individuals into groups.
The second process implies that membership in a social group provides an important 
source of self-esteem for individuals. The existence of a fundamental individual 
motivation for self-esteem (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1981b, 1982) is satisfied 
in an inter-group context by maximising the difference between in-group and out-group 
on those dimensions which reflect positively upon in-group. People try to derive a sense 
of value, self-respect and self-worth from their membership of high-status or successful 
social groups. Just as self-esteem may be enhanced by positive comparisons between the 
personal self and other individuals, high self-esteem may also be achieved through 
membership of a group with positive distinctiveness as compared to other groups. To
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enhance their self-esteem even further, individuals tend to be positively biased in the way 
they perceive their own group in relation to outsiders.
Conversely, membership in a low-status, disadvantaged or devalued group may threaten 
self-esteem by suggesting that an individual has undesirable attributes, or is regarded 
unfavourably by others (Allport, 1954). However, people are not merely passive victims 
of their group’s social status. People often actively try to protect their self-esteem from 
the damaging implications of membership in low-status, disadvantaged or poorly 
performing groups by mainly using the following three strategies (Crocker and Major,
1989):
(1) Distancing oneself from the “undesirable group”, for instance by criticising its values 
or policies in public;
(2) Reinterpreting the group’s status in order to increase its prestige or value, for 
example by emphasizing the promising long-term potential of a company which currently 
is not very profitable;
(3) Discriminating against members of the out-group whose status is seen to be 
lower than one’s own group (e.g. some men discriminate against women). The 
meaning of membership of a high-status or successful group is derived partly from 
the fact that other groups are lower in status, less selective or less successful (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979). Thus, by derogating other groups, one may elevate the relative 
status of one’s own group and hence elevate one’s own self-esteem (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; 1986);
With these influences of social identity on individual behaviour, the theory has 
recently provided new basis for explaining the phenomenon of employees’ 
identification with their organisation. Since some authors equate the concept of 
identification with organisational commitment, social identity theory may also 
account for phenomenon of organisational commitment. The theory implies that 
when employees perceive themselves to be members of an organisation, they tend to 
comply with their values or norms of organisation (This conformity issue will be 
discussed in detail in the section 5.5).
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Many authors have tended to focus their research on the link between the degree or 
strength of individual’s identification or commitment and performance. This is 
because in large organisations, even though employees are recognised as 
organisational members, they may not comply or pretend to comply with the values 
or norms of their organisation because organisational values or norms are not 
helpful at all for an individual in certain departments and are not strong enough to 
affect individual behaviour. This raises issues concerning the following concepts: 
compliance, identification, internalisation in terms of the degree of conformity. 
O’Reilly and Chatman have been interested in linking these with employees work 
behaviour.
Apart from this issue, it is extremely interesting to look at the contents of values or 
norms of organisations which may affect the individual behaviour or organisational 
performance. Some organisations can have discretionary effort-promoting norms 
such as cooperation norms; others may have performance-harming norms such as 
avoidance norms. In many cases (especially large organisations), values or norms of 
organisations are not powerful enough to influence individuals’ behaviour because 
there may be no mechanisms to reward or punish them when individuals conform or 
deviate. Individual behaviour is more likely to be affected by their work groups such 
departments or bank branches which are environments that are closer to individuals. 
This is because in small groups individual behaviour is more clearly and easily 
observed by group members such as group leaders or managers and group 
expectations (group norms) are clearer, and thus group leaders more easily reward 
or punish employees who conform or deviate group norms (but group norms are 
different from formal rules based on formal rewards systems or formal sanction). For 
this reason, in small groups such as work groups, regardless of whether employees 
identify with their organisations, the existence of work group norms can have 
independent impact on individual behaviour. According to social identity theory, 
since employees tend to conform to their norms or value as group members, it may 
be more important to focus research on contents of norms than degree of 
conformity.
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The important difference between the two mechanisms is that organisational 
identification is broader than group norms in an analytical unit as well as the 
application of the concept itself. Organisational identification focuses on 
organisational unit (e.g. banks), whereas, group norms focuses on groups (e.g. bank 
branches). The concept of organisational identification is broad and general in that 
the object of identification is group or organisation itself which may have various 
attributes whereas, group norms implies a specific attribute (norms) of group. 
Hence, these two mechanisms may affect individual behaviour differently within 
organisations. These difference will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.3.
5.4. Organisational Identification
5.4.1 Confusion about the Concept
Organisational identification has long been regarded as important in the literature 
because of its potential impact on individual behaviour and thereby on the general 
effectiveness of an organisation (Hall, Schneider, and Nygren, 1970; Lee, 1971; O’Reilly 
and Chatman, 1986; Patchen, 1970; Rotondi, 1975). Theoretical and empirical works on 
organisational identification have not provided fruitful results, but have confused the 
concept with other relevant concepts such as commitment and internalisation. There is 
no generalised agreement on its definition. Many authors equate it with the concept of 
organisational commitment as illustrated in the following quotation.
“the relative strength o f an individual’s identification with and involvement in a 
particular organisation... ” ( Porter et al., 1974).
“An attitude or an orientation toward the organisation which links or attaches the 
identity o f the person to the organisation ” (Sheldon, 1971, p. 143)
“the process by which the goals o f the organisation and those o f the individual 
become increasingly integrated or congruent” (Hall, Schneider and Nygren, 1970, 
p. 176).
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“the totality o f internalised normative pressure to act in a way that meets 
organisational interests” (Wiener, 1982, p.418) This definition refers to the degree 
of the internalisation of normative pressure exerted by an organisation. Here 
normative pressure seems to be the same as organisational values or norms. The 
internalisation of these values or norms implies that an individual agrees with and 
accepts them. Hence, Wiener’s definition is similar to that of Hall, Schneider and 
Nygren’s (1970), which considers commitment to be the same as organisational 
identification or internalisation.
Hogg and Turner (1987) treat identification as a different concept from internalisation by 
defining it as “self’ in terms of social categories, whereas the concept of internalisation 
refers to the incorporation of values, attitudes, and so forth within the self as guiding 
principles. Hence, authors assume that although certain values and attitudes are typically 
associated with members of a given social category, acceptance of the category as a 
definition of self does not necessarily mean acceptance of those values and attitudes.
However, identification may not be simply a form of categorisation, as Hogg and Turner 
(1987) suggested, but it is a process of becoming psychological group (through 
emotional attachment), based on categorisation. It is different from categorisation which 
may not always include emotional attachment. Identification is more likely to imply 
psychological categorisation. For this reason, it is difficult to distinguish difference 
between identification and internalization in the sense that both are indicators of 
emotional attitudes. Thus, if individuals identify with their organisation, they tend to 
internalise their organisational values. Hall et al, (1970) define organisational 
identification as “an process by which the goals of the organisation and those of the 
individual become increasingly integrated and congruent.” (p i76). This definition 
equates identification with internalisation, which implies an acceptance of organisational 
goals or values. This subsequently makes identification equate with organisational 
commitment, which is defined as “the process by which the goals of the organisation 
and those of the individual become increasingly integrated or congruent.” (Hall, 
Schneider and Nygren, 1970, p. 176).
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For these reasons, this research assumes that organisational commitment and 
organisational identification are the same concept. However, some authors still suggest 
that there is difference between them (e.g. McGreger, 1967; March and Simon, 1958). 
Organisational identification is regarded as an antecedent of commitment by defining the 
extent to which the individual accepts the values and goals of an organisation as his own 
and, therefore, becomes emotionally committed to that organisation. The relationship 
between the two concepts very much depends on their particular definitions. It is 
essential to examine what makes these concepts confusing to establish clear definitions of 
identification and commitment.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of commitment, in this research, is suggested as 
“psychological, emotional engagement or responsibility which is represented by 
individuals’ identification or internalisation with individuals, groups, organisations 
or the goals, values or norms o f organisa tionsThis definition is in line with many 
authors’ definitions, as mentioned above, in terms of core meaning of commitment such 
as shared values or norms. Hence, organisational commitment or identification is 
conceived of as the psychological engagement felt by the person for the organisation; it 
will reflect the degree to which the individual internalises or adopts the characteristics or 
perspectives of the organisation.
The fact that commitment or identification research has had unfruitful and inconsistent 
results today may be due to the lack of conceptual clarity, although there has been a 
great deal of research over the last thirty years. The concept of identification or 
commitment basically refers to the relationship between employees and the organisation, 
although recently its objects are extended to individuals, work groups, or organisations 
(e.g. Meyer and Allen, 1997, who focus on an organisation, top management, unit, unit 
manager, work team, and team leader). These relationships begin with formal contracts 
which require mutual responsibility and duty. Hence, individuals who work for 
organisations feel responsible for their contracts and subsequently feel that it is 
compulsory to work for their organisations. Apart from formal contracts, individuals 
may have independent psychological engagement or responsibilities towards 
organisations which can be affected by formal contracts, but are more likely to be 
controlled by broad social exchange relationships. This implies that commitment or
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identification can be explained by social exchange theory, but does not exclude the 
possibility that it can be explained by either individual characteristics (e.g. disposition) or 
formal contractual conditions.
However, individuals may face the organisation as a system which has complex 
characteristics or attributes in terms of its mission, purposes, values, norms, and goals as 
well as leadership styles, interpersonal relationships among co-workers, and a rewards 
system. All factors may have an influence on psychological engagement and 
responsibility (Rousseau’s, 1995, psychological contract seems to be in line with the 
same notion). Some factors may be contradictory for some individuals, but individuals 
may have general feelings of engagement or responsibility towards their organisations.
As many authors recognise, when commitment, or identification focuses on aspect of 
organisational values or goals, it may cause serious problems in applying the concept to 
today’s complicated organisations. What are organisational values or goals? The 
existence of an organisation or a group is recognised when it has goals or values to 
maintain the system. These goals or values may be essential symbols representing the 
reality of the organisation as a de-personalised object. There can be clear and consensual 
goals or values for the existence of an organisation in some circumstances (especially 
small groups, like football teams), but in most circumstances (e.g. large business 
organisations), the goals or values of the organisation are not simple and clear objects 
but vary according to departments, work groups or leaders. As individuals come into 
contact with organisations, they encounter dress norms, the organisation’s formal rules 
and procedures, its informal codes of behaviour, tasks, pay systems and so on. These are 
expressions of certain kinds of values or goals. It is extremely difficult to categorise 
these values or goals into a single consensual concept. Furthermore, organisation itself 
can be seen in terms of values or culture. Since organisational values or goals make the 
existence of an organisation possible and thus may be the proxy of organisation itselfj 
they can be treated with the organisation. For these reasons, some authors focus 
organisational commitment on emotional attitudes towards the organisation (Porter et al, 
1974; Sheldon, 1971), but others stress organisational goals or values (e.g. Hall, 
Schneider and Nygren, 1970; Wiener, 1982). Hence, there may be little difference 
between organisation itself and organisational goals or values.
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One of the reasons why commitment or identification research has become complicated 
may be the assumption that there are clear and concrete consensual goals or values of the 
organisation for individuals or consensual attitudes towards organisations. This 
assumption may be helpful in small groups. However, it may be a less useful concept in 
large business organisations, particularly in attempting to establish links between 
commitment and work behaviour. Individuals may not have consensual goals or values, 
(e.g. some goals or values of organisation are congruent with competent individual goals 
or values, such as performance-related pay), but others are not congruent with 
individuals (e.g. supervisor’s over-control of the work process). In this case, the basis for 
individuals’ commitment towards the organisation can vary (e.g. rewards system, 
formally written mission or values of organisation, leadership style, or work group 
norms), and subsequently these factors may strongly moderate the relationship between 
commitment and work behaviour. It may not be very interesting to link between 
commitment, identification and work behaviour without considering these moderating 
factors, but it is interesting to investigate what sorts of mechanisms affect organisational 
commitment or identification.
What is the basis for one’s psychological engagement or identification to an 
organisation? One important mechanism in the development of identification is the social 
identity. From this perspective, identification with the values or goals of the object (that 
is, some of the attributes, motives, or characteristics of the object) are accepted by the 
individual and become incorporated into the cognitive response set of the individual.
5.4.2 Links between Identification and Discretionary Effort
Previous research has not really provided a clear link between organisational 
identification and employees’ discretionary effort, which is the subject of the present 
analysis. Organisational identification may be associated with various types of employee 
behaviour which contribute to superior organisational performance. Organizational 
identification means that individuals see themselves and another individual or a group of 
individuals as being one. Individuals’ desire to have positive social identity may have a
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considerable impact on organisational identification. Hence, this research attempts to link 
organisational identification, which is based on social identity theory, and discretionary 
effort. The SIT literature suggests that several factors of direct relevance to 
organisations are most likely to increase the probability of organisational identification:
(1) The distinctiveness of organisational values and practices in relation to those of 
comparable groups (Oakes and Turner. 1986).
(2) The prestige of the organisation (Chatman, Bell, and Staw, 1986; March and Simon, 
1958): perceived organisational prestige is seen to be strongly related to organisational 
identification.
(3) The salience of the out-groups (Allen et al., 1983; Turner, 1981). Out-groups 
become salient when conflict and competition between groups is intensive, and 
awareness of out-groups reinforces awareness of one’s in-group. According to Wilder
(1981), individuals assume that there is a greater homogeneity in the in-group when an 
out-group is present than when no specific out-group is salient.
(4) The sets of factors traditionally associated with group formation (e.g. interpersonal 
interaction, similarity, liking, shared goals and so forth) can be expected to affect the 
extent to which individuals identify with an organisation.
Benkhoflf also suggests that organisational identification can be operationalised in terms 
of social identity theory and thus focuses on the following three aspects:
(1) The perception of shared goals and values, which refers to the view that employees 
and organisations have important issues in common and that there are no significant 
conflicts of interest.
(2) Pride in one’s membership, which relates to employees’ needs for esteem.
(3) Positive cognitive bias, which refers to employees’ positive attitude towards their 
organisation (positive social identity).
Identification may be better recognised by the perception of no conflict with the values 
or goals of an organisation. The desire for consistently positive social identity is more 
likely to imply both pride in membership and perceived positive bias toward the in-group 
than acceptance of the values of an organisation. Identification can be expected to affect
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employees’ behaviour or effort only when employees strongly identify with their 
organisation (that is, when they feel psychologically engaged or responsible for 
organisation but not just emotional attachment, belongings which refer to traditional 
concept of identification).
In linking organisational identification and employees’ behaviour, some previous 
research has assumed that employees who identify with their company will exhibit 
discretionary behaviour such as “supporting the organisational objectives, taking pride in 
the tenure in the organization or defending the organization to outside.” (e.g. Lee, 1971, 
p.215). This relationship can be explained in terms of social identity theory. For example, 
supporting the organisational objectives derives from the fact that when individuals find 
that their own goals and values are similar to those of the organisation, they are less 
likely to exhibit counterproductive behaviour or resist management demands. Taking 
pride in one’s group membership may derive from a positive cognitive bias towards the 
in-group and a negative bias towards the out-groups. Defending the organisation is a 
form of defending oneself since criticism of the organisation simultaneously undermines 
the members’ own status. All these insights derive from social identity theory.
Since employees who identify with their organisation tend to support their organisational 
goals and take pride in their organisational membership, they may choose to exert direct 
discretionary effort in order to make a contribution to the superior performance of their 
organisation. This triggers a circular mechanism: once an organisation gains a reputation 
for high performance, this also improves the self-concept of the employees who feel part 
of it.
Organisational identification may have a strong impact on discretionary effort, especially 
if discretionary effort is a condition for group membership. This relationship may be 
moderated by how much individuals value group membership and how strong group 
expectations are. If membership of an organisation is very salient and valuable for an 
individual (e.g. when the organisation has high status and is associated with tangible and 
emotional rewards such as support and warmth from other members within an 
organisation), and if the response of salient others (e.g. a supervisor or colleagues) is 
important to an individual, then there will be a strong relationship between organizational
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identification and discretionary effort, e.g. employees will be more likely to perform 
according to the expectations of the organisation that go beyond the contractual 
relationship.
Since this research regards identification as commitment, it is interesting to look at the 
link between commitment and discretionary effort (especially OCB) in the literature. The 
links between organisational commitment and organisational citizenship behaviour 
depend in large measure on whether one conceive the latter as a set of behaviour, a set of 
behavioural intentions, an attitude, or a calculated motivational force. In the work of 
Steers, Mowday, and Porter (1982), whose measure of organisational commitment has 
been used extensively, organisational commitment seems to represent both an attitude 
and a set of intentions, since they define organisational commitment as connoting an 
acceptance of organisational goals and values along with an intent to remain in the 
organisation and a “willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organisation.” As many empirical researchers (e.g. Benkhoff 1994) demonstrate, there 
is no single dimension. Behavioural aspects such as extra effort and desire to stay may 
not be part of the commitment concept, but they seem to be more likely the results of 
commitment.
Scholl (1981), and O’Reilly and Chatman (1986) present persuasive arguments for 
thinking of organisational commitment as a psychological state rather than overt 
behaviour, although they differ somewhat in how they characterise this state. For Scholl, 
organisational commitment is a moral imperative that sustains the direction and intensity 
of an organisational participant’s behaviour when calculated incentive would not suffice 
to do so. O’Reilly and Chatman prefer to regard organisational commitment as simply 
the strength of attachment to an organisation; however, the basis of this attachment can 
take qualitatively different forms. Their research suggest that only an attachment based 
on identification with the organisation or internalization of its values would sustain the 
types of contributions defined as OCB.
Allen and Myer (1993), distinguishing between affective commitment and normative 
commitment, examine the links between citizenship behaviour and both concepts of 
commitment. Both affective and normative commitment are positively related to
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citizenship behaviour. The relationships between normative commitment and extra-role 
behaviour, however, are weaker than those involving affective commitment.
A literature review of the links between commitment and discretionary effort shows clear 
positive relationships between them. However, if commitment is defined in terms of 
psychological engagement or responsibility towards the organisation, these relationships 
become theoretically clearer: they involve the norms of reciprocity, according to which 
the recipient of benefits is morally obligated to recompense the donor (Gouldner, 1960). 
Helping others incurs obligations, the repayment of which reinforces giving and 
strengthens the mutually advantageous exchange of benefits (Blau, 1964; Eisenberger).
However, organisational commitment or identification is only one of many psychological 
mechanisms that may result in discretionary effort. In situations where group norms are 
strong enough, they can be expected to have an impact on employee behaviour, 
independently of whether or not employees identify with their organisation. Conversely, 
employees who identify with organisations do not always conform to norms within an 
organisation if those norms are not very strong or if employees do not care very much 
about supervisors’ or colleagues’ expectations. Moreover, it is questionable whether in 
reality an organisational consensus about norms exists. For example, in a large 
organisation where there are many different departments or branches, various group 
norms may co-exist. For these reasons, work group norms need to be captured 
separately as a different or additional mechanism from organisational identification. The 
subsequent section is therefore dedicated to the nature and dynamics of work group 
norms.
5.5 Work Group Norms
The work group holds immense influence over individual behaviour, such as work 
effort, in most work settings. Hackman (1976) reviewed a number of studies which 
suggested that group norms may have a greater influence on individual’s 
performance than the knowledge, skills, and abilities the individual brings to the 
work setting. The behaviour of individuals occurs within three conceptually
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independent subsystems (McGrath, 1983): the physical and technical environment; 
patterns of interpersonal relations; and the person or self system. The physical or 
technical environment consists of the stable conditions of the environment that place 
limitations and requirements on behaviour. Much of the physical and technical 
environment makes up a portion of the ambient stimuli available to the group.
Hackman (1976) defines ambient stimuli as “stimuli which potentially are available 
to all group members....whose availability is contingent only on group membership 
per se” (p. 145). Much of the behaviour of individuals is controlled by the ambient 
stimuli. New comers to the group can infer what behaviours are appropriate from 
the ambient stimuli. Thus, these environments specify the task contents and the 
process demands of the task. Groups use discretionary stimuli (“which can be 
transmitted selectively to individual group members at the discretion of their peers” 
as defined by Hackman, 1976) to enforce norms and establish roles. Norms are 
patterns of interactive behaviour which become mutually established within a group. 
Once established, norms dictate how individuals should behave, and thus become 
rules for appropriate behaviour in a work group. Violations of norms are negatively 
sanctioned by members of the group. Some norms are general and apply to all 
members of a group in a wide variety of situations. Importantly, they are more 
potent than tangible rewards or punishments (see Asch, 1955; Allen, 1965; Aronson, 
1995). Such norms can become so habitual, so familiar, that they are adhered to 
without question. For these reasons, it is necessary to examine their dynamics in 
work settings in relation with employees’ work effort or discretionary effort.
5.5.1The Definition and Functions of Norms
The definition of norms varies according to the author’s point of view. The following 
definitions are considered to be the most appropriate and are adopted in this research:
“........ Norms are commonly considered legitimate, socially shared guidelines to
accepted and expected behaviour (Birebaum et al., 1976). They are standards against 
which people can evaluate the appropriateness of behaviour. They provide order and 
meaning to what otherwise might be seen as an ambiguous, uncertain, or perhaps
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threatening situation (Raven et al., 1976). Norms are regular behaviour patterns that are 
relatively stable and expected by a group’s members (Bettenhausen et al., 1985). They 
need not be explicitly recognised or discussed to use considerable behavioural force. 
There are two kinds of norms: (1) formal norms, rules or guides to behaviour which are 
formally set out in legal codes, or the commandments of religious faiths, or the rules of 
group; (2) informal norms such as returning a kindness, being courteous to the elderly, 
offering hospitality, and in fact any other commonly assumed “proper” ways of behaving. 
The main difference between formal and informal norms in this sense can be seen in the 
consequences associated with non-conformity. Violation of formal norms is in principle, 
and often in fact, accompanied by more or less clear-cut and inevitable punishment; 
transgression of informal norms are not so accompanied by sanctions which are in 
principle clear-cut and inevitable. There are punishments laid down for breaking laws and 
rules but, in our society at least, not, in the same sense, for being rude to elderly people 
or for lack of kindness. On the basis of these definitions of norms, in this research, group 
norms are defined as informal interpersonal behavioural rules established by the members 
of a group within a bank branch to maintain behavioural consistency. Although bank 
branches norms can function as a control mechanism, this does not mean formal 
sanctions through formal rewards system,.
More important, norms may either operate consciously or unconsciously, whether they 
are formal or informal. That is to say, the individual in conforming to norms may not be 
remotely aware that he is conforming: he is simply behaving in a certain way. This may 
be precisely the situation of everyday life. In ordinary circumstances, the individual 
behaves in accordance with norms without being conscious that his behaviour is the 
norm and that his is conforming to it (See, Beloff, 1958). This being so, any definition of 
the concept of “norms” must allow that behaviour in terms of behaviour is usually 
unconscious. Awareness of norms and conformity probably may only arise in situations 
of conflict, when, in some sense and for some reason, the norms are breaking down and 
conformity to it is difficult or impossible.
Norms provide a basis for anticipating and predicting the behaviour of others and also 
serve as a guide for the group members’ own behaviour, thus reducing ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Groups are likely to bring under normative control those forms of behaviour
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that ensure group success, increase the predictability of group members’ behaviour, 
avoid embarrassing interpersonal situations and give expression to the group’s central 
values (Feldman, 1984). Norms refer to what should be done. They thus represent value 
judgments with respect to modes of behaviour in social situations, and are social 
products which are formed during the course of social interaction. Since norms define a 
range of acceptable (and hence also unacceptable) behaviour for group members, 
they specify, more or less precisely, certain rules for how group members should 
behave. The norms of work groups are the invisible force that guides behaviour. 
Norms are the unwritten - often unconscious - messages that complement or 
undermines what is decreed in formal policies, rules, procedures and job 
descriptions. Norms determine how formal statements are interpreted and provide 
what the written documents leave out. As a result, norms affect the quality of 
decision-making and action-taking, and this in turn affects work group morale and 
performance.
By conforming to group norms, an individual’s attitude may be adjusted in order to 
correspond to his/her behaviour. According to Bern's self-perception theory (1972), 
individuals come to know their own attitudes, emotions and internal states partly by 
inferring them from observations of their own overt behaviour and the circumstances in 
which this behaviour occurs. They tend to adjust their attitudes in line with their 
behaviour, not necessarily because of cognitive dissonance but because they simply 
draw inferences from their behaviour provided it was freely chosen. Hence, one should 
normally expect a strong relationship between attitudes and behaviour in cohesive 
groups.
The more members are attracted to a group and internalise its goals, the more likely they 
are to abide by the group’s norms and to press one another to do so. This is a circular 
phenomenon as the more cohesive a group is, the more it is able to exert social pressure; 
and the more it can exert pressure on members to conform to its standards, the higher 
will be its cohesion. Norms thus represent a form of social control and help the group to 
work expediently and may increase the satisfaction of the participants within the group.
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5.5.2 The Strength of Norms
An important research issue concerning norms is their strength. Norms in an 
organisational or group context have two key features which need to be assessed: 
direction and intensity. Direction refers to the actual content or substance of norms, 
exemplified by (though not limited to) behavioural norms and thinking styles (Trice 
and Beyer, 1984). Intensity refers to the strength of this content. Norms that vary in 
direction (a group may have a diverse set of norms highlighting the importance of 
achievement, control or efficiency) may support different behavioural patterns, 
whereas norms varying in intensity have different degrees of influence on members’ 
actions. The intensity of norms is a function of several factors, including (1) the 
degree of consensus among unit members regarding what the norms emphasise, and
(2) the strength of the connections among expectations and behaviour (Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988). Norms can be experienced as a coercive power, given the 
penalties attached to deviant behaviour. However, where individuals share the 
values of the group, they may be unaware of the influence norms have on their 
behaviour.
The strength of group norms refers to the extent to which an individual conforms to 
group norms and the degree of pressure these norms exert on group members. When 
groups feel so strongly about norms that deviations are met with strong disapproval and 
when they are able to impose strong rewards and punishments (such as public 
humiliation, censure, overt disapproval, and even ostracism from the group), one speaks 
of strong norms. Since strong norms are associated with rewards and punishments, the 
strength of the norms can be deduced from the strength of the consequent sanctions. 
However, the problem here is that even though group pressure on members may be 
strong, this does not necessarily mean that norms are strong. Some people may 
pretend to conform to the norms publicly while not accepting them privately. This 
phenomenon is called public compliance. The strength of norms implies something 
different; members have a desire to maintain membership in the group, and so are 
likely to privately accept its norms. If the contents and strength of group norms are
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convincingly measured, they will thus be very helpful in seeking to examine the link 
between the strength of norms and employees’ discretionary effort.
5.5.3 Conformity to Norms
Conformity is defined as “a change in behaviour or belief toward a group as a result of 
real or imagined group pressure” (Kiesler, 1971, p.5). The theoretical treatment of 
conformity contains a number of conceptual distinctions. A typical distinctions of social 
influence is that between normative and informational influence (Deutsch and Gerard, 
1955). Normative influence, which is a traditional approach, results from the individual’s 
need for social approval and acceptance. It creates a conformity which is merely public 
compliance with, rather than private acceptance or internalisation (Kelman, 1958) of 
group behaviours. It is not associated with true internal change. The individual goes 
along with the group for instrumental reasons such as the attainment of group goals or 
the avoidance of punishment, censure or rejection for deviation, or in order to cultivate 
social approval and acceptance. Normative influence arises under conditions in which 
the group (or individual) is perceived to have coercive power (i.e. the power to criticise, 
derogate, threaten, punish, or enforce laws and regulations for which there are penalties 
attached for non-compliance), and reward power (the power to reinforce compliance or 
administer affection, praise and material rewards).
On the other hand, informational influence (Ash, 1952 Gerard, 1955) results from the 
individual’s need to be correct. It is true influence in that it results in private acceptance 
and internalisation of behaviour. The power of informational influence resides in the 
perceived expertise or expert power (i.e. possession of knowledge) or the informational 
power (possession of a specific piece of information that is needed) of others. The 
precondition for effective informational influence is therefore subjective uncertainty, or 
lack of confidence in the objective validity of one’s belief, or opinion. Although 
normative and informational influence are theoretically distinct processes, in most 
circumstances they operate together to create conformity. It is difficult to distinguish 
between the two since they most often are operation concurrently to conformity.
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From the social identity perspective adopted in this research (Hogg and Turner, 1987a; 
Turner 1982, 1985), the conformity to group norms occurs in the following three 
stages: first, people categorise and define themselves as members of a distinct social 
category or assign themselves a social identity; secondly, they form or learn the 
stereotyped norms of that category; and thirdly, they assign these norms to themselves 
and thus their behaviour becomes more normative as their category membership 
becomes salient. This approach accounts for conformity as private acceptance or true 
change as a consequence of social identification through self-categorization. Conformity 
is increased by identity salience and since increased salience of the identity leads to the 
greater expectations of agreement between common category members, and this thus 
creates greater pressure for conformity when perceived or actual disagreement is 
encountered.
Conformity to norms is generally rewarded by the group while deviancy is punished or at 
least not rewarded. Hence, it is not surprising that there is general conformity to group 
norms. As a result of observation of deviant behaviour, other group members are 
reminded of the range of behaviour that is acceptable to the group. When the group is 
faced with failure, the deviance is much more sharply punished. Any behaviour which 
negatively influences the success of the group becomes much more salient and 
threatening to group members.
The power of a group to influence its members towards conforming to shared beliefs and 
actions depends on three main factors:
(1) The degree to which individual members value their membership of the group and its 
accompanying rewards (e.g. recognition, status, prestige, financial inducement). If the 
group is of little importance to the individuals, they may not conform to norms and try to 
seek more attractive groups;
(2)The positive and negative sanctions (rewards and punishment) the group has at its 
disposal. If the deviant contributes a great deal to the group, the group may tolerate the 
deviation in order to avoid threatening the loss of a valued member;
(3)The members’ desire to avoid negative sanctions such as social and physical 
punishments or expulsion from the group;
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(4) Individual characteristics: individuals with self-confidence and inner security are least 
likely to be affected by group norms. Subjective uncertainty, or lack of confidence in the 
objective validity of one’s belief or opinion, makes individuals more likely to conform to 
their group norms;
5.5.4 Link between Norms and Discretionary Effort
Groups tend to have a large variety of norms. In particular, groups may have 
discretionary effort-promoting or high performance-enhancing norms. The concept 
of norms seems to be incompatible with the concept of discretionary effort because 
norms mechanisms may function through sanctions, but norms also function through 
rewards. Furthermore, since these sanctions and rewards imply informal sanctions or 
rewards and do not involve formal sanctions or formal rewards systems, norms are 
compatible with the concept of discretionary effort, especially in work contexts. For 
example, employers can not give formal punishment even if their employees do not 
respect or trust their superiors. Also, although employees conform to these norms, 
they are not rewarded by any formal rewards system. These make norms different 
from formal rules which consist of in-role job description.
5.5.4.1 A Literature Review and Justification for Choice of Particular norms
In the literature, many norms (representing the culture) have been associated with 
high effort or performance (e.g. innovation norms, social relationship norms; see 
Kilmann and Saxton, 1983) and in some cases this relationship has been tested (e.g. 
achievement norms, helpful norms, afifiliative norms and self-actualisation norms; see 
Cooke and Rousseau, 1990). In order to provide a justification of the framework of 
this present research, several studies are reviewed. In particular, the choice of eight 
specific norms (achievement norms, competence norms, co-opcration norms, 
autonomy norms, innovation norms, respect norms, openness norms and trust 
norms) in relation to high effort or performance needs to be justified.
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In the following section, different sets of norms are equated with the concept of 
culture. This approach is in line with the work of some authors who operationalise 
culture in terms of behavioural norms (e.g. Allen and Dyer, 1980, and Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988). Many organisational theorists (Pascale and Athos, 1981; Peters 
and Waterman, 1982; Ouchi and Johnson, 1978; Denison, 1984; Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988) who assume that certain types of norms or culture directly affect 
employees’ effort and performance fail to provide a theoretical justification for 
linking culture (referring to organisational values) or norms to performance. For 
example, Ouchi (1981) and Pascale and Athos (1981) argue that the financial 
success of some Japanese and American firms is attributable to their “strong” 
cultural emphasis on certain humanistic values, for example their concern for the 
personal well-being of employees or their emphasis on consensus decision-making. 
Similarly, Peters and Waterman (1982) described the cultures of sixty-two 
financially successful firms, making similar claims of a link between a particular type 
of “strong” culture and superior performance to those of Ouchi (1981) and Pascale 
and Athos (1981). They define culture in terms of the following eight espoused 
values: (1) a bias for action, (2) being close to the customer, (3) autonomy and 
entrepreneurship, (4) productivity through people, (5) being hands-on value-driven,
(6) sticking to the knitting, (7) simple form, lean staff (8) loose-tight properties. 
Some of these values which the authors stress are humanistic (e.g. productivity 
through people, being close to the customer, and autonomy). Apart from the fact 
that many of these values seem to represent business strategies rather than culture 
(e.g. being to close to the customer, sticking to the knitting), it remains open as to 
why particular types of culture should raise performance.
Furthermore, this particular research by Peters and Waterman lacks the rigour of 
traditional scientific research in that the sixty-two companies were too convenient a 
sample, apparently drawn from a list of McKinsey clients. Samples of employees 
were selected in a non-random fashion, often by the firm’s management. No 
comparison groups of either less successful companies or companies with different 
kinds of cultures were included in the same. The authors focused primarily on the 
top managers' of these companies. The subculture of the single most powerful group 
in the firm was treated as equivalent to a unitary, firm-wide culture. Culture was
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measured through interviews (open-ended and unstructured) with managers, and the 
“strong cultures” of these sixty-two firms were described as sharing the above 
mentioned eight values with these generalisations being illustrated by memorable 
anecdotes. Accordingly, it can be argued that the research results may have been 
affected and overestimated by the authors’ subjective judgement of the degree to 
which the firms exhibited the eight particular attributes.
A subsequent follow-up of the same companies in Peters and Waterman’s sample 
(W ho’s Excellent Now, 1984) demonstrated further inadequacies of these 
methodological choices. Focusing only on measures of financial performance, this 
article concluded that fourteen of the original sixty-two “superior performances” had 
either not passed the financial tests described in their research or had suffered a 
subsequent decline in earnings. It becomes apparent that Peters and Waterman’s
(1982) research did not establish a solid empirical link between culture and 
performance.
Cooke and Rousseau (1988) assume that certain types of norms are linked to high 
performance: “(1) Achievement norms characterise organisations that do things 
well and value members who set and accomplish their own goals; (2) 
Humanistic/helpful norms characterise organisations that are managed in a 
participative and person-centred way; (3) Affiliative norms characterise 
organisations that place a high priority on constructive interpersonal relationships; 
and (4) Self-actualisation norms characterise organisations that value creativity, 
quality over quantity, and both task accomplishment and individual growth” (p.258). 
The authors’ theoretical justification for linking certain types of norms with high 
performance was influenced by research on human needs (especially Maslow, 1954) 
and the growing body of literature on leadership styles (e.g. Katz, Maccoby, Morse, 
1959; Stodgill, 1963). The authors assumed that “the people dimension” and 
“higher order needs ” such as “self-actualisation norms”, “achievement norms” and 
“affiliative norms” lead to high performance.
Maslow’s (1954) need hierarchy theory, however, is neither convincing nor helpful 
for explaining the relationship between certain types of needs and performance for
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the following three reasons: (1) there is no evidence to support it; (2) the need for 
self-actualisation is ambiguous and almost impossible to measure; and (3) while 
achievement norms by definition should have an effect on effort or performance, the 
case is not obvious in relation to the need for affiliation, which refers to social needs 
reflecting a desire for affection and belonging. This need can have an effect on work 
motivation only if the desired reward, group membership and affection are 
conditional on high performance.
Research about leadership styles seems to have influenced the categorisation of 
norms (e.g. "people-oriented norms” versus "tasks-oriented norms”, Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988) associated with leadership behaviour. Behavioural theories (e.g. 
Likert, 1967; Halpin and Winer, 1957; and Blake and Mouton, 1964) have focused 
on the relationship between leadership styles (e.g. production-centred leadership 
style and employee-centred leadership style) and organisational effectiveness. 
However, the research results on these relationships are inconclusive because it is 
difficult to measure and categorise individuals in terms of the two styles. For this 
reason, Cooke and Rousseau’s assumption that people-oriented norms are positively 
related to performance ( e.g. helpfulness norms) and task-oriented norms are 
negatively related to performance (e.g. competence norms) are not convincing.
Rousseau (1990) attempted to test the links between these different types of norms 
and performance through a cross-sectional study of local (metropolitan) units of a 
nation-wide non-profit organisation. He investigated differences in behavioural 
norms between high and low fund-raising units. Some types of norms such as 
achievement, self-actualisation, co-operation, and affiliation norms (“team-oriented 
norms”), were hypothesised to be positively associated with performance. Others 
norms which were termed “security norms” (approval, conventional, dependent, 
avoidance, opposition, power, competition, and perfectionistic norms) were 
hypothesised to be negatively related to performance.
Just as Cooke and Rousseau failed to establish a theoretical justification for the link 
between different types of norms and performance as a result of the flaws of needs 
theory and leadership theory, they also failed to find a statistically significant
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relationship between satisfaction-oriented norms and performance (see Rousseau,
1990). As hypothesised, the statistical results (Spearman’s rank order correlation 
coefficients) showed that there was a significant and negative relationship between 
the dollar amount of funds raised and some of “the security-norms” such as 
approval, conventional, and dependent norms. The relationship between “team- 
oriented norms” and performance was positive but not statistically significant.
Achievement norms and helpfulness norms, which are the more promising among 
those norms identified by Cooke and Rousseau (1990), are adopted in this research. 
This is because the authors found that these norms were positively correlated with 
high performance, and these links are convincing in terms of theoretical justification. 
Since the failure to find a statistically significant relationship between these norms 
and high performance may be due to methodological problems (e.g. the sample size 
or measures), they are regarded as potential candidates in the search for norms with 
a performance enhancing effect.
Rousseau (1990) admitted that the lack of a significant correlation may be attributed 
to the fact that relatively few units had strong team-oriented cultures at this time. It 
also seems likely that there were problems with the measurement of achievement, 
helpfulness and self-actualisation norms in that the wordings used were ambiguous. 
For example, the statement “show concern for the needs of others” was used to 
measure helpfulness norms, but “needs of others” is simply not clear enough and is 
too general for respondents to give meaningful answers. The statement “take 
moderate risks” was used to measure achievement norms, but the meaning of 
“moderate risks” is ambiguous. Finally, to measure self-actualisation, the following 
items were used: “emphasise quality over quantity”, “do even simple tasks well”, 
and “maintain their personal integrity”. However, it is doubtful whether these items 
can really measure “self-actualisation norms” because their meanings do not seem 
to match that concept.
In summary, although the literature discusses many norms which are assumed to 
lead to high performance, there are not many statistical results to support this 
assumption. One possible reason may be the lack of theoretical justification for the
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assumption linking certain types of norms and performance (e.g. humanistic norms, 
affiliation norms and self-actualisation norms in Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; close to 
customers, a bias for action, and hands-on value-driven in Peters and Waterman, 
1982; task support, social relationship, and personal freedom in Kilman and Saxton, 
1983; and performance facilitation, job involvement, training and supportive climate 
in Allen and Dyer, 1980). Since it is not established whether these norms do actually 
lead to high performance, they are not considered in this research.
Another reason for the failure of empirical testing may be the inadequacy of the 
measures used (e.g. self-actualisation is an extremely ambiguous concept and thus 
difficult to measure; see Cooke and Rousseau, 1990). Accordingly, this present 
research attempts to test some types of norms which are linked convincingly with 
high discretionary effort on the basis of new measures. These are (1) achievement 
norms; (2) competence norms; (3) co-operation norms; (4) autonomy norms; (5) 
innovation norms. It is argued that these five norms are applicable in explaining high 
performance, particularly in the banking industry. In the service sector, employees’ 
behaviour at work is more discretionary than in the manufacturing sector (e.g. when 
dealing with customers; for example, employees can not be forced to behave 
politely) and this discretionary behaviour is more likely to be affected by norms.
In order to identify further norms which are not suggested by previous research, this 
present research has employed in-depth interviews with bank managers and 
employees lower down in the hierarchy in Korea. The following question was put to 
the interviewees: “What sort o f values or behavioural patterns are disapproved o f 
in your branch?” Nine managers and fourteen other employees from different 
branches were interviewed. The results revealed that further norms were relevant 
for employees’ effort and branch performance, such as respect norms, trust norms 
and openness norms. These three norms may be seen as more important for high 
performance in the banking industry than elsewhere because such performance is 
more likely to depend on interpersonal relationships between employees than in 
other sectors such as manufacturing.
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Since certain types of interpersonal relationships (e.g. respect, openness or trust 
relationships with colleagues or superiors) help employees to obtain or exchange 
useful information on important issues such as the circumstances of customers and 
their preferences, these relationships may consequently affect performance by 
avoiding wasteful, internal competition and duplication of effort. Additionally, 
employees’ relationships with their colleagues or supervisors may affect behaviour 
towards their customers. If employees feel respected by their supervisors, they find 
it easier to respect their customers. By contrast, individuals’ behaviour in the 
manufacturing sector is more likely to be controlled by the technology of the 
production system and less likely to be affected by interpersonal relationships.
However, other norms such as competition, reciprocity, customer service norms 
which are frequently mentioned in the literature in explaining discretionary efforts 
are not treated as independent mechanisms for the following reasons: Since 
competition norms in bank branches may function through competence norms or 
achievement norms which emphasise individual ability or achievement, they are not 
considered as a separate variable. The same applies for reciprocity norms: they may be 
recognised through the following specific individual norms: respect norms, co-operation 
norms, trust norms, and openness norms which emphasize interpersonal relationship 
which leads to reciprocity. Furthermore, it is clear that reciprocity norms are essentially 
vague, and cover perhaps only general principles: it may be a universal expectation that 
people will reciprocate the favours they receive, but how they do so is left open. Such 
broad universal norms therefore offer little guidance on what any particular individual 
may expect in any particular situation. Hence, since norms are to be a guide to actual or 
potential relationships, it becomes necessary to establish norms, to provide expectations, 
for these more specific relationships. Customer service norms may be represented by 
innovation norms, especially in work places like bank branches where most of the tasks 
involve dealing with customers because the emphasis of innovation through change in 
work methods, unlike in the manufacturing sector, may imply change in ways of dealing 
with customers. In particular, this case is obvious in the Korean banking industry where a 
supply-oriented baking service is changing into customer-oriented service through 
innovation.
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5.5.4.2 Theoretical Grounds between Specific Norms and Discretionary Effort
The following section summarises the theoretical explanation of why the eight 
specific norms may affect employees’ effort and performance and describes them in 
detail.
(1) Achievement norms
The concept of achievement norms, which is in line with Cooke and Rousseau’s (1988) 
definition of achievement culture, refers to group expectations that individuals will feel 
responsible for their tasks, work alone and set challenging and achievable goals for 
themselves. When achievement norms exist in a bank branch, employees are expected to 
establish plans to reach these goals and pursue them with enthusiasm.
Achievement norms may affect discretionary effort or performance by directly 
establishing the level of effort. For example, employees feel that they must avoid all 
mistakes, keep track of everything, and work long hours to meet deadlines because 
perfectionism, persistence and hard work are valued and rewarded. Since most tasks 
within the bank branch are simple, it can be assumed that employees’ effort may lead 
directly to high performance.
(2) Competence norms
Competence is the accumulated result of one’s interactions with the environment, and of 
one’s exploration, learning and adaptation (White, 1959). Competence norms refer to 
behavioural rules within the bank branch which value and reward employees’ 
competence and punish their incompetence. If competence norms exist in a bank branch, 
employees are expected to have the skills to handle any tasks required of them.
The performance of many tasks in organisations is strongly affected by the job-relevant 
knowledge and skills of employees. Even if an employee has exerted effort towards 
accomplishing a particular piece of work and has a well-formed strategy of how to go 
about it, the implementation of that plan can be constrained or frustrated if individuals do 
not have the necessary skills to carry it out. This implies that competence norms can have
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a direct impact on performance independently of achievement norms. Competence 
norms and achievement norms, however, are not completely independent because the 
existence of achievement norms may also encourage employees to improve their 
competence. If competence norms and achievement norms coexist within a bank branch, 
branch performance is likely to be greater than when each exists alone.
(3) Co-operation norms
Co-operation norms refer to the group expectations that employees will behave in 
helpful ways toward colleagues or superiors within the group. If co-operation norms 
exist in a bank branch,- employees tend to help less skilled colleagues, provide 
information and additional expertise, or share the tasks of colleagues with problems. It is 
hypothesised that such co-operation relationships among employees will have a direct 
effect on the level of discretionary effort or branch performance over and above the 
effect of achievement norms and competence norms.
Co-operation norms may be independent of competence norms and achievement norms 
in that employees may need to cooperate with others to obtain important information or 
support even though they have enough skills and the determination to complete the job.
(4) Autonomy norms
Autonomy means the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, 
independence and discretion to the individual in scheduling work and in determining the 
procedures to be used in carrying it out (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). If a bank branch 
has autonomy norms, group members are expected to use autonomy in planning their 
tasks or determining the work procedures, and to feel responsible for work outcomes.
To the extent that autonomy is high, workers will view work outcomes as depending 
substantially on their own efforts, initiatives and decisions rather than on the adequacy of 
instructions from their supervisors or on a manual of job procedures. In such 
circumstances, individuals should feel strong personal responsibility for the successes and 
failures that occur on the job, and accordingly they should exert discretionary effort. 
Autonomy norms can have a direct impact on employees’ effort or performance, 
independently of other norms such as co-operation norms. Both autonomy and co­
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operation norms can be expected to raise expectancy levels. In many instances, 
autonomy norms may be associated with achievement or competence norms. The more 
employees know and the more they care about their performance, the more likely they 
will be given autonomy.
(5) Innovation norms
Innovation refers to changes in work methods, and innovation norms mean that 
creativity at work is expected and rewarded by a group. When innovation norms exist 
within companies, risk-taking and creativity at work are valued. These norms are rarely 
observed in the banks.
Management in the banking sector has tended to dislike innovation since the industry has 
traditionally been stable. However, in the Korean context, this situation has now 
changed. Employees are expected to create innovative ideas or methods, such as 
canvassing new customers (e.g. customer management plan), or make suggestions to 
improve work processes dealing with customers (e.g. quicker and more polite customers 
service) at work rather than depending on traditional ways of doing things. Strong 
innovation norms are now regarded as desirable in the face of the forthcoming intensive 
competition which will result from the entry of foreign banks into the domestic market.
(6) Respect norms
Respect norms mean that recognition, praise and politeness among members are valued 
and rewarded within a bank branch. The theoretical link of respect to motivation may be 
explained in terms of group cohesion. The interpersonal relations based on trust among 
members may increase the identification with their group and subsequently lead to 
discretionary effort in situations where achievement or competence norms exist.
Respect norms may have a significant impact on discretionary effort, particularly in 
the banking industry, when performance depends directly on customers’ satisfaction 
with employees’ services, especially in terms of politeness or respect. Employees’ 
behaviour in turn may be considerably affected by their feelings of psychological 
satisfaction deriving from their interpersonal relationships with colleagues or
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superiors. If employees feel respected by their superiors, it is easier for them to be 
respectful to customers.
(7) Openness norms
Openness means free and frank communication between employees, and openness norms 
refer to group expectations that members have frank discussions. If openness norms exist 
in a bank branch, members tend to be open-minded each other and may experience 
psychological arousal since this openness may lead to a reciprocal understanding and 
trust. Such positive psychological arousal may affect the level of discretionary effort. 
Besides, the existence of openness norms allows for employees to criticize about their 
group policies or to discuss branch problems. In this case, potential mistakes are easily 
identified and avoided, and it is possible to take advantage of employees’ different levels 
of skills, knowledge and information. For example, if some employees within a branch 
have personal information on existing or potential customers, and others employees or 
managers take advantages of this information, then this action should affect branch 
performance.
Open communication channels within a group can have a direct impact on 
performance regardless of trust or co-operation between members (e.g. formal open 
communication channels can exist in a company without a trusting relationship 
between employees and superiors). Employees tend to be open to members with 
competence because they have confidence in their likely performance level. For this 
reason, openness norms are probably related to competence norms and trust norms. 
However, openness norms may have direct impact on performance independently of 
competence norms.
(8) Trust norms
The concept of trust is in line with Cook and Wall’s (1981) definition: “the extent to 
which one is willing to ascribe good intention to and have confidence in the words and 
action of other people” (p.56). Trust norms refer to the group expectation that 
employees will trust their colleagues or superiors. Co-operation or openness norms may 
appear to be similar to be trust norms. Although trust can frequently lead to co-operative
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behaviour, trust is not a necessary condition for cooperation to occur. Employees could 
co-operate with another employee whom they actually do not trust. The reason for co­
operation may be the existence of a powerful manager who is clearly expected to punish 
the other employee for any refusal to co-operate. In the circumstances where employees’ 
tasks are interdependent, cooperation among members may happen even without 
trusting other members.
If trust norms exist in a bank branch, these may lead to high performance through the 
reduction of transaction costs in terms of time or money spent in controlling or checking 
the employees. Examples of control systems that branch managers may establish are the 
requirement that members should report all small tasks, or the creation of a new 
reporting system or control department. These control systems may raise the transaction 
costs and consequently harm branch performance in terms of efficiency. When 
achievement or competence norms exist, trust norms may modify the impact on 
employees’ effort. If employees feel trusted by others, they are more likely to 
comply with other members’ demands and co-operation. However, co-operation 
norms can have a direct impact on performance regardless of the existence of trust 
norms. For example, some employees should co-operate and help to complete 
colleagues’ tasks if their tasks are interrelated regardless of whether openness or trust 
towards them exists.
In summary, each of the eight norms identified above is expected to have an independent 
and additional explanatory power for the level of effort and performance of an employee. 
However, since these norms are conceptually interrelated in some respects (e.g. in the 
case of achievement norms and competence norms) and influence each other, this may 
lead to the results with a high correlation coefficient among the five norms in statistical 
analysis.
It can thus be seen that both organisational identification and group norms are likely 
to have a significant impact on discretionary effort and performance. Group norms 
may represent different and additional mechanisms from organisational identification for 
the following reasons: First, if strong norms exist within a group, they may affect 
employees’ effort independently of whether or not employees identify with organisations.
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Secondly, even if employees identify with their organisation, they do not always conform 
to group norms unless norms are helpful to them. Thirdly, organisational identification 
focuses on the organisation (e.g. the whole bank), whereas group norms apply first and 
foremost to work group units (e.g. bank branches) as sources of individual motivation.
These two group motivation mechanisms may also provide a different and additional 
explanation of individual behaviour (e.g. discretionary effort) from the five 
motivation theories which will be described in the following section. To some extent 
they overlap with these theories, but there are also crucial differences between them.
5.5.5 Comparisons between Group Motivation and BenkhofTs individual 
Motivation Mechanisms
BenkhofTs the five individual motivation mechanisms have been discussed in terms of 
the major similarities and differences amongst them in Chapter 4. It may now be useful to 
discuss the other two mechanisms (organisational identification and group norms) in 
terms of the similarities and differences when compared with these five individual 
motivation mechanisms. A strong theoretical relationship seems to exist between the 
following motivation mechanisms: (1) the need for self-esteem, social exchange theory 
and identification; (2) the need for achievement and achievement, competence and 
autonomy norms; (3) openness norms, autonomy norms and behavioural commitment; 
and (4) group norms in general and social exchange theory. Each of these relationships 
will now be considered in turn.
5.5.5.1 The Need for Self-esteem, Social Exchange Theory and Identification
There are some similarities between organisational identification and the need for self­
esteem. Social identity theory postulates that individuals seek to create a social identity 
through membership in prestigious groups. This can be explained by the need for esteem. 
People like to belong to organisations which have a high reputation in order to enhance 
their own positive distinctiveness. Organisational identification, however, differs from a
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need for esteem in the sense that the latter can be satisfied in various ways (e.g. through 
personal achievement, competence or physical attractiveness) or through identification 
with other social groups (social class, identification with profession, family, etc.)
Organisational identification can be explained in terms of social exchange theory. If 
employees are satisfied with the financial and non-financial rewards offered by the 
organisation, they are more likely to identify with it. However, individuals may still 
identify with their organisation, even though they are not satisfied with particular 
rewards offered by the organization, such as pay, in situations where their organisations 
face difficulties. The reverse also applies. Employees who are satisfied with a high salary 
or good interpersonal relationships with others do not always identify with the 
organisation, for example if it has a bad reputation.
5.5.5.2 The Need for Achievement and Achievement Group Norms
In the work context, individual behaviour may be affected by group norms as well as by 
individual personal needs or values. One can imagine different situations in which group 
norms and individual needs may or may not coincide. Individuals can be expected to 
make behavioural choices between group norms and individual needs depending on their 
relative strength.
Where employees have a high need for achievement and their bank branch exhibits 
strong achievement, competence and autonomy norms, employees will behave in line 
with these group norms and work hard to accomplish their achievement needs by 
contributing to their branch performance. Where employees’ achievement needs are low, 
and their bank branch has weak or no achievement, competence and autonomy norms, 
employees will not work hard and consequently will have a low performance. In both 
situations, since employees do not have any conflict in their behavioural choices between 
individual preferences and group expectations, a state of balance exists and they are 
likely to be satisfied.
Where strong achievement, competence and autonomy norms exist within a bank branch 
and employees’ achievement needs are low, employees may have several behavioural
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choices to make. Employees may work hard in line with these group norms instead of 
following their own weak achievement needs if punishments for the deviation from 
group norms are very severe. Alternatively, individuals may leave their group if the 
discrepancy becomes more unpleasant than the value of group membership can 
compensate them for. If individuals for some unrelated reasons want to stay with the 
organisation, they may isolate themselves from others and pretend to work hard, 
especially when supervised.
Finally, where employees have a need for high achievement and their bank branch has 
weak or no achievement norms, competence norms and autonomy norms, high 
achievers may stay in the group and pursue their own achievement needs by ignoring 
low achievement norms or may accomplish their achievement needs elsewhere. They 
may become isolated from a group as a result of not following low achievement 
norms and they may prefer to leave their group. Another way of dealing with 
discrepancies between values and norms, is that employees may then change their 
individual values in order to conform to group norms.
These various examples illustrate that even though individual needs and group norms 
may be congruent, it would be a mistake to measure group norms through individual 
needs even if they are difficult to distinguish from values. Achievement group norms 
across bank branches may vary and so may employees’ values. Hence, individual needs 
and norms should be assessed separately.
5.5.5.3 Openness, Autonomy, Respect Norms and Behavioural Commitment
Openness norms and behavioural commitment are inter-linked in that employees’ 
behavioural commitment is triggered when employees explicitly express their opinions to 
other group members. Autonomy norms affect employees’ behavioural commitment 
because they emphasise employees’ independence at work. Employees try hard to 
maintain their behavioural consistency in order to protect their self-esteem. Also, when 
respect norms exist, people have a strong behavioural commitment because people tends 
to commit more to those whom they respect, or who matter to them. To the extent that 
autonomy is high, workers will view work outcomes as depending substantially on their
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own effort rather than on the adequacy of instructions from their supervisors or on a 
manual of job procedures. In such circumstances, individuals should feel strong personal 
responsibility for the successes and failures that occur on the job, and accordingly they 
should exert discretionary effort. The existence of autonomy norms increases employees’ 
feelings of personal responsibility for their tasks, and consequently they may work harder 
not to damage their self image as competent.
5.5.5.4 Group Norms and Social Exchange Theory
One reason why individuals may comply with group norms is the benefit derived from 
the working conditions, including pay, task area, promotion opportunities and the 
relationship with supervisors and colleagues. In particular, employees’ conformity to 
trust norms requires social exchange relationship which generates, and is based on trust. 
Nevertheless, group norms are different from the tenets of social exchange theory in the 
sense that they explain and suggest particular, desirable behavioural patterns while social 
exchange theory simply emphasises the exchange relationships in rather vague terms. 
Norms make more explicit the expectations the organisation has of its employees. This 
gives all participants in the exchange a stronger sense of direction which in turn produces 
greater satisfaction for both partners. Also, group norms sometimes tend to operate 
unconsciously while social exchange theory tends to be a more conscious process. Even 
though employees may be satisfied with the general rewards of an organisation, they may 
not always comply with group norms when the corresponding specific behavioural rules 
deviate significantly from individual values and self-interest.
Having explained the theoretical overlap between Benkhoff s five individual motivation 
mechanisms and the two additional variables, all the fourteen variables will be entered 
into the same model of factor analysis. The results will show whether variables 
measuring each of the motivation mechanisms appear as a different cluster. This implies 
that each mechanism has a distinctive and independent explanatory power. On the other 
hand, some mechanisms may appear as one and the same cluster, implying that variables 
share an underlying meaning. In particular, with regards to the specific norms, the result 
of factor analysis may indicate some overlaps between norms because they are strongly 
interrelated theoretically.
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5.5.6 Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses of this research are based on the argument that discretionary effort and 
high performance may be explained by group motivation, organisational identification 
and work group norms as discussed above. The specific hypotheses that will be tested in 
this research are as follows:
(1) The discretionary effort of employees is greater when they identify with their 
organisation.
(2) Employees exert discretionary effort when the following group norms exist at the 
bank branches: (a) achievement norms, (b) innovation norms, (c) competence norms, (d) 
respect norms, (e) trust norms, (f) autonomy norms, (g) cooperation norms, and (h) 
openness norms.
(3) Organisational identification and work group norms provide a different and additional 
explanatory power from that offered by Benkhoff s the five individual motivation 
mechanisms.
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Chapter 6 Methodology I: The Replication of Benkhoffs 
Model
This section aims (1) to show how variables concerning the five motivation 
mechanisms are measured; and (2) to confirm with statistical evidence whether the 
five motivation mechanisms established by BenkhofF (1994) provide an 
independent and additional explanatory power in understanding discretionary 
effort in the Korean bank branches. In Benkhoffs (1994) research in German 
context, the five motivation mechanisms were entered simultaneously in the same 
model of factor analysis. The results showed that the measures of each mechanism 
(need theories, a positive work disposition, intrinsic motivation, behavioural 
commitment and social exchange theory) represented independent mechanisms, 
with the exception of intrinsic motivation and disposition, whose measures formed 
one factor. Also, the author tested whether the variables representing the five 
motivation mechanisms made a contribution to discretionary effort when the 
effect of other variables was held constant (using multiple-regression). In a 
replication of this approach, it will be interesting to examine whether the same 
picture emerges when applying for Korea which is a completely different sample 
from a different culture.
6.1 The Sample
In order to test these relationships, the data were collected through a postal 
survey of bank employees in Korea. In this paper, to maintain its anonymity, the 
bank involved will be referred to as “K-bank”. “K-Bank” was founded by a group 
of Korean merchants in 1899 and is now a full-service financial institution firmly 
placed among Korean’s big five commercial banks. Through a network of 442 
domestic branches and 18 overseas offices staffed by approximately 8,000 
employees, it provides various services in four major business areas: (1) retail 
banking, which is based on individual customers’ deposits; (2) corporate banking 
to over 20,000 corporate customers; (3) international banking, offering a portfolio 
of financial services; and (4) capital market services such as investment in various
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securities including monetary stability bonds, public bonds, stocks, and foreign 
currency securities.
At the end of 1996, total assets amounted to W 43,339 billion (US $ 51,337 
million), and their total stockholders’ equity was Wl',711 billion (US $ 2,026 
million). Rising to new levels of banking excellence in virtually every area, “K”- 
bank is now moving towards securing superior competition in both the domestic 
and overseas financial markets.
“K”-bank, however, faces difficult external environments, as does the Korean 
banking sector as a whole. These include the implementation of comprehensive 
income taxation, reform of the trust business, interest rate deregulation, and the 
opening of the foreign exchange market. Such changes lead to intensive 
competition in the banking sector and consequently affect the policies or 
strategies of each bank.
The banking sector in Korea was traditionally regarded as a conservative industry 
and thus its policies were not aggressive. Recent changes in business 
environments do no longer allow for such stability and demand aggressive or 
innovative marketing strategies and policies. However, among bank branches 
there is a marked difference of degree in adopting headquarter policies. Branches 
as independent groups establish their own formal policies and have their own 
behavioural norms or cultures. Since “K-bank” has a long history, it can be 
assumed that it has its own steady cultural norms. For these reasons, bank 
branches of “K-bank” are appropriate as a sample for this research in order to test 
group motivation, i.e. the impact of norms on employees’ effort or performance.
The questionnaires used contained approximately 130 items on various aspects of 
motivation theories, discretionary effort and control variables of performance. 
They were sent out to 800 employees at 90 branches. Each branch had between 5 
and 13 staff members. These relatively small branches scattered across the whole 
distribution network of the bank were selected because it was more likely that 
their financial performance measures would reflect the behaviour of individual 
bank employees as opposed to the measures of larger branches. The sales figures
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and profits of branches with more employees tend to be distorted by large 
customers and large deals (Benkhoff, 1997).
228 of the 800 questionnaires sent out were returned, amounting to a response 
rate of 28 per cent. The responses came from 51 different branches. Responses 
from bank branches where at least two employees filled in the questionnaire were 
included in the analysis. Sole employee responses from an individual branch were 
discarded because a single view was not regarded as sufficient to give an unbiased 
picture of the practices and attitudes operating within the branch.
6.2 Statistical Techniques for Data Analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted to test a variety of hypotheses linking 
motivation mechanisms with discretionary efforts in K-Bank. The statistical 
techniques implemented were as follows: (1) frequency and descriptive analysis;
(2) factor analysis (construct validity) (3) Cronbach’ Alpha coefficient (reliability 
test) (4) correlation analysis (5) multiple regression analysis (linear regression, and 
logistic regression) and (6) analysis of Variance (one way and multivariate).
First of all, (1) frequency and descriptive analyses for each variable (i.e. mean, 
standard deviation) were conducted for two purposes: to check the characteristics 
of the collected data through summarising them (e.g. normality test), and to 
screen data for unexpected codes in the tables that may indicate errors in data 
entry or coding.
(2) Factor analysis was conducted with two purposes: firstly, to check the 
homogeneity of all the multi-questions used in this research. Factor analysis is one 
of the most commonly used statistical techniques to examine whether multi-item 
measures form a homogeneous scale (construct validity); and secondly, to explore 
the meaningful factors by identifying a relatively small number of factors that can 
be used to represent relationships among sets of many interrelated variables. The
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS) 
were conducted to examine whether the use of factor analysis is appropriate. 
First, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) was used to test the sampling 
adequacy since this test indicates whether the items belong together by examining 
the underlying correlation matrix (see Backhaus et al., 1994, p.205). KMO-values 
should be above .50 to achieve statistical significance because “small KMO values 
indicate that a factor analysis of the variables may not be a good idea since 
correlation between pairs of variables cannot be explained by the other variables” 
(Norusis, 1990 p.35).
The second test, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS), was used to test whether or 
not the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, and to show whether or not the 
factor model is appropriate. If the value of the test statistic for sphericity is large 
and the associated significance level is small, it appears unlikely that the 
population correlation matrix is an identity. If the hypothesis that the sample 
correlation matrix is an identity can not be rejected because the observed 
significance level is large, this implies that the use of factor analysis may not be 
appropriate.
(3) Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (see Kaiser et al., 1974) was used to check a 
internal reliability (consistency) of the variable items. According to Kaiser et al., 
in the .90s reliability is marvellous; in the 80s meritorious, in the .70s middling; in 
the 60s mediocre and in the .50s miserable but still acceptable.
(4) Correlation analysis (Spearman correlation) was used to examine the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Correlation 
analysis is useful in understanding whether or not there is a linear link among 
variables. However, its weakness is that the impact of other variables confounds 
the results of the correlation. To understand the relationship between variables, it 
is necessary to hold all other variables constant.
(5) Multiple-regression analysis ( linear and logistic regression) were conducted in 
order to overcome drawbacks of correlation analysis. It eliminates the effect o f
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other variables and therefore provides a better picture than correlation analysis of 
the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. The 
methods of factor- based regressions rather than item-based, were used. In this 
research, multiple regression analysis are used for a “tournament of variables” 
produced results where the variables representing each theory isolated their own 
contribution to discretionary efforts or financial performance. Logistic regression 
analysis was used with dichotomous dependent variables.
(6) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) shows significant tests for the equality of 
group means for each variable.
The more specific objectives and a description of each techniques applied are 
provided when they are used in analysis of the following sections.
Two levels of analysis were followed: an individual and group level (bank 
branches). Apart from performance indicators (branch performance), all the data 
was collected at the individual level through individual perception. Therefore, in 
order to analyse the data at the group level, the individual data had to be 
aggregated at the group level (branch). A variety of individuals’ responses were 
averaged to determine the means at the group level.
6.3 Measures of Benkhoff’s Five individual Motivation Mechanisms
In measuring the five motivation mechanisms, this research adopts Benkhoffs 
measures except for those measuring the need for achievement and behavioural 
commitment. In order to measure these later two variables, (a need for 
achievement and behavioural commitment), a new approach was designed for this 
research.
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6.3.1The Need for Achievement
Needs can be triggered and satisfied within work organisations and outside work. 
This research, however, focuses exclusively on work-related issues. Hence, the 
need for achievement is measured in terms of employees’ evaluation of work 
characteristics (e.g. opportunities for self-development or feeling challenged). 
Employees with a high need for achievement are assumed to value highly having 
opportunities for self-development through work and challenging feelings 
regarding work.
The following two statements attempt to measure this underlying need:
(1) "It is really important fo r  me to have opportunities fo r  self-development in 
my work. ”
(2) “It is really important fo r me to have the opportunity to do challenging work ” 
Response categories are as follows: (I) unimportant, (2) slightly important, (3) 
moderately important, (4) important, (5) very important.
Since these needs can only be satisfied in a work situation where there is a possibility 
of their realisation, respondents are presented with the following statement to examine 
whether or not these features are “fully” realised at the bank branches: 
"Opportunities fo r  self-development are fully realised in the bank". Response 
categories are as follows: (I) fully disagree, (2) do not agree, (3) neither agree nor 
disagree, (4) partly agree, (5) fully agree. Only employees who respond to “partly 
agree”, and “fully agree” are included in statistical analysis.
In the literature, needs are measured together in terms of overall Higher Order 
Need Strength (Hackman and Lawler, 1971; Warr, Cook and Wall, 1979) or 
Individual Growth Need Strength (Hackman and Oldman, 1975). These overall 
measures typically combine the need for achievement with the need for autonomy, 
and in Hackman and Lawler’s case also with the desire to do a complete job and 
to obtain feedback. It is useful to keep each specific need separate so that its 
particular contribution to employee’s effort or performance can be identified. The
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items selected in this research are similar to the 6-item Higher Order Need 
Strength questionnaire by Warr, Cook and Wall (1979). They ask respondents 
how important (along a 7-point scale from “not at all important” to “extremely 
important”) they find, for example, “the opportunity to learn new things” or 
“extending your range of abilities”. However, since their approach does not seem 
convincing in that the wordings of certain items are too generally phrased and not 
all the items are work related, new statements are designed for this research.
The items used by Benkhoffs (1994) research (“promotion opportunities” and 
“training opportunities”) are also not adopted in this research because these items 
as measures of the need for achievement may be contaminated, the first by a 
money motive, and the second by the respondents’ perception of their own 
competence.
6.3.2 The Need for Esteem
The need for esteem refers to the desire for self-respect, self-esteem and for the 
esteem of others and may be focused internally or externally. When focused 
internally, esteem needs include a desire for confidence, independence and 
freedom. When focused externally, this need consists of a desire for reputation or 
prestige, status and recognition
The following three items measure the need for esteem:
(1) “Ifin d  self-confirmation and recognition at work. ”
(2) “Personal approval o f my work is cm incentive fo r me to do even better. ”
(3) “Ifin d  my work interesting because I  have the feeling that I  am needed ”
These measures seem to be more appropriate than other measures suggested in 
the literature (e.g. the three item sub-section in Porter’s Need Satisfaction 
Questionnaire, 1961) in that they refer to esteem about the work itself rather than 
the position or esteem in general. By contrast, Porter’s Need Satisfaction 
Questionnaire clearly attempts to measure the need for esteem in terms of
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position, for example by asking: “how much is there now and should there be of
(1) The feeling of self-esteem a person gets from being in my management 
position; (2) The prestige of my management position inside the company; and
(3) The prestige of my management position outside the company?” The results of 
factor analysis and reliability test about the three items measuring a need for 
esteem are shown in the following Table 6-1.
Table 6-1 Factor analysis of the need for self-esteem
Factor loadings
(1) I find self-confirmation and recognition at work. .8745
(2) I find my work interesting because I have the feelings
that I am needed. .8685
(3) Personal approval of my work is an incentive to me
to do even better. .8135
Eigenvalue=2.18, Variance = .72, N=228, KMO=70, Alpha = .81 BTS=.0000
6.3.3 Work Disposition
There are two work dispositions that are particularly relevant to discretionary 
effort: (1) work as a central life interest and (2) the Protestant work ethic. Work 
as a central life interest (Dublin, Champoux and Porter, 1975) identifies 
individuals who regard their job as their preferred setting for carrying out a wide 
range of activities. The Protestant work ethic is frequently used to imply a high 
level of work effort, no matter how pleasant or unpleasant the work.
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“Work as a central life interest”, which is one work disposition, is measured by 
the following item: “I regard work as the main purpose of my life.” Response 
categories are (1) “fully disagree”, (2) “disagree”, (3) “neither disagree nor 
agree”, (4) “partly agree”, (5) “fully agree.” Since there is no appropriate item 
that could identify individuals who regard high work effort as their norms, the 
measurement of the Protestant Work Ethic (Kidron, 1978) was not used in this 
research.
6.3.4 Intrinsic Motivation
Intrinsic motivation is defined as the tendency to engage in an activity for no other 
reason than an interest in the activity itself. Tasks at work that have the potential 
for arousing intrinsic motivation are: (1) those that are neither too easy nor too 
difficult, and (2) those which allow employees to feel free from pressures such as 
reward and outside control.
The following item measures intrinsic motivation, “My work is almost like a hobby 
tome". Response categories are (1) “fully disagree", (2) “disagree", (3) “neither 
disagree nor agree ", (4) “partly agree ", (5) “fully agree. "
This measure is derived from Deci and Ryan’s (1980) approach, which seems to 
be the most appropriate because they regard intrinsic motivation as a motive 
resulting from the enjoyment of work as though it were a hobby. According to 
them, the two basic needs for competence and self-determination are assumed to 
be responsible for intrinsic motivation.
6.3.5 Behavioural Commitment
Behavioural commitment refers to a self-affirming mechanism which induces 
individuals to behave consistently in relation to previous behaviour. People have 
an interest in behaving in a predictable way in order to avoid damaging their
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competent self-image and disappointing or frustrating exchange partners’ 
expectations. In this research, behavioural commitment is focused on the 
behavioural patterns relating to discretionary effort. When employees stop 
exerting discretionary effort, they may lose their self-image as competent 
employees.
The following items, in this research, are used to measure behavioural 
commitment:
(1) “'My superiors and colleagues regard me as a hardworking person. ”
(2) “I  always deliver the result o f the work expected from me. ”
(3) “Bad working conditions do not prevent me from working harder than others. ”
Items (1) and (2) are concerned with the employee’s perception of other people’s 
judgements and expectations while item (3) refers to the employees’ perception of 
his/her own behaviour in terms of consistency. The results of factor analysis and 
the reliability test, which tests homogeneity of scale, are shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2 Factor analysis of behavioural commitment Factor loadings
(1) My superiors and colleagues regard me as a hardworking person. .8628
(2) I always deliver the result of the work expected from me. .8190
(3) Bad working conditions do not prevent me from working harder
than others. .8311
Eigenvalue 2.11, Variance .70, N=228, KMO= .70, Alpha=.79 BTS=.0000
Benkhoff (1994) uses a proxy, such as employees’ position in the organisational 
hierarchy, to measure behavioural commitment. According to her, the more 
demanding the task, the higher will be people’s expectations. One’s own 
understanding of these expectations is also likely to be a function of task 
difficulty, which may well be proxied by one’s position in the organisational
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hierarchy. However, this approach is not adopted in this research because the 
hierarchical level, as she admits, may not only reflect pressure from heightened 
expectations. Employees in higher positions are likely to be characterised by, for 
example, a high need for achievement or need for esteem, by intrinsic motivation 
due to more challenging jobs, or by a sense of obligation to reciprocate the higher 
rewards they receive.
6.3.6 Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory predicts that employees will exert discretionary effort only 
if they feel that the organisation responds or will respond in the future with 
adequate financial rewards (pay and promotion) or non-financial rewards (respect, 
recognition, job security and position). Though social exchange theory is based on 
the idea of self-interest, it excludes a immediate calculative attitude because this 
harms the feeling of mutual discretionary efforts. The various aspects of working 
conditions provided by an organisation can be exchanged for varying levels of 
discretionary effort by employees. Hence, the level of an employee’s satisfaction 
with working conditions may affect the level of his/her effort. Only important 
aspects of working conditions in general are considered in this research because 
these are the ones which affect employees’ discretionary efforts: (1) position, (2) 
task area, (3) pay, (4) promotion opportunities, (5) training opportunities, and (6) 
initial expectations.
Social exchange theory is measured by the following items:
“All in all, how satisfied are you with: (1) your position (2) task area (3) pay level (3) 
promotion opportunities (4) training opportunities? ” and 
“My initial expectations from the company before entering were met. ”
Response categories are as follows: (1) fully dissatisfied, (2) not satisfied, (3) partly 
satisfied, (4) satisfied, (5) very satisfied
The item, “Employee’s overall work satisfaction”, with which Benkhoff (1994) 
attempted to measure social exchange theory, is not adopted in this research
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because there is a weak relationship between general job satisfaction and job 
performance (e.g. Vroom, 1964). It is assumed that there is a stronger 
relationship between the level of employees’ satisfaction with specific aspects of 
working conditions and the level of discretionary effort than between general 
work satisfaction and performance.
The importance of working conditions may vary according to an individual’s 
preferences or values. In particular, when they are thought to be important and 
meaningful to individuals, the level of satisfaction with them can affect employees’ 
behaviour. Hence, it is necessary to check whether or not these working conditions 
are important to the respondents. For this reason, the following question was also 
asked of respondents: “How important is: (pay level, position, task area, promotion 
opportunities, training opportunities) to you? ” Response categories are as follows:
(1) unimportant, (2) slightly important, (3) moderately important, (4) important, (5) 
very important.
Only employees who respond to “partly important”, “important” and “very 
important” are included in statistical analysis. Also, in order to check whether or 
not the various aspects of working conditions have common underlying factors, 
factor analysis and reliability test were conducted (see Table 6-3 for factor 
loading).
Table 6-3 Factor analysis of social exchange theory Factor loadings
1. All in all, how satisfied are you with your position? .7713
2. All in all, how satisfied are you with your task area? .7432
3. My initial expectations from the company before entering
the company were met. .6756
4. All in all, how satisfied are you with your pay? .7007
5. All in all, how satisfied are you with your promotion opportunities? .7685
6. How satisfied are you with your training opportunities? .7108
Eigenvalue 3.19, Variance .53, N=228, KMO= .81, Alpha=.74 BTS=.0000
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6.4 Measures of Discretionary Effort
The definition of discretionary effort used in this research is based on BenkhofF s 
(1994) concept of work commitment, which is defined as extra effort: “the 
outcome of a set of motivational mechanisms, apart from calculation, which 
induces employees to act in support of their task or their organisation in a way 
that exceeds the requirements for keeping the job” (Benkhoff, 1994, p. 185). 
However, since there is no convincing theoretical basis to define work 
commitment as discretionary efforts, as discussed in Chapter 1, this research do 
not regard work commitment as discretionary efforts but adopt extra effort as 
important part of discretionary effort.
Benkhoffs two instruments for measuring extra effort are also used in this 
research to measure discretionary effort: in the first, discretionary effort is 
measured in terms of extra work effort The respondents in this research were 
presented with the following four statements and were asked to indicate the one 
with which they most definitely agreed.
(1) “I  put m yself out in my work and I  often do more than is demanded o f me. M y 
job is so important to me that I  sacrifice much fo r  it. ”
(2) “A ll in all, I  enjoy my work and every now and then I  do more than is 
required. But this should not be a permanent situation. ”
(3) “In my job I  do what is demanded o f me. Nobody can criticise me there. But I  
cannot see why I  should exert extra effort beyond that. ”
(4) “I  often have to force m yself to go to work. I  therefore only do what is 
absolutely necessary. ”
The second method adopted here is individually through various discretionary 
behaviours that employees display in bank branches. This instrument will be 
referred to as the discretionary behaviour. Benkhoffs approach applies equally 
to the Korean bank industry because the tasks in the Korean bank branches bear 
remarkable resemblance to those in German banks (according to interviews with
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bank managers). Consequently, employees’ discretionary behaviour may be shown 
in some way to be cross-cultural.
In this research, these discretionary behaviours are captured through the following 
questions. Response categories are based on a 5-point Likert scale: (a) completely 
agree (b) partly agree (c) neither agree nor disagree (d) disagree and (e) 
strongly disagree.
(1) “I  try to contribute to the performance o f the bank by suggesting improvements to 
my boss and colleagues. ”
(2) “Even i f  1 do not like certain changes which are to be introduced\ I  go along 
with them i f  they will help us to hold our market share. ”
(3) “I  am always friendly and helpful to customers, even i f  I  do not like them 
particularly. ”
(4) “I  avoid taking on additional duties and responsibilities at work. ”
(5) “I  work harder than most others in my type o f job or position. ”
(6) “I f  I  can get away with it, I  refuse to work late or at weekends. ”
(7) “I  try to not to let customers wait. In situations where this is unavoidable, I  
apologise to them. ”
In order to check whether or not these items designed to capture discretionary 
effort belong to one dimension (factor), statistical analyses (factor analysis and 
reliability test) were conducted. The results (see Table 6-3 for factor loadings) 
show that apart from items (4) and (6), all other items load to one factor. To 
ensure homogeneity (which implies high internal consistency; see Green, Lissitz 
and Mulaik, 1977), only these items were considered for discretionary effort. The 
fact that items (4) and (6) deviated from the one dimension of discretionary effort 
may be explained as following two reasons. First, the phrase in item (4), “taking 
additional duties and responsibility” may be ambiguous and therefore problematic. 
It might suggest to respondents that they encroach on others employees’ task 
areas, perhaps because these are popular or enjoyable tasks, or perhaps because 
respondents are compelled to accept other employees’ unpopular tasks. 
Respondents may therefore not read this option to mean simply exerting extra 
effort as a positive action. As for item (6), employees who “work late or at the
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weekend” might be seen by respondents as incompetence, implying that they are 
not able to finish their work on time. Respondents might thus need clarification 
with regard to the specific purpose of “working late or at the weekend”. 
Secondly, since these two items are phrased in negative ways, it may affect 
employees’ perceptions.
Table 6-4 Discretionary behaviour (Self) Factor loadings
(1) I try to contribute the performance of the bank by
suggesting improvements to my boss and colleagues. .6801
(2) Even if I do not like a certain changes which are to be introduced,
I go along with them if they will help us to hold our market share. .8002
(3) I am always friendly and helpful to them particularly. .6850
(4) I work harder than most others in my type of job or position. .5209
(5) I try to not to let customers wait. In situations where this is
unavoidable, I apologise to them. .7636
Eigenvalue 2.43, Variance .48, N=228, KMO= .75, Alpha=.73 BTS=.0000
6.5 Statistical Methods and Results
6.5.1Test of the Distinctions between BenkhofTs Motivation Mechanisms
6.5.1.1 Methods
Factor analysis is conducted to explore whether each of the five motivation 
mechanisms (need theories, disposition, intrinsic motivation, behavioural 
commitment, and social exchange theory) has its own explanatory power as an 
independent mechanism in the Korean context. By clustering related variables, 
factor analysis explores the meaningful relationships among sets of many 
variables.
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The statistical package used (SPSS FOR WINDOWS 6.1) extracts by default the 
factors through principle component analysis and discards those with an 
Eigenvalue less than one. Oblique rotation is applied because it produces factors 
that are assumed to be related rather than independent of each other.
The results of factor analysis will indicate whether the motivation mechanisms 
hypothesised as contributing to discretionary effort really represent distinct 
mechanisms rather than just different aspects of a smaller number of latent 
variables. If the clusters appear as expected, the credibility of the different 
theoretical approaches as well as the items used to measure them is enhanced. If 
the clusters do not support the hypothesis that the five different mechanisms are 
responsible for discretionary effort, then it would be necessary to consider 
questioning the justification of the theories or to refine the measures.
6.5.1.2 The Results
Table 6-5 indicates that the six motivational approaches form four separate 
factors. Two theories appear as separate factors as predicted: social exchange 
theory and the need for achievement. The other four theories combine with each 
other as follows: (1) behavioural commitment and the need for esteem and (2) 
intrinsic motivation and work disposition.
One possible explanation of why behavioural commitment and need for esteem 
appear as the same factor may be the theoretical interrelation between them (see 
Chapter 4 for details) in the sense that some employees may tend to exert 
discretionary effort to avoid damage to their reputation or self-esteem. 
Behavioural commitment goes together with the need for esteem in that 
consistently hard workers gain recognition and enjoy the feeling of being needed. 
Also, intrinsic motivation and disposition appear as the same factor. This may be 
due to the interrelation between the two theories in the sense that enjoyable work 
(measuring intrinsic motivation) is likely to make one regard it as important and 
the main purpose of people’s life (disposition).
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In addition, one of the items measuring the need for esteem (“Personal approval 
cf my work is an incentive to me to do even better”) does not appear as one 
fictor but it appears as one factor with intrinsic motivation and disposition. This is 
because recognition from others does not necessarily guarantee an employee’s 
personal approval. Self-esteem is not always given externally; it comes from an 
inner source (personal approval). It may also be explained by a theoretical inter­
linkage between the need for esteem (“Personal approval”) and intrinsic 
motivation and disposition: employees may enjoy their work (intrinsic motivation) 
and regard work as important (disposition) because of the positive feelings 
resulting from personal approval of their work
There are other interesting results. Even though some theories do not appear as 
one cluster, they are highly loaded on the same factor, which implies that they are 
related to each other: (1) the need for esteem (“feel needed” and “recognition at 
work”), satisfaction with social exchange (“fulfilment of initial expectation”), 
intrinsic motivation and disposition; and (2) disposition, the need for esteem 
(“personal approval”) and the need for achievement. First, the need for esteem 
(“feel needed” and “recognition at work”) are related to intrinsic motivation, 
satisfaction with social exchange (“fulfilment of initial expectation”) and 
disposition in that employees with a high need for esteem at work are likely to 
enjoy their work, be satisfied with the rewards from the organisation, and regard 
their work as the important in their life. Secondly, disposition and the need for 
esteem (“personal approval”) and a need for achievement are related, indicating 
that employees who values their work as important (disposition) are likely to have 
a corresponding need for esteem (“personal approval”) and a need for 
achievement at work. Employees with a need for esteem (“personal approval”) 
are more likely to have a need for achievement.
6.5.1.3 Comparison with Previous Research
Findings from Benkhoffs previous research indicated that each of the motivation 
mechanisms was an independent factor (with the exception of disposition and
133
intrinsic motivation which appeared as one factor). In this research, even though 
the measurement of some variables (i.e. the need for achievement and behavioural 
commitment) is slightly different from Benkhoffs (1994) approach, the general 
pattern of the results shown in Table 6-5 is remarkably similar to Benkhoffs 
results. The main difference between Benkhoffs (1994) pattern of results and 
those of this research is that behavioural commitment and the need for self esteem 
appear as different factors in Benkhoffs (1994) research, whereas they appear as 
one factor in this research. There are two possible reasons for this difference: first, 
it may be due to different methods of measurement of behavioural commitment. 
Benkhoff used proxy variables (employees’ position in the organisational 
hierarchy) to measure behavioural commitment whereas, in this research, it is 
measured by individuals’ perceptions of their own behaviour in terms of its 
consistency and the expectations of others. A second explanation for the 
discrepancy may be the theoretical similarity between behavioural commitment 
and the need for esteem, which the former can be proxy of the latter.
In conclusion, the results of factor analysis (Table 6-5) raise a question 
concerning the assumption that the five motivation mechanisms established by 
Benkhoff (1994) have their own independent and additional explanatory power. 
This is because among Benkhoffs motivation mechanisms, behavioural 
commitment and the need for esteem do not appear as independent and different 
mechanisms; and work disposition and intrinsic motivation are perceived as the 
same mechanisms in both research. There are two possible ways to explain why 
these variables belong to one factor: one reason is that they may be theoretically 
the same mechanisms and another reason may be due to a unrefined measurement. 
Considering the clear theoretical difference between these motivation 
mechanisms, as discussed in Chapter 4, the problems are more likely to arise from 
unrefined measurement. For example, with regards to items measuring 
behavioural commitment and the need for self-esteem, employees might perceive 
them as the same phenomenon in the sense that all these items relate to confidence 
in their work and accompanying hard work (e.g. the need for esteem: “I find self­
confirmation and recognition at work” and behavioural commitment: “ I always 
deliver the result of the work expected from me.”) The same principle applies to
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measurement of work disposition and intrinsic motivation. Respondents might 
have difficulty in perceiving a difference between the following two items in a 
sense that work itself is something important: “ I regard work as the main
purpose of my life” (work disposition) and “My work is almost like a hobby to 
me” (intrinsic motivation)
Because of the failure of the assumption that motivation mechanisms identified by 
Benkhoff are independent, at least in this case, this research regards clustered 
variables (e.g. work disposition and intrinsic motivation) as single variables in 
subsequent analysis (multi- regression) to ensure construct validity.
Table 6-5 Factor analysis of BenkhofTs motivation mechanisms
1) Behavioural commitment Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
-Hard-working person .85509 -.02141 -.01899 -.06009
-People’s expectation .83650 -.02459 .04540 -.01785
-Working conditions 
Need for esteem
.74925 .06802 -.08102 .08259
-Feel needed .51536 .07131 .49212 .00509
-Recognition at work .46326 .12360 .41713 .10770
2) Social exchange theory
-Satisfaction with promotion -.11670 .80875 .05693 -.07248
-Satisfaction with pay .19883 .77056 -.27289 .02991
-Satisfaction with position .10519 .73381 -.02633 .15510
-Satisfaction with task area .04842 .71216 -.01448 .18793
-Training opportunities -.10918 .63541 .28228 -.16094
-Initial expectation -.05168 .51250 .41854 -.16338
3) Intrinsic motivation and disposition
-Intrinsic motivation (Work is like hobby) .01776 .01755 .78265 .02587
-Disposition (Main purpose of life) .08412 .01897 .54849 .40299
-Need for esteem (Personal approval) .26475 .08662 .41012 .35096
4) Need for achievement
-Self-development is important -.11950 .02260 .02845 .91773
-Challenging job is important .11162 .01737 -.00397 .78575
135
6.5.2 The Correlates of Discretionary Effort
6.5.2.1 Methods
This section attempts to identify the correlates of discretionary effort in order-to 
find out what sorts of variables are associated with it. To explore the relationships 
between variables, it is necessary to hold all other variables constant with the help 
of multivariate analysis (linear regression, logistic regression). However, the 
results of correlation analyses are still helpful in that they give general impressions 
of the relationships between variables, although the impact of the other variables 
compound the results of the correlation. In this research, where no correlation or 
only a weak correlation was found between variables, qualitative data from in- 
depth interviews with bank managers and bank employees was used to gain an 
understanding of the findings. Since the response scale used in this research is 
ordinal, Spearman correlation is used.
6 .5.2. 2  Results: Spearman Correlation
Table 6 - 6  presents the result of Spearman correlation, illustrating the relationships 
between the items representing five motivation mechanisms and discretionary 
efforts. The five motivation mechanisms (need theories, disposition, intrinsic 
motivation, behavioural commitment and social exchange theory) are all 
significantly correlated with discretionary efforts which are measured by a-5 item 
scale capturing (1) discretionary behaviour and (2) extra work effort. In 
particular, among the five motivation mechanisms, the variables measuring 
behavioural commitment have a high correlation coefficient with discretionary 
effort. By contrast, there is a weak correlation coefficient between the variables 
measuring social exchange theory and discretionary effort (e.g. initial expectation 
and satisfaction with pay).
Particularly with regard to social exchange theory, some aspects of exchange such 
as task area and position are significantly related to discretionary effort, but others
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(such as “training opportunities” and “promotion opportunities”) are not. One 
possible reason why “training opportunities” and “promotion opportunities” are 
not significantly related to discretionary effort may be the inappropriate 
measurement on aspects of social exchange theory, at least in the Korean context. 
In general, “K-bank” is faced with the problem of slow promotion opportunities 
for most employees when compared with other private companies. In other 
words, most employees do not seem to be satisfied with their promotion 
opportunities and training opportunities (84 per cent, according to the survey 
data). Since such dissatisfaction seems to be a general tendency in this industry, it 
has less of an impact on effort. In fact, employees may work even harder to get 
promotion since competition for rare promotion and training opportunities is 
severe.
The item “initial expectations met” appears to be unrelated to discretionary 
behaviour but significantly related to extra effort. One possible reason is that an 
individual may exert discretionary effort in order to satisfy his/her need for 
achievement elsewhere when the initial expectation is not fulfilled. Equally, if an 
employee’s initial expectation is met, she(he) may not feel generously treated, and 
so reciprocal discretionary effort may not be considered an obligation.
With regards to pay, it is significant for extra effort but not for discretionary 
behaviour. One possible reason may be as follows. There have been a lot of 
arguments regarding whether or not satisfaction with financial reward (pay) leads 
to high performance. For example, some authors argue that high pay does not 
always lead to high performance even though pay is an important working 
condition for employees (Winstanley,1982; Pearce and Perry 1983). In general, 
despite the above-mentioned exceptions, the results confirm the contribution of 
social exchange theory on discretionary effort at least in terms of the task area and 
position. There are differences in the results of correlation coefficients concerning 
the aspects of social exchange (e.g. “initial expectation met” and “satisfaction with 
pay” between two measures: discretionary behaviour and extra work effort. Such 
discrepancy may also be due to difference in the measurement focus between two 
measures in that discretionary behaviour seems to measure discretionary effort
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resulting from employee’s general behaviour for the organisation, while extra 
work effort is likely to measure discretionary efforts, focusing on work itself (e.g.
“  I often do more than is demanded of me. My job is so important to me that I
sacrifice much for it”).
6 .5.2.3 Comparisons with Previous Research
Benkhoffs (1994) research used Contingency tables (Pearson’s chi-square) to 
show that there was a relationship between the five motivation mechanisms and 
extra work effort (work commitment in Benkhoffs terms). The results showed 
that all the items were significantly related to extra effort, apart from training 
opportunities, which attempted to measure the need for achievement.
These results are similar to those emerging from the present research. The only 
difference between the two pieces of research is that some aspects of social 
exchange theory, such as promotion and training opportunities, pay and initial 
expectation, are not significantly related to discretionary effort in this research, 
whereas all the aspects of social exchange theory in Benkhoffs (1994) research 
were significant at the 1 per cent level for discretionary effort.
The difference may be due, first of all, to the contrasting measurements of social 
exchange theory. In Benkhoffs (1994) research, two aspects of the measurement 
of social exchange theory (satisfaction with promotion and training opportunities) 
were not taken into account, but instead overall work satisfaction was employed 
in order to account for discretionary efforts (extra work effort). Secondly, the 
difference may reflect the inappropriate application of several aspects of the 
measurement of social exchange theory (promotion and training opportunities) to 
the context of this particular Korean bank.
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Table 6-6 The correlates o f discretionary effort: B enkhoffs motivation mechanisms
(Spearman correlation coefficient, n= 228, One tailed test, 
*=probability values< 05, ** = probability values <01)
individual items based>
1) Need theories 
a)Need for achievement
Mean S.D Discretionary 
Behaviour
Extra Work 
Effort
-Opportunity for self-development 3.53 .82 3 4 ** .24**
-Opportunity for challenging work 3.38 .87 .31** .34**
b) Need for self-esteem
-Recognition at work 3.30 .79 .31** .31**
-Personal approval 3.44 .85 .27** .39**
-Feel needed 3.20 .85 .27** 3 4 **
2) Disposition
-Main purpose of life 3.17 .94 .27** .28**
3) Intrinsic motivation
-Work is like hobby 2.83 .97 .15* .29**
4) Behavioural commitment
-Hard working person 3.05 .77 .35** .36**
-Others’ expectation 3.22 .79 .37* 38**
-Working conditions 3.36 .82 .50** .37**
5)Social exchange theory
-Satisfaction with task area 3.19 .85 .2 0 ** .26**
-Satisfaction with training opportunities 2.44 .84 -.05 .05
-Initial expectation is met 2.58 1 . 0 0 - . 0 2 .15* 1
-Satisfaction with pay 2.83 .89 .07 .16**
-Satisfaction with position 3.02 .93 .18** .27**
-Satisfaction with promotion opportunities 2.42 .97 . 0 0 .06
< Factor based>
- Need for achievement 3.46 .75 3 7 ** .26**
- Work disposition/intrinsic motivation 3.27 .72 .34** .32**
- Need for esteem/ behavioural commitment 3.23 .62 .47** .38**
- Social exchange theory 2.75 .6 6 .07 .14*
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6.5.3 “Tournament” of the Variables
6.5.3 .1  Methods
It remains to be seen whether the variables representing motivation theories make 
their own contribution to discretionary effort when the effect of other variables is 
held constant. The statistical technique that allows one to establish the weight of 
several hypothesised independent variables is multiple-regression analysis. 
Multiple-regression analysis provides a better picture than correlation analysis of 
the relationship between independent and dependent variables since it indicates by 
how much the dependent variable changes as the independent variable changes 
whereas the correlation coefficient indicates only whether or not the two variables 
move in the same or opposite directions and the degree of linear association.
There are various methods of multiple-regression (e.g. linear multiple-regression 
and logistic multiple regression). In general, linear multiple-regression is used in 
situations where response scales of independent and dependent variables are 
continuous and data are normally distributed. Strictly speaking, the response scale 
used for this research is not continuous but ordinal. However, since the data 
distribution is close to normal, linear multiple regression can be used to test the 
relationships between the five motivation mechanisms and discretionary 
behaviour. Logistic-multiple regression, on the other hand, is used when the 
dependent variable has only two possible values. The use of this binary variables is 
appropriate whenever the theory implies that behaviour differs between two 
different time periods, or between two groups within a cross-section (e.g., 
married and unmarried individuals). In this research it is used to test the 
relationship between motivation mechanisms and extra work effort which is re­
coded into two values.
Since theoretical similarities between motivation mechanisms (e.g. need for 
esteem and behavioural commitment) may lead to a multicollinearity problem in 
statistical analysis, multiple regression-analysis is based on factors obtained from
140
the results of previous factor analysis. A multicollinearity problem arises whenever 
two or more independent variables used in a regression are not independent but 
are correlated. In the social sciences, this problem often arises since many 
psychological variables are interrelated. When two or more independent variables 
are correlated, the statistical estimation techniques discussed earlier are incapable 
of sorting out the independent effects of each on he dependent variables.
Multicollinearity is probably present in most regression analysis since the so -  
called independent variables are unlikely to be totally independent. Thus, whether 
or not multicollinearity is a problem depends on the degree of collinearity. The 
difficulty is that there is no statistical test that can determine whether or not it 
really is a problem (see Schroeder et al., 1986). One method to search for the 
problem is to look for “high” correlation coefficients between the variables 
included in a regression equation. Even then, however, this approach is not 
foolproof since multicollinearity also exists if linear combinations of variables are 
used in a regression equation. There is no single preferable technique for 
overcoming multicollinearity, since the problem is due to the form of the data. If 
two variables are measuring the same thing, however, one of the variables is often 
dropped, since little information is lost by doing so.
6 .5.3.2 The Results of Multiple-Regression Analysis:
Tables 6-7 (a) and (b) show the importance of motivational mechanisms in terms 
of the two measures of discretionary effort: discretionary behaviour and extra 
work effort. Extra effort was re-coded in the following ways: Agreement with 
Statement (a), “ I often do more than is demanded of me. My job is so important 
to me that I sacrifice much for it”, and (b) “ All in all, I enjoy my work and every 
now and then I do more than is required. But this should not be a permanent 
situation.” was recorded as 1; all other responses were recorded as 0 . This is 
because only statement (a) and (b) refer to the measurement of discretionary 
effort.
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The multivariate analysis is conducted as illustrated in Tables 6-7 (a) and (b) 
which show the result of the link between the five motivation mechanisms and 
discretionary efforts. Table 6-7 (a), showing the result of linear regression, 
indicates that some hypothesised motivational approaches within the five 
motivation mechanisms survives the “tournament” for discretionary behaviour, a 
need for achievement, need for esteem, behavioural commitment are significant 
for discretionary behaviour. Table 6-7 (b), giving the result of logistic regression 
analysis for extra work e f fo r tshows a different pattern of independent variables 
emerging as significant. The need for achievement, need for esteem, and 
behavioural commitment are significant for extra work effort. However, work 
disposition, intrinsic motivation and social exchange theory are not significant for 
both discretionary behaviour and extra work efforts.
6 .5.3.3 Comparison with BenkhofFs Results
BenkhofFs (1994) research demonstrates that most hypothesised motivational 
mechanisms survive the “tournament” for extra work effort (using logistic 
regression analysis), but need for esteem and intrinsic motivation are not 
significant for extra work effort (p. 158). The following motivation mechanisms 
are responsible for extra work effort in Germany.
( 1 ) the potential to satisfy one’s need for achievement as measured by promotion 
prospects for those who want promotion;
(2 ) a positive work disposition measured by “ I regard work as the main purpose 
of my life”;
(3) behavioural commitment, showing its impact through both its proxies, being a 
supervisor and belonging to a higher level in the organisational hierarchy and;
(4) social exchange theory in terms of overall work satisfaction.
The common results between the two research investigation are that the needs for 
achievement and behavioural commitment are significantly related to extra work 
effort, but intrinsic motivation is not related to extra work effort. In particular,
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intrinsic motivation is not significantly related to discretionary effort in either 
context.
The main difference between BenkhofFs results and this present research is that 
according to Benkhoff, work disposition and social exchange theory are 
significant for extra work effort, but not significant in this research. One possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is the cultural difference between Germany and 
Korea. It is interesting to ask why work disposition and social exchange theory 
(operationalised in terms of job satisfaction) are not responsible for discretionary 
effort.
First of all, with regards to work disposition and intrinsic motivation, which are 
part of the same factor because of similar measurements resulting from the 
theoretical overlaps, there are no clear links between these variables and 
discretionary effort in Korean bank branches. One possible reason is that work 
disposition, which refers to the affective aspect towards work as an individual 
trait (e.g., “work is like hobby to me”), may not have strong impact on individual 
work behaviour in the Korean context. This view is supported by the assumption 
that emotional state themselves do not always lead to behaviour. Work disposition 
and intrinsic motivation are positively correlated with discretionary effort (see 
Table 6 -6 ), but this impact seems to be moderated by the impact of the need for 
esteem and behavioural commitment, which emphasise hard-work deriving from 
confidence about work itself. This implies that work behaviour, like discretionary 
effort, is more likely to be affected by cognitive elements which may be 
represented by behavioural commitment and the need for esteem (to gain 
recognition from others or to meet others’ expectation) rather than the emotional 
aspects which may be revealed by work disposition and intrinsic motivation. For 
similar reasons, the need for achievement may have a positive impact on 
discretionary effort (e.g., “it is really important for me to have the opportunity for 
self-development”).
Secondly, with regards to social exchange theory which is operationalised in terms 
of job satisfaction, it is not found that job satisfaction has resulted in employees’
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discretionary effort in the Korean context. Many studies in the literature have 
shown that there is a clear link between job satisfaction and discretionary effort 
(especially discretionary behaviour). In particular, Organ (1988) has suggested 
that the relationship between job satisfaction and OCB may be better stated as a 
relationship between job fairness and OCB. Job fairness measures might capture 
more directly than job satisfaction measures the cognitive appraisal process which 
assesses the basis on which an employee can define his/her relationship with the 
organisation as social exchange. Hence, job fairness is a core part of job 
satisfaction.
One possible reason why job satisfaction is not significantly related to 
discretionary effort in the Korean banks may be employees’ perception of 
unfairness in terms of distributive justice or procedural justice. For this reason, 
employees’ job satisfaction is very low (the mean of job satisfaction is 2.75 and 
especially the mean of promotion opportunity, which is the most important aspect 
of exchange relationship, is 2.42 ). Hence, employees’ discretionary effort might 
not be sensitive to such an exchange relationship. It may be affected by other 
factors such as norms, or identification, based on different types of exchange 
relationship. Furthermore, since 84 per cent of employees in this survey data are 
not satisfied with their jobs, this unbalanced data distribution might lead to 
statistical problems which make it difficult to examine the two relationships
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Table 6-7 (a) and (b) Antecedents of discretionary effort: BenkhofFs 
motivation mechanisms
(Multiple-regression analysis, Beta coefficients, *=p <05 **=p<.01
analysis level is an individual).
(a) Discretionary behaviour (self, linear) (b) Extra work effort (logistic)
Adjusted R Square .29 Model chi-square = 35.34, S=00
F=15.81, S=00 Beta Wald
-Need for achievement .15* 5.58*
-Need for self-esteem/ .47** 17.68**
Behavioural commitment
-Work disposition/
Intrinsic motivation .00 .01
-Social exchange theory -.04 .00
6.5 Research Findings and Discussion
The statistical results of this research demonstrate interesting findings about the 
application of motivation mechanisms across national/ cultural boundaries. 
Statistical analyses were conducted in several ways according to the research 
hypotheses and purposes:
The first aim is to test whether or not the individual motivation mechanisms 
identified by Benkhoff (1994) have independent explanatory power, considering 
the similarities and differences between them, replicating BenkhofFs model about 
motivation mechanisms (originally tested in the German context) in the Korean 
context. The statistical results (factor analysis) are remarkably similar to 
BenkhofFs (1994) findings, showing that there are both similarities and 
differences between the first five motivation mechanisms. The only difference 
between the two investigations is that, in BenkhofFs research, behavioural 
commitment and the need for esteem appear as different factors, while in this
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research these two mechanisms appear as one common factor. One possible 
reason for this may be found in the different methods of measurement of 
behavioural commitment. While Benkhoff used a proxy variable (an employee’s 
position in the organisational hierarchy) which is not convincing, this present 
research measures behavioural commitment in terms of individuals’ perceptions of 
their own behavioural consistency. The measures of behavioural commitment used 
in this research seem to offer a better approach than Benkhoff s, but since the 
needs for esteem and behavioural commitment are theoretically interrelated, they 
seem to appear as one and the same factor. These research results imply that the 
motivation mechanisms established by Benkhoff (1994) are not completely 
independent mechanisms, at least in the Korean context. Such overlaps between 
motivation mechanisms may result from similar measures deriving from theoretical 
similarities. It is extremely difficult to make a clear measurement of a particular 
motivation mechanism which is completely different from related motivation 
mechanisms. In order to examine whether each of the motivation mechanisms has 
its own explanatory power for discretionary effort, it is necessary to use more 
refined measurements
The second aim is to examine the relationship between these motivation 
mechanisms and discretionary effort in the Korean context, in particular, to see 
whether each of them provides a different and independent explanatory power for 
discretionary effort. With regards to the simple relationships between each of the 
Benkhoff s motivation mechanisms and discretionary effort, the results of 
Spearman correlation show that all motivation mechanisms, except for social 
exchange theory, clearly explain discretionary effort, in the Korean context. 
However, multiple-regression was conducted to test whether each of these 
mechanisms shows its own independent factors affecting discretionary effort, by 
controlling the impact of other variables which result from interaction between 
independent variables. The results of multiple-regression show that some of the 
motivation mechanisms, such as the need for achievement, the need for esteem 
and behavioural commitment account for discretionary effort in Korean context. 
However, social exchange theory, work disposition and intrinsic motivation are 
not significant for discretionary effort.
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This research, replicating the analysis of Benkhoff (1994), confirms with statistical 
evidence (e.g. through factor analysis, correlation analysis and multiple-regression 
analysis) that some of the less-calculative motivational mechanisms identified by 
Benkhoff are responsible for employees’ discretionary effort in the Korean bank 
branches (such as the need for achievement, the need for esteem and behavioural 
commitment). However, some are not significantly related to discretionary effort 
(work disposition, intrinsic motivation and social exchange theory). This result 
implies that some authors’ assumptions (e.g. Hofstede, 1982) that motivation 
mechanisms are not universal across cultures, is questionable because some 
mechanisms still function in the Korean context. Meanwhile, since other 
mechanisms such as social exchange theory or work disposition do not work in 
the Korean context in explaining discretionary effort, this implies that motivation 
mechanisms can also be affected by national/cultural context. Hence, this research 
result supports the assumption of universalist motivation theories, which argue 
that basic psychological processes are likely to be a common feature of human life 
everywhere, but that their manifestations are likely to be influenced by cultural 
context. Accordingly, employees exert discretionary effort in Korean bank 
branches for the following reasons: (1) They put in high discretionary efforts to 
satisfy their needs for achievement and self esteem at work. (2) Additionally, 
discretionary effort increases because employees like to show behavioural 
consistency in order to sustain their self-image as hardworking persons.
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Chapter 7 Methodology II: Organisational Identification and 
Group Norms
This section deals with the measurement of the two variables concerning group 
motivation (organisational identification and group norms) and statistical analyses 
which attempt to examine whether or not these two mechanisms provide an 
alternative and additional explanatory power for discretionary effort in BenkhofFs 
(1994) model. For the statistical analysis which attempts to test the links between 
group motivation and discretionary effort and performance, the sample, 
discretionary effort scale, and performance data follow those used in the previous 
analysis (Chapter 6 ).
7.1 Measurement of Organisational Identification
Measurement follows Benkhoff s approach (l 995) which attempts to operationalise 
organisational identification in terms of social identity theory, thus emphasising the 
following three aspects:
(1) the perception of shared goals and values;
(2 ) pride in one’s organisational membership; and
(3) positive cognitive bias.
The first aspect, the perception of shared values, is measured by the following 
statements:
“I  feel that my values and norms and those o f the bank are the same. ”
The response categories are based on a five-point scale ranging from “fully 
disagree”, “disagree”, “neither disagree nor agree”, “partly agree”, to “fully 
agree. ”
Shared goals are measured by the following two elements:
To what degree do you think you share the same goals and interests as the 
following in the bank (a) your head office, (b) the bank in general ? ”. Response 
categories consist of a five-point scale: (1) large conflict, (2) considerable conflict, (3) 
some conflict, (4) minor conflict, and (5) same interest.
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The second aspect, pride in organisational membership, is measured by the following 
statement which is taken from Porter et al.’s (1974) Organisational Commitment 
Questionnaire:
“I  am proud to tell others that I  am part o f this bank. ”
The response categories are based on a five-point scale ranging from “fully  
disagree”, “disagree”, “neither disagree nor agree”, “partly agree”, to “fully  
agree. ”
The third aspect, positive attitudes toward the bank and its management, is measured 
individually by capturing the latent variable underlying several opinion statements. It is 
assumed that individuals who strongly identify with their organisation are positively 
biased when making judgements about the company that are difficult to verify.
(1) “A t the top o f the bank we have competent and sensible people. ”
(2) “The bank has good prospectsfor the future ”.
(3) “There is good co-operation between departments and branches in the bank. ”
(4) “The bank has a series o f interesting financial products. ”
(5) “The bank is bureaucratic and not open to development that would enhance its 
performance. ”
(6) “The bank supports many important causes in society. ”
(7) “One cannot trust the bank because top management is capable o f deceiving 
people. ”
The response categories are on a five-point scale ranging from “fully disagree”, 
“disagree ”, “neither disagree nor agree ”, “partly agree ”, to “fully agree. ”
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There are other approaches measuring identification in the literature (e.g. Porter 
et al., 1974, Hall, Schneider and Nygren, 1970). These authors have attempted to 
measure it in terms of only shared values. However, these approaches do not 
consider social identity aspect of identification such as in-group positive bias and 
pride in membership. Hence, since these are not comprehensive enough, this 
research adopts BenkhofFs approach identified above.
Factor analysis and a reliability test were conducted to test homogeneity of sub­
scales (See Table 7-1 (a) and (b) for factor loadings). The results show that all 
items measuring organisational identification are divided into three factors (See 
Table 8-1 (a) for factor loadings). The removal of items 5 and 6  ( “The hank is 
bureaucratic and not open to development that would enhance its performance ” 
and “The bank supports many important causes in society”)  reduces the three 
factors to just two. The first factor refers to positive attitudes (item 1 to item 7), 
shared values and norms and pride in the bank, and the second factor is about 
shared goals with the bank in general and headquarters. For the purpose of 
subsequent analyses (e.g. correlation analysis and multi-regression analysis), the 
second factor (shared goals) was removed from the identification scale (Table 7-1 
(b)). This was because identification refers to positive attitudes toward the in­
group and it is thought to be more important to include positive attitudes rather 
than shared goals to measure identification. Items (5) and (6 ) were also removed 
for the same reason.
It is unclear exactly why in the result of factor analysis item (5) appeared as an 
independent factor. One possible reason is that the statement may be seen to 
indicate a factual characteristic of banks in Korea rather than a measurement of an 
emotional attitude. Generally, the banking industry in Korea is regarded as a 
relatively stable industry composed of bureaucratic organisations, particularly in 
comparison to other private companies. Even though attitude is based in part on a 
factual (cognitive) component, the emotional aspect is also important. However, 
these two elements are not always congruent. For example, even if a bank is 
bureaucratic, employees may still have a positive attitude in the Korean context.
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With regards to item (6 ), one possible reason for the deviation is that there are no 
social causes for Korean banks to support.
Table 7-1 Factor analysis of organisational identification
(a) identification scale based on all the items
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1. The bank has good prospects .79245 .05450 -.19097
2. There is good co-operation .74490 .06784 .05927
3 .1 am proud to tell others .73810 .14942 -.23070
4. The bank has interesting products .72158 -.18765 .10185
5. Bank has competent top managers .66780 .06401 .09635
6 . My values and those of bank are same .61230 .00480 .12704
7. One can not trust management of bank .54011 .11865 .07893
8 . The same goals and interests with Head office .04051 .86162 .10269
9. The same goals and interests with bank .18457 .80388 .00316
lO.The bank is bureaucratic -.10103 .25564 .75125
1 l.The bank supports causes in society .32408 -.18751 .66750
Eigenvalue= 4.20 Variance =38.3 N=228 KMO=.83 Alpha=.63 BTS=.0000
(b) Identification scale after removal of some items
Factor loadings
1. The bank has good prospects .78756
2. There is good co-operation .74948
3 .1 am proud to tell others .73957
4. The bank has interesting products .71155
5. Bank has competent top managers .67850
6 . My values and those of bank are same .64372
7. One can not trust management of bank -.61132
Eigenvalue= 3.49 Variance =.50 N=228 KMO=,84 Alpha=.62 BTS=.0000
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7.2 The Measurement of Work Group Norms
There has been little statistically-based research into group norms and their 
relationship with organisational effectiveness. Consequently it is not surprising 
that there is a lack of well-developed instruments to measure them. One 
explanation stems from the difficulty in measuring norms as a collective concept.
One of the most significant features of group norms as properties of a social 
system is that they are based on group behaviour. However, they tend to be 
measured at an individual level through a measure of an individual’s perception 
(by using questionnaires). The problem with this is that the responses can be 
contaminated by individual norms rather than group norms or the aggregation of 
individual data to the group level. Since individual norms are not always 
congruent with group norms, it is open to question as to whether or not the 
former accurately reflect the latter when measurement is undertaken.
The following section deals with how group norms are measured in this research, 
based on a critical literature review of approaches to the measurement of norms. 
Measures of group norms, in this research, have been approached in two ways in 
order to enhance the validity of measurement: qualitatively through in-depth 
interviews, and quantitatively through questionnaires. Both methods have relative 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of the validity of norms measurement. In order 
to measure norms or culture within groups or organisations, many authors 
advocate qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, and observation (e.g. 
Louis, 1983, Smircich, 1983). Such proponents argue that norms are most 
appropriately assessed by qualitative methods for the following reasons;
(1) The fundamental content of culture (norms) is unconscious and highly 
subjective.
(2) Norms (culture) are highly subjective social constructions that cannot 
properly be studied by researcher-constructed categories and scales.
(3) The categorisation of constructs of norms (culture) by researchers doing field 
research may misrepresent the experiences of respondents, and may thus be
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invalid. For these reasons, qualitative methods may be useful to enhance the 
validity of norms measurement. Furthermore, since many behavioural norms can 
exist within a group, it may be difficult to identify them all through the structured 
and categorised quantitative approach, and consequently many important norms 
which may effect discretionary effort may be overlooked. This implies that the 
sole use of quantitative methods, such as questionnaires, may be problematic in 
measuring group norms.
Despite the fact that qualitative approaches have strong support, one possible 
reason why quantitative methods are generally preferred is that it is exceedingly 
difficult to make any analytic comparisons from qualitative data. There are many 
important theoretical questions which cannot be answered until norms can be 
measured with repeatable, easily administered instruments that permit systematic 
comparisons. For example, behavioural norms can be derived from the values and 
expectations that organisational members share (e.g. Pettigrew, 1979; Baker, 
1980). In order to determine the extent to which norms are shared, the responses 
of individual organisational members must be compared. In order to learn if an 
organisation has sub-units (e.g. departments) with distinctive norms (e.g., Martin 
and Siehl, 1983), it may be possible to identify and compare group norms. In 
order to study norms as a dynamic process of learning and change, systematic 
comparisons across time must be made possible.
Furthermore, in order to test speculations about the relationship between types of 
norms or the strength of these norms and levels of effort or profitability, it is 
necessary to use quantitative methods. It may be difficult to make these types of 
comparisons systematically when only qualitative data are available. A few studies 
have used quantitative approaches to the study of norms (e.g. Cooke and 
Rousseau, 1988; Kilmann and Saxton, 1983).
Since this research is designed to examine the statistical relationship between 
group norms, discretionary effort and performance, the survey method is 
indispensable. In response to the above critiques, both quantitative data
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(questionnaire) and additionally qualitative methods (in-depth interview) are used 
to compensate for the challenges inherent in both approaches.
7.2.1 Qualitative Method (In-depth Interview)
Nine managers and fourteen employees from different branches were interviewed 
and the following questions were asked in order to obtain data concerning norms 
measurement.
(1) What sort o f values or behavioural patterns are valued in your bank branch?
(2) What sort o f values or behavioural patterns are disapproved o f in your 
branch?
(3) What will happen to you i f  you do not follow  your group norms or values? 
Will you be punished?
(4) I f  you get punished, what kind ofpunishment is there?
(5) What is the most important thing to observe fo r  employees working in your 
branch?
(6) What things do employees very much like to see happening in your branch?
(7) What is the biggest mistake an employee can make at work in your branch?
(8) What sort o f things does your branch manager emphasise the most when you 
have meetings?
(9) Are there any “taboos ” in your branch?
The main findings may be summarised as follows:
First, concerning the above questions used to obtain branch norms, most 
managers gave similar answers. In particular, response patterns were almost the 
same for the following questions: (1), (2), (5) and (8 ). These are “co-operation 
among members”, “respects towards members and customers”, “enthusiastic and 
hard work”, “honesty”, “trust relationships”, “new ideas” and “employees’ 
ability”.
However, the responses to the following questions: (6 ),(7) and (9) did not 
produce similar responses as questions (1), (2), (5) and (8 ) (e.g. “high payment”, 
“promotion”, and “ finish the works in time” and in some cases (e.g. What sorts
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of “taboos” are there in your branch) there were no answers at all because the 
respondents did not understand completely what the questions meant. When 
interviews were conducted with employees, most of them did not understand 
wkat group norms were. However, when employees were asked the questions: 
“What behaviours are valued in your branch? ” and “What sort o f behaviour is 
disapproved of? ”, they answered easily. These results were similar to those of the 
interviews with managers. The results give an insight into one possible way of 
measuring group norms, which is to access group norms in terms of specific 
behavioural patterns rather than by asking directly what the group norms are.
The existence of group norms may be recognised when employees meet with 
disapproval for behaving in certain ways. In Korean banks, when employees 
violate group norms, they may meet with disapproval and punishments as follows:
( 1 ) criticism from the manager or co-workers; (2 ) exclusion from dinner or drink 
meetings after work. Members may recognise their group norms through the 
disapproval and punishment they experience in the workplace. In addition, 
members recognise the content and strength of norms indirectly through the 
experience of their co-workers.
When comparing the interview results, it was found that responses to questions
(1), (2 ), (5) and (8 ) also varied according to bank branches. Some branch 
managers mentioned co-operative behaviour among members as being important, 
while other managers valued this less. In other branches behavioural patterns such 
as “respect” or “kindness” among members were seen as important. According to 
ordinary employees within branches, this variation in group behaviour or norms 
was considerably influenced by their branch manager’s style. For example, some 
branch managers particularly emphasised co-operation and openness among 
employees in a workplace, for example by organising “a special party” on a 
Sunday to build co-operation and interpersonal trust among members.
Other managers also organised “a meeting” for dinner or drinks after work. These 
sorts of meetings or parties may have affected the formulation of certain kinds of 
group norms (e.g. co-operation/trust) in the workplace. The results of interviews
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indicate that group norms and their strength do vary amongst bank branches. 
Many interviewees with work experience at different branches confirmed that 
there are different group norms in the various branches as well as differences in 
the strength of norms, and this may be an important factor in affecting the level of 
individual effort.
Finally, during the interviews, the following questions were asked in order to see 
the relationship between norms and employees’ effort or performance: “What 
makes employees within bank branches work harder than required?” Most 
respondents said that it depends on “the branch climate (participative/co­
operative)”, or “the relationships among co-workers and managers 
(respect/kindness)” . “Branch climate” and “relationships among members” may 
exert pressure on members through the formation of group norms by the manager 
or co-workers. Respondents also said that these were the most important factors 
affecting branch performance. The “branch climate” and “the relationship among 
members” may reflect the effects of interpersonal behavioural rules. Consequently 
what group members call “branch climate” seems to have basically the same 
meaning as “group norms”. It is conceivable that group norms are the most 
significant factor in affecting the effort level of employees as demonstrated 
through the results of the interview. It seems that certain kinds of group norms do 
make people work harder.
7.2.2 Quantitative Method (Questionnaire)
In order to measure norms as a collective concept with a questionnaire, this 
research focuses on the concept of “d isa p p ro v a lSince group norms are 
behavioural rules which are “desirable and admirable”, employees meet with 
“disapproval” when they violate these rules. Hence, group members may 
recognise their group norms by encountering certain kinds of “punishments” 
(raised eyebrows, criticisms, censure, public humiliation, and even rejection from 
the group) when they violate their group norms. Since punishments are severe for 
strong group norms, this strength is measured by the degree of “disapproval”
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(punishments). This approach in measuring norms may be convincing, compared 
to the other previously used measures of norms which suffer from several flaws 
in terms of the validity of measurement.
Given that there has been lack of research into group norms (in particular, the link 
between types of norms and performance), there are only a few instruments in the 
literature measuring norms, including the one designed by Cooke and Rousseau 
(1988). There are other norms measures available, such as the Norm Diagnosis 
Index (NDI; Allen and Dyer, 1980). Since NDI may be used by others 
researchers, it deserves particular attention and scrutiny.
Cooke and Rousseau’s instrument will be analysed and criticised with the 
following questions in mind: ( 1 ) does the instrument actually measure what it is 
supposed to measure? and (2 ) are the individual items clearly worded or are they 
ambiguous and easily misunderstood by respondents?
Cooke and Rousseau define behavioural norms as the shared beliefs and values 
guiding the thinking and behavioural styles of members. They assume that these 
values specify appropriate and inappropriate behavioural patterns in an 
organisational setting. Cooke and Rousseau seek to assess behavioural norms 
within an organisation and their sub-units (groups).
It is questionable, however, whether Cooke and Rousseau’s proposed instrument 
really measures behavioural norms. It attempts to measure behavioural norms in 
terms of “members’ expectations in the organisation” by presenting the following 
statement: “Please think about what it takes fo r  you and people like yourself (e.g. 
your co-workers, people in similar position) to f i t  in and meet expectations in 
your organisation. In other words, how are things done around here?” 
Measuring group norms, through the use of the phrase, “meet expectation in the 
organisation ”, may be problematic for the following reason. Behavioural norms 
are the rules of employees’ behaviour to which a majority of members within a 
group conform. Since group norms tend to restrict or guide members’ behaviour, 
and predict what sorts of behaviours are appropriate, they can be seen as the
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behavioural patterns that are expected of an organisation or group. This 
expectation of the organisation or group, however, may not be based purely on 
specific group norms, but may be contaminated by their wider social desirability. 
It is likely that any desirable social values (e.g. respect) would be expected from 
everybody, whether or not they form part of a group specific norms. Thus this 
approach can measure just socially desirable values rather than actual group 
norms. Therefore, the idea of using the expectations of others to measure 
behavioural norms does not seem to be convincing.
In general, Cook and Rousseau’s measurement is problematic in that the wordings 
of most items in the questionnaire are too ambiguous to allow employees to 
respond consistently. For example, item 1 ("point out flaw s ") attempts to 
measure opposition norms, but the term "flaw" is ambiguous and not specific 
enough. What exactly does it mean? Is it a “flaw” regarding products or processes 
or regarding co-workers? These ambiguous wordings undermine the validity of 
the questionnaire since employees may interpret the particular terms arbitrarily. 
For example, given the question; “point out flaw s’\  some respondents may think 
of the term “flaw” in terms of the personalities of the supervisor or co-workers. 
Others may interpret the term “flaw” in relation to their products or production 
processes. Hence, depending on the definition one attributes to the term “flaw”, 
the response will vary greatly and consequently weaken the validity of the 
questionnaire.
There is an other important measure of behavioural norms, the Norms Diagnostic 
Index (NDI), designed by Allen and Dyer (1980). The authors define norms in the 
following way: “ Norms are expected or usual ways of behaving in groups or 
organisations” (p i94). The NDI was developed from an original pool of 8 6  
survey items used by the Human Resources Institute (HRI) over a period of more 
than 15 years’ work with organisational norms in diverse settings, ranging from 
migrant labour camps to large manufacturing and retail firms. This pool was 
reduced to a final set of 38 statements dealing directly with organisational norms 
in seven primary areas:
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((1 ) performance facilitation: employees' perception of norms relating to job 
performance; (2 ) job involvement: reflecting employees' emotional environment in 
thrir jobs and in the total organisation; (3) training; (4) leader-subordinate 
interaction; (5) policies and procedures: the efficiency of organisational policies 
and procedures and the extent to which they are effectively communicated to 
these who must implement them; (6 ) confrontation: relating to constructive 
re^onses to other people's behaviour (interpersonal interaction); and (7) 
supportive climate.
NDI (see Appendix 2 for all items) seeks to identify the specific norms of these 
various areas rather than general behavioural norms within the group or 
organisation. Allen and Dyer assume that the seven areas are significantly related 
to the success of the organisation. However, they do not consider the specific 
relationship with performance.
NDI may have several problems in terms of the validity of norms measures. First, 
since norms are behavioural rules within a group which restrict members’ 
behaviour, members may be expected to follow them. However, it is doubtful 
whether the use of the idea of “expected or usual ways” is appropriate for 
measuring norms because even if it is not included in all statement wordings, the 
operational definition of norms mentioned in the questionnaire’s instruction makes 
respondents think of norms as the “expected and usual ways” (e.g. “norms is 
expected or usual ways”. “It is norms around here: to maintain the progress that is 
made.” Hence, this idea can be contaminated by social desirable values, and its 
use may not be comprehensive enough to measure norms.
Secondly, there are also problems with the statements in each question. NDI 
intended to measure norms by asking too directly for respondents’ opinions 
concerning norms that exist in the group. It is not always possible to recognise 
what norms are, because norms are sometimes unconscious. For example, this is 
the problem with item 1 : “it is a norm around here: to maintain the progress that 
is made
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Thirdly, NDI seems to measure individual opinions on aspects of an organisation 
rather than group norms themselves. For example, the following items were used 
to measure norms of performance facilitation: “It is the norm in our organisation 
to maintain the progress that is made, ” "...to care about and strive fo r excellent 
performance, ” and "...to have a clear way o f measuring results. ” These items 
may easily lead respondents to give their own opinions about management policies 
rather than about group norms. Norms seen as specific behavioural rules are 
different from individuals’ opinions about the management policies. In general, the 
wordings of items on the questionnaire are also unclear and ambiguous.
There are others instruments measuring culture (e.g. Organsiational Culture 
Profile, O’Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1988; Corporate Culture Survey, 
Glaser, 1983; and Organisational Beliefs Questionnaire, Sashkin and Fulmer, 
1985). However, these are not considered in this research because their concept 
of culture is operationalised in terms of organisational values rather than specific 
behavioural patterns. Given the considerable disadvantages associated with the 
existing instruments measuring norms or culture, in this research norms are 
captured in terms of the disapproval with which deviation from the expected 
behaviour is met. The following section focuses on how specific eight group 
norms are measured.
(1) Achievement norms
Achievement norms refer to the group expectation that employees will do things 
well and set and accomplish their own goals. Employees are expected to set 
challenging but realistic goals, establish plans to reach these goals, and pursue 
them with enthusiasm. The following two items measure achievement norms:
(1) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not take on challenging tasks; and
(2) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not try hard to improve on their past 
performance at work
(2) Competence norms
Competence norms refer to the group expectation that employees will have high 
level of skills and knowledge at work. When competence norms exist groups,
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employees are expected to avoid all mistakes, and work long hours to finish their 
work on time. The following items measure competence norms:
(1) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not have sufficiently high level o f skill 
to do their work;
(2) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not perform perfect tasks; and
(3)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not try to learn all the work skills that 
they need for their work
(3) Co-operation norms
Co-operation norms signify the group expectation that employees will give one 
another a hand at work and will share tasks when necessary. The following three items 
measure co-operation norms:
(1) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not give advice to colleagues who 
need help;
(2)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they just care about their own work without 
co-operation; and
(3) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not share the workload when their 
colleagues are in danger o f not meeting a deadline.
(4) Autonomy norms
Autonomy at work refers to the degree to which the job may provide substantial 
freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling work and in 
determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out (Hackman, 1976). When 
autonomy norms exist, individuals are expected to use autonomy in planning their 
own tasks or determining the work procedures. Hence, autonomy norms can be 
measured by the following three items:
(1)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they shift their responsibility to others;
(2)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not try to use their own judgement in 
interpreting rules and regulations; and
(3) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they are not confident about working on their 
own.
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(5) Innovation norms
Innovation refers to creative change in the work process (e.g. developing new 
methods in dealing with customers or efficient work process). When innovation norms 
exist, employees’ risk-taking and creativity at work are valued and rewarded. These 
norms are measured with the following three items:
(1) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they always follow the same methods when 
they do their own work;
(2) Employees meet with disapproval i f  members do not approach work in original 
ways; and
(3) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not suggest new ideas at work
(6) Respect norms
Respect may be represented by the expression of recognition and praise and 
politeness among members. In this research, respect norms are operationalised in 
terms of expected politeness among employees, and this includes both superiors’ 
respect to subordinates as well as subordinates’ respect to superiors. Respect 
norms are measured through the use of the following three items:
(1)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not show respect fo r  their 
colleagues at work;
(2) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not show respect fo r  their 
superiors at work;
(3)Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not behave in a friendly and 
polite ways towards their colleagues.
(7) Openness norms
Openness norms are interpersonal behavioural rules which are associated with the 
free and frank expression of employees’ opinion to their colleagues and superior 
concerning their branch policies and practices. Openness norms also refer to the 
group expectation of listening to other employees’ opinions and not ignoring 
them. Measurements of these norms may be made through the following 
statements:
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(1) Employees .meet with disapproval i f  they do not express their thoughts and 
opinions on their tasks at work;
(2 ) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not listen to or ignore their 
colleague’s opinions; and
(3) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not share information that would 
help to improve the performance o f the branch
(8 ) Trust norms
The definition of trust adopted in this research refers to both superiors’ trust of 
their subordinates and subordinates’ trust of their superiors. Superiors who trust 
their subordinates tend to control their subordinates’ work behaviour less, and 
subordinates who trust their superiors tend to honestly discuss their problems and 
mistakes at work. Hence, trust is measured by the following three items:
(1) Superiors meet with disapproval i f  they exert too much control over how 
subordinates do their work;
(2) Employees meet with disapproval i f  they do not discuss the problems they 
have with their work with their superior; and
(3) Subordinates meet with disapproval i f  they make mistakes at work and do not 
consult with their superior.
Each of these eight specific norms which are measured by multi-items is put into a 
factor analysis model and a reliability test is conducted to test homogeneity 
between items. The results show that each of these norms belong to one factor 
which implies that they are homogeneous. (See Tables 7-2 for factor loadings and 
Alpha). However, some items which have not shown internal consistency, that is, 
Alpha coefficient is too low (less than .50) were removed from scales ensure 
reliability (e.g. autonomy norms). Although Alpha coefficient is unacceptable low 
(.46), these items such as achievement norms are adopted as homogeneous scale, 
because Alpha coefficient (.46) may be relatively not too low, when considering 
only two items.
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Tables 7-2 Factor analysis and reliability test for norms
_______ Achievement norms___________________, Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not take on
challenging tasks. .8069
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not try hard
to improve the past performance at work. .8069
Eigenvalue= 1.32, Variance=.53, N=228, KMO=.50, Alpha=.46, BTS=.0000
Competence norms Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not have
enough skill to do jobs. .7578
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not do perfect jobs. .7916
(3) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not try to learn
all the work skills that they need for their work. .8114
Eigenvalue 1.86, Variance .62, N=228, KMO= .6 6 , Alpha=.69 BTS=.0000
Co-operation norms Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not share the work
when their colleagues are in danger of not meeting the deadline. .8560
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they just care about
their own work without co-operation. .7901
(3) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not give
advice colleagues who need help. .7882
Eigenvalue= 1.98, Variance^ .6 6 , N=228, KMO= .67, Alpha=.74 BTS=.0000
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Autonomy norms Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if people do not try to use 
their own judgement in interpreting rules and regulations. .8552
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they are not confident 
about working on their own. .8552
Eigenvalue = 1.46, Variance = .73, N=228, KMO= .50, Alpha=.63 BTS=.0000
Innovation norms Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if members do not approach 
work in original ways. .7920
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they always follow the same 
methods when they do their own work. .6971
(3) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not show new ideas and 
make suggestions on work. .7758
Eigenvalue 1.72, Variance .57, N=228, KMO= .63, Alpha=62 BTS=.0000
Respect norms
Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if members do not show
respect for their supervisors at work. .7440
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not show respect
for their colleagues at work. .8131
(3) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not behave friendly
and politely to their colleagues. .8579
Eigenvalue 1.95, Variance=65.1, N=228, KMO= .65, Alpha=.73, BTS=.0000
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Openness norms Factor loadings
(1) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not express
their thoughts and opinions on their tasks at work. .7305
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not share
information that would help to improve the performance
of the branch. .7466
(3) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not listen to
and ignore their colleagues’ opinion. .7044
Eigenvalue= 1.59, Variance=.53 , N=228, KM0=62 , Alpha=.55 BTS=.0000
Trust norms Factor loadings
( 1) Superiors meet with disapproval if they exert much control over
how subordinates do their work. .7170
(2) Employees meet with disapproval if they do not discuss the problems
they have with their work with their superiors. .7487
(3) Subordinates meet with disapproval if they make mistakes at work and
do not consult with their superior. .7170
Eigenvalue =1.60, Variance =.53, N=228, KMO= .63, Alpha=.56 BTS== . 0 0 0 0
7.3 Statistical Methods and Results
The specific statistical techniques which will be used in this analysis follow those 
mentioned in the previous section, Chapter 6.
7.3.1 Differences and Similarities between the Specific Group Norms
Factor analysis is conducted to examine whether each of the eight specific group 
norms is an independent mechanism or if there exists an underlying common 
factor. 22 items of norms measurement are entered into a factor analysis model. 
These are divided into the three factors as shown in Table 7-3. This Table 
demonstrates that the eight specific group norms are strongly interlinked, 
appearing as three factors: the first refers to an underlying common factor among
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competence norms, respect norms, and trust norms; the second among 
autonomy norms, co-operation norms and innovation norms, and the final 
factor refers to achievement norms, openness norms, trust norms and innovation 
norms.
Even though there are interrelations between these three factors, one can infer 
differences in underlying meanings between them: the first factor seems to refer to 
discretionary effort-promoting norms which are based on individual characteristics 
in terms of their ability and personal disposition. These norms are interrelated in 
that competent employees will tend to be respected and trusted within an 
organisation. Additionally, some other norms items appear as the common cluster 
with the first factor (e.g. “listen to peers’ opinion” - openness norms, and “the 
improvement of performance”- achievement norms). One possible explanation for 
these overlaps is as follows: openness norms which are measured by the item, 
“Employees meet with disapproval if they do not listen to their colleagues’ 
opinion” seems to be related to respect norms because people tend to listen to 
peers’ opinion if they respect their peers. The item measuring achievement norms, 
“Employees meet with disapproval if they do not try hard to improve the past 
performance at work” is related to competence norms in the sense that the 
existence of achievement norms may also encourage employees to improve their 
competence.
The second factor seems to refer to discretionary effort-promoting norms which 
are pertinent to the process of dealing with tasks. They are interrelated in a 
theoretical sense in that employees enjoying autonomy at work tend to help and 
co-operate with colleagues (co-operation norms) and also try to work in original 
ways (innovation norms). Since employees enjoying autonomy at work tend to 
work alone without the control of supervisor, they feel more responsible for their 
own work and thus may need co-operation with their peers for better 
performance. One of the items measuring openness norms, “Employees meet with 
disapproval if they do not share information that would help to improve the 
performance”, has loaded on the second factor. One possible explanation may be
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the interrelation between co-operation norms and openness norms in that sharing 
information is one of ways of co-operation.
Finally, it is not clear whether the third factor has any underlying meaning and 
why these items appear as one factor. One possible reason may be due to 
employee’s different responses deriving from the measurement problems rather 
than to theoretical similarities. As the correlation coefficient (.27) between the 
items of achievement norms shows, two items are not homogeneous (“take on 
challenging tasks” and “try hard to improve on their past performance at work”). 
This weak correlation may be due to the wrong measurement of “take on 
challenging tasks”. Achievement norms seem better captured by the item, “try 
hard to improve on their past performance at work” than by “taking on 
challenging tasks” because the latter may not be appropriate in the Korean bank in 
that most of the tasks within bank branches are simple and routine, and thus 
employees may not feel challenged by their work. This may have affected the 
result of factor analysis. Openness norms measured by the item, “Employees meet 
with disapproval if they do not express their thoughts and opinions on their tasks 
at work”, may be problematic. Respondents may also have perceived this as 
carrying negative connotations (e.g. the expression of strong individual opinions 
or thoughts on their tasks may harm co-operative relationships, which might imply 
a criticism of non-conformity with company policies). One item measuring trust 
norms may not be appropriate in that most employees tend not to reveal their 
mistakes or faults to their superior unless they a great deal trust him (her). Rather 
they are likely to hide their mistakes so as not to be criticised for their 
incompetence. The item measuring innovation norms (“follow the same work 
methods) may be problematic since it does not seem appropriate in a banking 
context where most tasks within bank branches are simple and routine and thus 
may require the same methods.’
Some norms items such as openness norms are loaded on separate clusters. This 
may be due to the theoretical interaction between norms dimensions or the 
measurement problems mentioned above. For example, openness norms are 
strongly inter-linked with trust norms, respect norms, and co-operation norms and
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consequently this makes extremely difficult to measure pure openness norms 
without the contamination of respect, trust norms and co-operation norms. For 
this reason, one item measuring openness norms (“listen to pees’ opinions”) goes 
together with respect and trust norms, and the other item (“sharing information”) 
goes together with co-operation norms. As a result of these potential problems, it 
is suggested that better measures concerning some items of achievement norms, 
openness norms, trust norms and innovation norms are needed in order to 
examine the better relationship between specific norms.
With regard to the distinction between the eight norms, despite the fact that there 
is clear theoretical independence as discussed in Chapter 5, the results of factor 
analysis do not show such distinctions. To ensure the construct validity among 
norms dimensions, factor based-variables will be used for subsequent analysis 
such as correlation analysis and multiple-regression analysis.
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Table 7-3 Factor analysis of group norms
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Respect norm (friendly and politely) .75768 -.13901 -.04525
Competence norm (do perfect jobs) .72753 -.20791 -.24996
Respect norm (respect for colleagues) .71589 .17661 .20365
Trust norms (consult with their supervisor) .70601 -.14285 -.21057
Openness norm (listen to colleagues opinion) .69710 .15155 .28439
Competence norm (enough skill) .59476 .14321 .34167
Achievement norm (improve the past performance) .57456 -.18910 .05859
Respect norm (respect for supervisor) .47418 -.20699 .12784
Trust norm ( not too much control) .45758 .08440 .34704
Competence norm ( learn all the work skill) .44127 -.37884 -.05542
Autonomy norm (use their own judgement) -.14747 -.77036 .08437
Autonomy norm (confident about their own work) .11636 -.74523 -.09904
Co-operation norm ( share the work with colleagues) .04670 -.70880 .10984
Co-operation norm ( give advise colleagues) .08989 -.69478 .02379
Innovation norm ( show new idea) .03499 -.64422 .16292
Openness norm ( share information) .23051 -.63344 -.09392
Innovation norm (approach works in original way) -.04039 -.47992 .41241
Co-operation norm (care about others work) .33206 -.35508 .18072
Achievement norm (challenging tasks) .06914 .01957 .71907
Openness norm (express their own opinion) -.03723 -.31706 .57021
Trust norm (discuss problems with superior) . 1 1 2 1 1 -.29920 .56857
Innovation norm ( not follow the same method) .13273 -.09964 .55210
7.3.2 Difference between Group Motivation and BenkhofTs individual 
Motivation Mechanisms
Factor analysis is conducted in order to test whether the two additional variables 
(organisational identification and group norms) can be seen as independent 
mechanisms which differ from the individual motivation mechanisms identified by 
Benkhoff (1994). Since there are too many items of norms, the factor (mean) of
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each of the eight norms is put into the factor analysis model. Additionally, another 
method of factor analysis is conducted on the basis of individual items of norms 
because aggregated data may cause statistical problems (see Appendix 8 ). As 
hypothesised, the results of the factor analysis (Table 7-4 and Appendix 8 ) show, 
first of all, that group norms appear as independent clusters of the five individual 
motivation mechanisms and organisational identification. The results of factor 
analysis (Table 7-4) also confirm the findings in Table 6 -6 , according to which 
BenkhofFs individual motivation mechanisms appeared as four individual clusters, 
with one cluster including both a intrinsic motivation and disposition.
The results of factor analysis with reference to group norms are as expected: all 
the different group norms appeared as independent clusters from the BenkhofFs 
motivation mechanisms and were also not common factors to organisational 
identification. This implies that group norms are different from the individual 
motivation mechanisms identified BenkhofF and organisational identification. 
These findings support the previous argument (in Chapter 5), which hypothesised 
that although group norms share some similarities with other motivation 
mechanisms (e.g. the need for achievement, social exchange theory etc.), they are 
in other respects different. With regard to organisational identification, Table 7-4 
also show clearly that it is independent of group norms and the five motivation 
mechanisms.
In conclusion, according to the results of factor analysis (Table 7-4), it can be said 
that this research model, which is composed of BenkhofFs five individual 
motivation mechanisms, group norms and organisational identification, is on the 
whole appropriate and convincing. It can be argued that the discrepancies 
identified above are due to either the inter-links between theories or measurement 
problems (especially, the overlap in the measurement of variables).
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Table 7-4 Factor analysis of BenkhofFs individual motivation mechanisms,
identification and group norms
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
l)Behavioural commitment/ 
Need for esteem
-Hardworking person .78 .08 - . 0 0 . 0 0 .0 1 - . 0 2
-Others’ expectation .77 -.04 - . 0 0 -.07 .05 .04
-Working conditions . 6 6 . 0 2 .08 . 0 1 -.03 .15
-Personal approval .55 .09 .07 -.16 .40 . 0 0
-Feel needed .54 .04 .16 -.08 .29 . 1 0
-Recognition at work .36 .05 .09 - . 1 2 .32 .30
2) Group norms 
-Openness norms . 1 2 .83 - . 0 2 -.05 - . 0 0 - . 1 2
-Trust norms .06 .78 - . 0 2 -.07 -.03 .04
-Innovation norms -.18 .78 -.04 . 0 2 .15 .05
-Co-operation norms - . 1 0 .76 .18 - . 0 1 .09 -.08
-Respect norms . 2 1 .76 . 0 2 -.04 -.16 -.03
-Competence norms .16 .74 .03 .06 - . 2 0 .17
-Achievement norms .03 .70 -.06 -.13 -.09 .03
-Autonomy norms -.28 .69 .08 .15 .32 - . 0 0
3) Social exchange theory 
-Satisfaction with promotion - . 1 1 .06 .80 .03 .07 -.06
-Satisfaction with pay .15 .09 .76 .14 -.19 .05
-Satisfaction with position . 1 0 - . 0 0 .71 -.08 -.04 .13
-Satisfaction with task area .06 - . 0 2 .70 -.09 -.08 .16
-Satisfaction with training -.07 -.06 .63 - . 1 0 .23 -.15
-Initial expectation - . 0 2 - . 0 0 .52 -.17 .32 -.17
4) Identification 
-Good co-operation -.03 -.06 . 1 0 -.79 -.03 - . 0 0
-Good prospects .04 .04 - . 0 2 -.77 - . 0 2 -.07
-Interesting products - . 1 2 .07 . 0 0 -.70 .04 . 0 0
-Competent top manager .17 .08 -.13 -.69 - . 0 0 -.04
-Pride in membership .03 . 0 1 .08 -.60 .09 .16
-Trust top management -.15 . 0 2 -.17 .55 . 2 2 - . 0 0
-Shared values -.13 - . 0 1 - . 0 2 -.53 .15 -.04
5)Disposition/intrinsic motivation 
-Intrinsic motivation . 2 0 - . 0 1 .07 . 0 1 .75 . 0 1
-Work disposition . 2 0 .05 .04 -.06 .47 .37
6) The need for achievement 
-Self-development -.07 .03 . 0 1 -.06 - . 0 0 . 8 6
-Challenging jobs .16 - . 0 1 . 0 2 .03 - . 0 0 .76
7.4 The Correlates of Discretionary Effort
Table 7-5 shows that there are clear relationships between organisational 
identification, group norms and discretionary effort at the individual level.
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Oiganisational identification is significant at the 1 per cent level for discretionary 
behaviour and extra work effort. Regarding group norms, it is seen that factor 1 
norms (achievement norms, competence norms, respect norms, and trust norms) 
are significantly correlated with both discretionary behaviour and extra work
effort.
Table 7-5 Correlates of discretionary effort
(Spearman correlation coefficient, n=228, one tailed test, *= probability values < .05 
**probaility values < .01, the analysis unit is at the individual level)
Means Standard
Deviation
Discretionary
behaviour
Extra 
W ork effort
1) Identification 3.15 .47 .25** .36**
2) Group norms: factor based
Factor 1 3.03 .67 .33** .18**
Factor 2 2.43 .63 .01 .12
Factor 3 2.57 .65 .01 .05
Since group norms exist at a group level, it is thought to be useful to examine the 
relationship between group norms and discretionary effort at the bank branch 
level. For this purpose, it is necessary to aggregate individual perceptions of 
group norms to the branch level. A variety of individuals’ responses concerning 
discretionary effort or motivation mechanisms in bank branches were averaged to
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determine the means at the group level. Two criteria must be met when using 
aggregated data to characterise unit-level (group level) constructs (group norms):
( 1 ) a significance in between-unit differences in members’ perceptions of group 
norms must be proved (2 ) a within-unit consensus regarding the group norms 
must be ensured (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988, p.254).
To test for the first criterion of aggregation, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), 
which contrasts group norms across groups, was used. The computed results 
indicated significant (p< .05) differences in the means of all the different kinds of 
group norms across the 51 bank branch units.
To test the second criterion for aggregation, Eta squared, a measure of within- 
unit (group) agreement, was computed. It can be interpreted as the proportion in 
the dependent variable explained by differences among groups. The results 
indicate a high degree of agreement regarding each unit’s group norms (ranging 
from .27 to .47). Because within-unit agreement on perceptual variables averaged 
.12 in other research (Glick, 1985) and ranged from .13 to .37 in Rousseau’s 
(1990) research, results here suggest relatively strong within-unit agreement and 
therefore support the appropriateness of aggregation to the unit level.
Table 7-6 shows that all the norms exhibit a variation (mean differences) across 
bank branches and agreement within a certain group. Table 7-7 shows the 
correlation between discretionary effort and its correlates assumed at the group 
level. The results of the analysis appeared as expected: both factor 1 norms and 
factor 2  norms are significant for discretionary effort.
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Table 7-6 Analysis of variance for group norms scale by branches
Eta-squared F
^Identification .35 1.90**
2) Factor 1 norms .65 2.59**
3) Factor 2 norms .54 1.48**
4) Factor 3 norms .59 1.89**
5) Need for achievement .56 1.65**
6 ) Behavioural commitment/
Need for achievement .62 2.31**
7) Work disposition/
intrinsic motivation .59 j 9 9 **
8 ) Social exchange theory .52 1.33
Table 7-7 Relationships between group norms and discretionary effort
(Pearson’s Correlation, *=probability values<.05, ** probability values <.01, 
analysis unit is at group, n= 51)
Discretionary effort Mean Std. Self Colleagues’ Superiors’ Extra
Deviation work effort
a) Identification 3.14 .37 .57** .28* .25* .62**
b) Group norms
Factor 1 2.98 .50 5 7 ** .62** .40** .13
Factor 2 3.22 .54 .42** .55** .50** .48**
Factor 3 2.55 .50 .19 .40** . 2 0 .09
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7.5 “Tournament” of the Variables
Multiple-regression analysis (Linear, logistic) is conducted to examine the 
variables representing group motivation mechanisms make a contribution to 
discretionary effort when the effect of other variables (the five motivation 
theories) is held constant. Tables 7-8 (a) and (b) indicate that some hypothesised 
variables among motivation mechanisms appeared as significant for discretionary 
effort. The following variables are found to be significant for discretionary 
behaviour (self): factor 1 norms (competence norms, respect norms, trust norms) 
and organisational identification (Table 7-8 (a)). Among BenkhofFs five 
individual motivation mechanisms, only one factor (behavioural commitment/ 
need for self-esteem) is seen to be significant for discretionary behaviour. By 
contrast, the results o f logistic regression (Table 7-8 (b)), which focuses on the 
relationship between motivation mechanisms and Discretionary effort as extra 
work effort, are slightly different from those in Table 7-8 (a). The relationship 
between extra work effort and each of the following variables appeared as 
significant: behavioural commitment/need for esteem, and organisational 
identification. However, any group norms do not appear significant for extra work 
effort at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 7-8 Antecedents of discretionary effort: group motivation
(Multiple-regression analysis, Beta coefficient, *=p=< 05 
* * = < . 0 1  analysis level is an individual, n=228)
(a)Discretionary behaviour (self: linear) (b) Extra work effort (log istic)
Adjusted R Square .38 Model Chi- Square
F = 10.41 Signif F = .00 Signifi F= .00
Beta Wald
1) Need for achievement .05 .36
2  Need for self-esteem/ .37** 1.34**
Behavioural commitment
3) Disposition/ .05 . 0 2
Intrinsic motivation
4) Social exchange theory -.09 -.40
5) Identification .19* 1.29**
6 ) Factor 1 norms .37** . 1 0
7) Factor 2 norms .05 .52
8 ) Factor 3 norms -.09 -.43
Table 7-9 shows the relationship between group motivation mechanisms and 
discretionary effort resulting from multiple-regression at the group level. Factor 1 
norms (competence norms, respect norms and trust norms) are significant for 
employees’ own discretionary behaviour, colleagues’ discretionary behaviour, and 
superior’s discretionary behaviour. Organisational identification also appears to be 
significant for all discretionary behaviour (self, colleagues, superior). However, at 
the group level, like the individual level, factor 1 norms are not significantly 
related to extra work effort, but factor 2  norms are significantly related to extra 
work effort.
177
Table 7-9 Relationship between group norms and discretionary effort
(Multiple-regression analysis, Beta coefficients, *=p< 05 **=p<01 
analysis level is an group).
l)Discretionary behaviour: Self Colleagues Superiors. 2) Extra work effort
Adjusted R Square .99 .99 .98
F = 1684 S = .00 F= 1427 S=.00 F = 4917 S=.00 Wald
Factor 1 norms .65** .54** .48** .77
Factor 2 norms .09 .26* .41* 7.45**
Factor 3 norms -.18 -.04 - . 2 1  . 1 1
Identification .43** .23* .31* 3.11(s=.07)
7.5.5 Group Norms and Group Productivity
The concept of performance used in this research refers to productivity, which 
expresses the relationship between output and the inputs required for its 
production. When applied to the group level of analysis, productivity is an index 
of the output of the group’s relative to inputs (efficiency) relative to goals 
(effectiveness) or relative to both. In other words, a clear conceptualisation of 
group productivity includes the use of group-based measures of both efficiency 
and effectiveness. In addition, the concept of group productivity more explicitly 
acknowledges that the functioning of a group requires interdependence between 
individuals if objectives are to be achieved. Because of this interdependence, the 
productivity of the group is not simply the sum of the performances of the 
individuals involved. Productivity also includes factors such as how well 
individuals co-operate with each other, and how the personnel are co-ordinated 
and managed. Although much of this research focuses on individuals, there is 
considerable interest in group performance and productivity as well. This is 
certainly appropriate because so much of the work done in an organisation is done
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by groups. Hence, it can be assumed that group productivity may result from the 
interaction between members. Since this interaction among members may be 
represented in the form of group norms, it is interesting to link group norms and 
group productivity at the group level
7.5.5 . 1  The Results
The results of logistic regression analysis (Table 7-10) show that there are also 
significant relationships between group norms and branch performance, 
particularly factor 1 norms (competence norms, respect norms and trust norms). 
This analysis shows whether group norms mechanisms contribute to the branch 
performance when the effects of other variables are held constant.
Table 7-10 Relationships between group norms and branch performance
(Logistic regression, n=36, Wald, * p<.05, **p<.01)
Model Chi- Square .14 Significance = 0.05
Variable Wald
Factor 1 norms 4.70*
Factor 2 norms .03
Factor 3 norms .69
Identification .19
Active sales policy .35
Directing . 0 1
Good premises 1.44
Managers’ competence .84
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7.6 Research Findings and Discussion
This Chapter has aimed to test the links between group motivation and 
discretionary effort and these relationships are confirmed by some statistical 
analysis:
Firstly, we have sought to test whether identification and group norms as group 
motivation mechanisms are separate mechanisms from those revealed in individual 
motivation mechanisms identified by Benkhoff (1994) (this is demonstrated by 
factor analysis) and whether both mechanisms provide further explanatory power 
in relation to employees’ discretionary effort. The results of factor analysis 
confirm that group norms and identification are perceived as different motivation 
mechanisms by respondents.
Secondly, the aim is test whether or not group motivation mechanisms such as 
organisational identification and group norms are responsible for discretionary 
effort in Korean bank branches. With regard to these relationships, Spearman 
correlation and multiple-regression analyses demonstrate that there are indeed 
strong links in the Korean context. Group motivation mechanisms such as 
organisational identification and group norms are proven to provide additional 
explanation for employees’ discretionary effort in Korean context to the five 
motivation mechanisms.
Specifically, this research demonstrates the following results:
(1) Among group motivation mechanisms, organisational identification is seen as 
an independent mechanism from group norms. Organisational identification has 
considerable impact on employees’ discretionary effort in Korean context.
(2) With particular respect to the specific group norms, factor analysis illustrates 
that there are underlying common elements which derive from theoretical 
interrelations: between autonomy, co-operation and innovation norms as 
performance-enhancing norms for the process of dealing with tasks; and between
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respect, trust and competence norms as performance-enhancing norms based on 
individual characteristics, in terms of ability and personal disposition.
(3) Statistical analyses (correlation analysis, and multivariate analysis) confirm that 
there are obvious links between specific types of norms and discretionary effort. In 
particular, discretionary effort-promoting norms based on individual attributes 
have an effect on employees’ discretionary effort, and lead to high branch 
performance. Even though these results are slightly different according to the 
statistical techniques, mode of measurement and analysis unit used, there are 
common norms, such as competence norms and respect norms, which strongly 
affect the discretionary effort of employees. This may imply that employees are 
more likely to exert discretionary effort under the pressure norms that stress 
individual attributes (such as ability or disposition) than those that stress task 
processes (such as co-operation or innovation).
Hence, the results of this research clearly suggest that, in the Korean context, 
individual work behaviour is strongly affected by group motivation mechanisms as 
well as by factors identified in BenkhofFs individual motivation mechanisms 
(1994). This implies that motivation mechanisms, at least those identified in this 
research, function in the Korean bank branches.
There has been no research so far which considers individual motivation 
mechanisms and group motivation mechanisms at the same time, taking an 
integrative approach. According to the results of multiple-regression analysis, into 
which all the motivation mechanisms were entered, individual work behaviour 
(e.g. discretionary effort) is strongly affected not only by individual values and 
needs, but also by group motivation mechanisms such as work group norms and 
organisational identification. An important point here is whether these results 
apply only to the Korean context or to other countries such as Britain or America. 
Some authors argue that some Asian countries such as Korea or Japan are 
culturally “group-oriented societies” while western countries such as America or 
Britain are more likely to be “individualistic” (e.g. Hampden-Tumer, 1993; and
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Hofstede, 1993). For this reason, they suggest that individual behaviour in some 
Asian countries is more likely to be influenced by group expectations rather than 
individual values or motives. However, this argument does not seem to be 
convincing in the sense that work group norms which are based on group 
expectations can exist even in western countries where “individualism” 
dominates. Even though this model, which consists of individual motivation 
mechanisms and group motivation mechanisms, has not been tested in western 
countries such as Britain or America, much research about group norms suggests 
that group motivation mechanisms have a strong impact on individual behaviour in 
western countries.
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Chapter 8 The Outcomes of Discretionary Effort
8.1 Theoretical Link between discretionary effort and Financial 
Performance
In a service context like that of bank branches, discretionary effort may be expressed 
in various ways such as active customer-service behaviour or helpful behaviour 
directed at customers which is beyond the in-role job description. This form of 
discretionary effort performed at the level of groups is positively related to branch 
performance. Group members generally tend to be helpful, courteous, and 
knowledgeable in their interactions with customers. At the initial point of contact, 
discretionary effort may result in higher sales because sales personnel provide 
customers with information and knowledgeable advice and help them locate items 
that will suit their needs. Customers who are the recipients of discretionary 
behaviours (e.g. that which is favourable and polite) are more likely to enjoy their 
experience and to develop a positive opinion of the branch; in general the branch 
may come to be viewed as a nice place in which courteous assistance is provided. 
This can in turn result in more repeat visits to the branch, generating subsequent 
sales and advertising whereby satisfied customers share their experiences with family 
and friends. In the end, bank branch may develop a positive image in the community. 
All of these potential outcomes of the level of discretionary effort directed at 
customers should ultimately affect overall branch performance.
This assumption is consistent with traditional ideas in the organisation and 
marketing literatures which stress the importance of providing good customer 
service (e.g., Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1985). The 
group level of analysis is somewhat advantageous for investigating relationships 
between service and sales. Relationships between service and sales may be weaker at 
the individual level of analysis because many of the benefits of discretionary effort 
in the service context are regained over time and across employees. For example, if 
a salesperson is very helpful, a customer may or may not make a purchases for a 
variety reasons but will be more inclined to return and make future purchases. Such
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future sales may not be reflected in the original salesperson’s performance because 
other salespeople may help the customer on subsequent visits.
8.1.1 Discretionary Effort as Group Phenomenon
Attempts to understand the correlates and causes of important organisational 
behaviours have frequently been focused on the individual level of analysis. For 
example, the job-satisfaction-job-performance literature (recently reviewed by 
Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985), and growing bodies of literature on pro-social or 
citizenship behaviour (e.g., Bateman and Organ, 1983; Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; 
O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Puffer, 1987; Smith, 
Organ and Near, 1983) have all tended to focus on behaviour at the individual level 
of analysis. •
However, some of these behaviours may be further understood by investigating their 
occurrence at higher levels of analysis, such as the work group, department or 
organisation. For example, discretionary effort may occur more often in some 
groups than in other groups: this variation in group behaviour may be partially 
explained by characteristics of the groups themselves. In this present research, we 
seek to increase our understanding of discretionary effort as a group-level 
phenomenon. A major aim is to determine the key work-group characteristics or 
properties associated with the incidence of discretionary effort at the group level of 
analysis and, hence, to help explain their occurrence. In addition, this research has 
focused on a potential outcome of discretionary behaviour in a service context, 
namely, bank branch performance.
Much research into discretionary effort has been focused on pro-social behaviour 
at the individual level of analysis, with very few exceptions (e.g. George, 1990). 
Because discretionary effort is performed by individuals, it is appropriate to seek to 
understand it in terms of individually manifested acts. However, discretionary effort 
may also occur at higher levels of analysis, such as the work group. Put simply,
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work groups may vary in terms of the extent to which discretionary effort is 
displayed by group members, and the incidence of these behaviours in groups may 
be meaningfully associated with group characteristics. In other words, it may 
ultimately be possible to characterise work groups in terms of discretionary effort 
orientation. Such a characterisation would ultimately define a group norms or 
culture that promotes discretionary effort. First, theoretical justification is provided 
for considering discretionary effort over group-level, followed by a discussion of the 
hypothesised group-level antecedents of these behaviours. The proposed 
relationship between the form of discretionary effort investigated and bank branch 
performance is then discussed.
Discretionary effort is behaviour that is performed by organisational members with 
the intention or expectation that the behaviour will benefit the group at which it is 
directed (e.g. pro-social behaviour; see Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). Hence, 
discretionary effort can be thought of as helpful behaviours expressed in extra role 
or extra work effort. Discretionary effort may not be rewarded or reinforced by 
others in the organisation. Examples of discretionary effort include helpful 
behaviours directed at co-workers, supervisors, subordinates, and customers or 
clients, and helpful behaviour directed at the organisation at large, such as 
suggesting improvements in procedures or talking favourably about the organisation 
to outside.
Theoretical justification for considering discretionary effort as a group-level 
phenomenon can be found in a diverse set of literature. That is, the complementary 
perspective of ( 1 ) the social-psychological literature on pro-social behaviour, (2 ) the 
group-norms and social-influence literature support the notion of discretionary 
effort as a group-level phenomenon.
The pro-social literature in social psychology has tended to focus on the individual 
level of analysis (e.g. Rushton and Sorrentino, 1981). However, some of the 
explanations offered for the occurrence of pro-social behaviour imply that it should 
also viewed at the group level. It has been suggested that norms of reciprocity (e.g. 
Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963; Blau, 1968; Goulder, 1960) and norms for fairness in
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social exchange (e.g. Blau, 1964; Organ, 1988) drive pro-social behaviour. In 
organisations, work groups are powerful suppliers of norms to their members, and 
exchange relationships that form within groups may determine, in part, the level of 
pro-social behaviour characteristic of group. By their very definition, pro-social 
behaviours is social in nature; it is directed at other individuals. The most immediate 
social groupings within organisations are primary work groups; hence, the display of 
such social behaviour may take place at this level of analysis. This is not meant to 
preclude the meaningful occurrence of pro-social behaviours at lower levels of 
analysis, however. Pro-social behaviour has been widely viewed at the individual 
level (e.g. Smith et al., 1983), and it probably occurs at the dyadic level as well. For 
example, the role-making process posited to occur at the level of the supervisor- 
subordinate dyad (Graen, Orris, and Johnson, 1973) suggests that an individual’s 
pro-social behaviour may be partially determined by dyadic properties.
Another support for analysing pro-social behaviour at the group level comes from 
the social influence literature. It is widely acknowledged that groups are powerful 
instruments of social influence (e.g. Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) and have substantial 
effects on the behaviour of individuals in organisations. Groups control a large 
portion of the stimuli that organisational members are exposed to. According to 
Hackman (1976), these stimuli are divided into two categories: (1) ambient stimuli, 
which are available to all group members and pervade the group, and (2 ) 
discretionary stimuli, which are transmitted on a selective basis at the discretion of 
the other group members. Both group-controlled stimuli have powerful effects on 
group members’ informational states, their affective states, and their behaviour 
(Hackman, 1976), resulting in uniformity of behaviour within groups. Thus, ambient 
and discretionary stimuli may result in employees’ performing similar levels of 
discretionary effort. Furthermore, some of the influence groups have are the results 
of the enforcement of group norms, which also serve to control group members’ 
behaviour to achieve uniformity of behaviour (Feldman, 1984).
Group norms may vary in the extent to which they are positively reinforcing or 
punishing. Hence, because of the operation of social influence and normative control 
in groups, some degree of uniformity in the display of discretionary effort within
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groups is to be expected. For example, in some bank branches there may be high 
levels of informal reward for discretionary effort, whereas in other groups members 
may discourage discretionary effort through low rewards.
At bank branches in Korea, the work of employees, is divided into two tasks: one is 
to deal with customers who wish to deposit and withdraw their money and open 
accounts; and another is to canvass new customers and to persuade existing 
customers to use new financial products. The friendly and helpful behaviour of 
employees towards customers and their quick and efficient work process in relation 
to customers’ needs may result from discretionary efforts, and these consequently 
may affect high branch performance since these employees’ behaviours influence the 
customers’ attitudes and behaviour. The second one is not a necessary responsibility 
of all employees, except during a special sales drive period when the bank branches 
set individual sales targets to improve the branch’s performance. This happens three 
or four times per year. On these occasions, the employees try to work hard to 
achieve the sales targets. Employees with high levels of discretionary effort are likely 
to canvass new customers actively and offer existing customers financial products. 
The behaviour of these employees will consequently affect the overall branch 
performance.
In summary, employees’ discretionary effort in a bank branch may be expressed in 
the following ways: ( 1 ) in more friendly and helpful behaviour to customers; (2 ) in 
quicker and more efficient work behaviours in response to the customers’ needs; (3) 
in the active suggestion of financial products to existing customers; and (4) in 
canvassing new customers. These forms of behaviour may represent employees’ 
extra effort above that required to maintain their jobs. In particular, managers who 
work at the bank branches are assigned individual sales targets. Usually, managers 
tend not to contact customers directly at the branch offices. In order to achieve the 
assigned individual sales targets, managers try to canvass new customers outside by 
telephoning or visiting local people or local organisations. This may have a 
significant impact on branch performance. Some managers with a high level of 
discretionary effort work harder to try to exceed the assigned sales targets.
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However, the following problems remain: discretionary effort may be difficult to 
isolate from effort deriving from other factors such as pressure from the branch 
manager (i.e. through the active sales policy) or the expectation of high rewards 
(promotion). Hence, in order to establish the pure link between discretionary effort 
and performance, it may be necessary to control for any extra effort caused by other 
factors. Furthermore, discretionary efforts in itself may not lead to consistently high 
performance. These reasons are as follows: Firstly, the relationship between 
employees effort (especially in terms of extra work effort) and performance depends 
very much on the characteristics of the task. The more routine and simple the tasks 
are, the more likely it is that their performance will depend on the level of 
employees’ effort. The more difficult the jobs are, the more likely it is that the 
performance will depend on the job-relevant knowledge and skills of individuals 
rather than the level of effort (e.g. the success of a complicated brain operation is 
less likely to depend upon effort expended that it is upon the strategies used and the 
job-relevant knowledge and skills of surgeon).
Secondly, however kind and polite employees are to customers, the customers are 
still free to choose the particular branch they want to use. Their decision will depend 
on a variety of other factors beyond the control of branch staffs, such as credibility, 
location, etc. Nevertheless, it may be reasonable to assume that customers are more 
likely to use branches where they find that employees are more polite and kind.
8.1.2 Research Hypotheses
The research hypotheses are based on the argument that employees’ performance may be 
directly affected by their commitment. More specifically, branch performance will be 
high when:
( 1 ) employees themselves exert discretionary effort;
(2 ) employees’ colleagues exert discretionary effort;
(3) employees’ superiors exert discretionary effort.
(4) employees’ exert extra work effort.
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8.2 Methodology: Discretionary Effort and Financial Performance
The sample of “K-bank branches” mentioned Chapter 6  is used in this section 
which attempts to test the links between discretionary effort and performance.
8.2.1 The Measurement of Discretionaiy Effort at the Bank Branches
This research adopts BenkhofFs (1997) measures of discretionary effort which is 
measured in terms of discretionary behaviour. Discretionary behaviour is 
measured from two perspectives: in terms of self-reports and by employees 
describing the behaviour of their superiors and colleagues. Superiors’ 
discretionary behaviour is assessed separately because the head office of the bank 
attributes great importance to branch managers. Colleagues’ discretionary 
behaviour is assessed by asking for the respondents’ opinions of their colleagues 
in order to avoid the bias resulting from respondents’ subjective judgement of 
their own behaviour. Hence, the five specific questions in this research are 
adopted: (e.g. “M y superior tries to contribute to the performance o f the bank 
by suggesting improvements to his boss and colleagues”). To ensure the 
homogeneity of scale, factor analysis is conducted. The results (Tables 8-1, 8-2) 
show that these items are homogeneous.
Table 8-1 Discretionary behaviour (Colleagues) Factor loadings
(1) My colleagues try to contribute the performance of the bank
by suggesting improvements to my boss and colleagues. .7522
(2)Even if my colleagues do not like a certain changes which are to be introduced,
they go along with them if they will help to hold our market share. .8441
(3) My colleagues are always friendly and helpful to customers, even if they do not
like them particularly. .7383
(4) My colleagues works harder than most others in my type of job or position. .8266
(5) My colleagues try to not to let customers wait. In situations where this is
unavoidable, they apologise to them. .8441
Eigenvalue 3.04, Variance .61, N=228, KMO= .79., Alpha= .84, BTS=.0000
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Table 8-2 Discretionary behaviour (Superior) Factor loadings
(l)My superior tries to contribute to the performance of the bank
by suggesting improvements to his boss and colleagues. .5891
(2) Even if my superior does not like certain changes which are to be introduced,
he goes along with them if they will help to hold our market share. .8261
(3) My superior is always friendly and helpful to customers, even if he does not
like them particularly. .8044
(4) My superior works harder than most others in his type of job or position. .8164
(5)My superior tries not to let customers wait. In situations where this is
unavoidable, he apologises to them. .8355
Eigenvalue 3.15, Variance .63, N=228, KMO= .83, Alpha= .85, BTS=.0000
8.2.2 The Measure of Performance
The performance measures used in this research are based on factual data. But the 
use of such data inevitably implies that the contribution of one person to 
performance is extremely difficult to separate from that of another person. Branch 
performance measured at the group level can solve this problem because many 
factors affecting performance are then shared by all employees and are 
automatically held constant. Combining two levels of analysis, the measurement of 
commitment at the individual level and of performance at the branch level, leads 
to statistical problems which may be caused by aggregating the individual data at 
the group level.
The factual performance data used here are based on ranking among bank 
branches, which will be discussed in detail in the following section. This measure 
is different from the ones used by Benkhoff (1994), such as sales targets and 
change in profit, because Korean banks have a different system for goals setting 
and performance measures.
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8.2.2.1 Branch Performance:
The performance data used in this research were collected from “K-Bank” by the 
Department of Performance Evaluation at the Headquarters and show the 
ranking order among bank branches in the period from July to December 1995.
Branch performance in “ K- Bank” is evaluated by various criteria (according to 
“guidance on branch performance evaluation”, 1990).
(1) The key point in evaluating branch performance is that this performance only 
takes into account that part of performance attributable to employees’ effort and 
ability rather than to other factors (e.g. location, the size of bank branch, the 
number of staff, market situation, previous performance, etc.)
(2) To control these external variables, all the bank branches are divided into 20 
groups where each group has approximately 15 bank branches. The branches 
within each group have similar attributes or factors, such as the size of branch, 
the number of staff and external market conditions. Using this method to control 
internal and macro-economic variables means that comparisons of performance 
across branches is only possible within the comparison group of branches.
(3) Performance is evaluated by the following criteria:
(a) the profit in relation to planned profit; (b) the increase in profit; (c) 
improvement in net profits as related to total assets; (d) cost-profit ratio; (e) the 
increased rate of total deposits per head; (f) the increased rate of the number of 
customers; and (g) the increased rate of deposit. These items have weighted 
scores. The evaluation is conducted by giving scores when branches achieve their 
goals or when they perform efficiently. The total possible score that a branch can 
achieve is 2,000. The branch with the highest total score across all items is ranked 
first and the ranking continues correspondingly. The evaluation of branch 
performance, according to the above- mentioned items, is conducted with both an 
absolute evaluation and a relative evaluation. An absolute evaluation means
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how far they achieve their sales target planned by Headquarters, and a relative 
evaluation refers to how well a branch performs, compared to other branches.
The method of absolute evaluation is as follows: (a) if a branch achieves 100 per 
cent of planned profit, it gets 0.7Y (a value of 0.7 derives from the assumption 
that there can be a difference of 30 percent between an optimum performance that 
branches can achieve and average branch performance, Y= weighted score); (b) if 
the achievement rate of profit is between 1 0 0  percent and 130 percent, they have 
0.7 Y + extra achievement rate(%)x 0.01 Y; (c) if the branch achieves the plan by 
more than 130 percent, it has a Y, which is the highest weighted value; and (d) if 
a branch achieves less than 100 percent, it gets 0.7Y-unaccomplishment rate (%) 
x 0.007Y.
A relative evaluation, referring to the increased rate or improvement rate 
comparatively is conducted in the following way: (a) if the branch’s profit 
achievement is the same as the average value of all branch profit achievements, it 
gets 0.7; (b) if its profit achievement is more than the average value of the total 
branch profit, it receives 0.7Y + (their branch achieved profit- averaged 
profit)/(highest profit among branches-average profit)x 0.3Y; and (c) if its 
achievement is less than the average profit of branches, it gets 0.7Y- (average 
achieved profit-their achieved profit)/(highest profit among branches-lowest profit 
among branches) x 0.3Y.
On the basis of the absolute evaluation and the relative evaluation, the 
measurement of branch performance is based on the ranking order among the 
bank branches evaluated by the Department of Performance Evaluation at 
headquarters.
The method of measuring branch performance used by “K-bank” seems to be 
convincing for the purpose of this research because it controls the many external 
variables which can affect branch performance (bank size or location). Most 
employees in the bank branches who were interviewed seemed to be satisfied with this 
method of branch performance evaluation. From this, it can be inferred that most
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employees feel that the system of evaluating branch performance is fair and 
reasonable. Branch managers’ promotion prospects and employees’ bonuses are 
closely linked to the outcome of these evaluations.
8.2.3 Control Variables
This research uses control variables which may have a potential influence on 
branch performance. This may help to isolate the impact of employees’ 
discretionary effort on branch performance from sales strategies etc. Otherwise, it 
is not possible to say whether it is employees’ discretionary effort or something 
else that makes a difference to the level of performance. The logic for using 
control variables is as follow: In order to identify the pure effect of discretionary 
effort on branch performance, all other possible factors which may affect branch 
performance will be taken into account at first. As there is no other plausible 
model so far to which one can attribute the remaining effect, it will be attributed 
to the discretionary effort factor.
The control variables adopted in this research are as follows: (1) active sales policy;
(2) directing (3) superior’ sales ability; and (4) good premises. These control variables 
are taken from Benkhoff s (1994) framework. They are appropriate to apply in the 
Korean bank because the factors affecting branch performance are shown to be similar 
to those suggested by Benkhoff according to the results of interviews with managers. 
However, some control variables (sufficient staff, reliable computers, opening hours, 
politeness, targeting customers) used by Benkhoff are not adopted in this research 
because (1) they are not appropriate for this research context (e.g., sufficient staff is 
already considered as an external control variable when branch performance is 
measured in Korean bank branches. (2) some control variables may be results deriving 
from discretionary efforts (e.g. politeness, targeting customer). By contrast, one 
control variable such as managers’ sales competence is added in this research because 
this has a large impact on Korean bank branches (according to the results of 
interviews with bank managers).
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An active sales policy may be realised through a supervisor putting more pressure on 
employees or through bonus incentives. Directing may be a significant part of the 
supervisor’s control. High performance is not only a function of employees’ effort, 
but is also related to physical conditions, such as good premises, which are not 
taken into account by the system of performance indicators. Finally, top branch 
manager’ sales competence through personal connection may affect branch 
performance.
8.2.3.1 The measurement of control variables
The measures of control variables are taken from BenkhofFs (1994) proposed 
approach.
(1) Active sales policy
An active sales policy that involves approaching new customers is adopted by some 
branches, but not all. This method is encouraged by head office.
The item for measurement is “Our branch pursues an active sales policy, including 
canvassing o f new customers. ” Responses scales are (1) Yes (2) No.
(2) Directing
Directing employees towards business goals by giving advice and feedback will 
contribute to both the efficiency and quality of service. Three items for measurement 
are adopted here:
(a) “M y superior checks and asks how fa r the agreed performance improvements 
have been realised ”
(b) “M y superior gives me good practical advice on how I  can improve my 
performance. ”
(c) “When our branch has not done well in terms o f certain products, my superior 
encourages us to do something about it. ”
To ensure the homogeneity of scale, factor analysis and reliability are conducted and 
the results are shown in Table 8-3.
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Table 8-3 Factor analysis of directing Factor loadings
(a)“My superior checks and asks how far the agreed performance 
improvements have been realised.” .56109
(b) “My superior gives me good practical advice on how 
I can improve my performance.” .90143
(c) “When our branch has not done well in terms of certain products, 
my superior encourages us to do something about it.” .88055
Eigenvalue 1.90, Variance .63, N=228, KMO= .56, Alpha=.67 BTS=.0000
(3) Premises
This is captured by the following item: “What changes would allow you to perform 
better?: a more attractive building.” Response scales are (l)Y es (2) No.
Response categories are on a five-point scale ranging from “fully disagree ”, “do not 
agree ”, “ neither disagree or agree ”, “partly agree ”, to “fully agree. ”
(4) Mangers’ sales competence
“In our branch, the branch manger has excellent sales competence in canvassing 
customers”,
Response categories are on a five-scale ranging from “fu lly  disagree ”, “do not 
agree ”, “ neither disagree or agree ”, “partly agree ”, to “fu lly  agree. ”
8.2.4 Statistical Methods and Results
8.2.4.1 Methods
The level of analysis.is followed at the group level (bank branches). Apart from 
performance indicators (branch performance), all the data were collected at the 
individual level through questions relating to individual perception. Therefore, in 
order to analyse the data at the group level, the individual data had to be 
aggregated at the group level (branch). A variety of individuals’ responses
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concerning discretionary effort in bank branches were averaged to determine the 
means at the group level.
Two criteria must be met when using aggregated data to characterise unit-level 
constructs: (1) a significance in between-unit differences in members’ responses in 
terms of discretionary effort must be proved (2) a within-unit consensus regarding 
the discretionary effort must be ensured (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988, p.254).
To test for the first criterion of aggregation, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), 
which contrasts discretionary effort across groups, was used. The computed 
results indicate significant (p< .05) differences in the means of all the different 
kinds of discretionary effort across the 51 bank branch units.
To test the second criterion for aggregation, Eta squared, a measure of within- 
unit agreement, was computed. It can be interpreted as the proportion in the 
dependent variable explained by differences among groups. The results indicate a 
high degree of agreement regarding each unit’s discretionary effort (ranging from 
.39 to .47). Because within-unit agreement on perceptual variables averaged .12 
in other research (Glick, 1985) and ranged from .13 to .37 in Rousseau’s (1990) 
research, results here suggest relatively strong within-unit agreement and 
therefore support the appropriateness of aggregation to the unit level. Table 9-4 
shows that discretionary effort exhibit a variation (mean differences) across bank 
branches and agreement within a certain group.
Table 8-4 Analysis of variance for discretionary effort scales by branches
Eta-squared F
(l)Discretionary behaviour (self) .47 3.10**
(2)Discretionary behaviour (superior) .43 2.67**
(3)Discretionary behaviour (colleagues) .40 2.40**
(4) Extra work effort .39 2.30**
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Logistic regression analysis is used to examine the factors hypothesised to affect 
branch performance. It provides significant tests for the similarity of group means 
of discretionary behaviour for high and low performance. In this research, the 
values of branch performance are re-coded into two groups in order to use 
logistic regression analysis. Branch performance is categorised according to their 
ranking within individual groups where approximately 400 branches of “K-bank” 
were divided into 20 groups on the basis of external market variables (e.g. the 
previous sales, size and location etc.). 51 different branches from 9 groups are 
examined and then categorised into two groups: high performers (the top five 
ranked branches of 15 within the group) and poor performers (the bottom five 
branches in a ranking of the 15 branches). The middle range of rankers (ranks 6- 
10 inclusive) were excluded in order to divide all the branches into two groups: 
high performers and poor performers. This is because it is only possible to 
compare performance within one group which has 15 branches through the 
ranking, but it is not possible to compare performance with other groups. In sum, 
only 36 of the 51 branches were selected as a part of the sample and these 36 
were divided into 2 groups: high performers and low performers.
The reason for dividing bank branches into two groups (high performers and poor 
performers, excluding the middle range of rankers), was that, first of all, it was 
thought that this might yield a better comparison since the focus would be on the 
extremes. Secondly, it was accordingly too difficult to judge whether the middle 
rankers belonged to the high or poor performer groups.
Logistic regression shows whether the variables contribute to the branch 
performance when other effects are held constant. In this multivariate statistical 
procedures, the emphasis is on analysing the variables together, not one at a time. 
By considering the variables simultaneously, we are able to incorporate important 
information about their relationships.
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8.2.4.2 The Results:
Table 8-5 (logistic regression analysis) shows that, as hypothesised, there is a 
difference in the group mean of discretionary effort between the performance of 
bank branches. Both discretionary behaviour (colleagues’ discretionary behaviour) 
and extra effort are significant for branch performance. All the control variables 
hypothesised to affect branch performance are not actually significant for branch 
performance. This may mean that branch performance is more likely to affected by 
employees, discretionary effort rather than others such as control variables.
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Table 8-5 Difference between high and low performing branches
(Logistic regression, wald * p< 05, **p<.01)
(a) Discretionary behaviour (self) and performance
Variables Wald
Discretionary behaviour: self .43
Active sales policy .13
Good premises .36
Managers’ competence 2.43
Directing .23
(b) Colleagues’ discretionary behaviour
Variables Wald
Colleagues’ discretionary behaviour 4.06*
Active sales policy .14
Good premises .90
Manager’s competence 2.44
Directing .13
(c) Superior’ discretionary behaviour
Variable Wald
Superior’s discretionary behaviour .38
Active sales policy 1.36
Good premises .26
Manger’s competence .34
Directing 1.43
(d) Extra effort (self)
Variables Wald
Extra Effort 5.08*
Active sales policy .17
Good premises .17
Manager’s competence .15
Directing .29
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8.2.5 Research Findings and Discussion
The results of this study generally support the notion that discretionary effort can 
be analysed at the group level. The occurrence of these behaviours within groups 
is significantly related to branch performance in a Korean bank. Since this research 
was conducted in a service context, the form of discretionary effort was 
considerably related to customer- service behaviour, or helpful behaviour directed 
at customers. The form of discretionary effort performed by groups would be 
positively related to group (branch) performance. This confirms some implicit 
assumptions in academic and popular writings about the importance of customer- 
service behaviour as a form of discretionary effort. This result supports the 
assumption that discretionary effort (e.g. pro-social organisational behaviour or 
organisational citizenship behaviour) are related to organisational effectiveness 
(e.g., Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Organ, 1988).
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Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusion 
9.1 Discretionary Effort at Korean Bank Branches
Discretionary effort in this research is regarded as discretionary behaviour as extra 
role or extra work effort. This definition requires that the behaviour must be 
voluntary. It is not role-prescribed nor part of formal job duties. It is not formally 
rewarded, and failure to engage in the behaviour can not be formally punished. 
Many authors have recognised the importance of discretionary behaviours which 
go beyond delineated role expectations and also benefit the organisation (e.g. 
Barnard, 1938; Katz, 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978). It is only recently, however, 
that discretionary behaviour has been the focus of concerted empirical effort 
under the domain of extra role behaviour (e.g., Brief and Motowildo, 1986; 
O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Organ, 1988; Organ and Konovsky, 1989; Van 
Dyne et al., 1995).
Although there is some disagreement in the literature concerning whether extra 
role behaviour can be differentiated from in-role behaviour, it is argued that extra­
role behaviour is conceptually distinct from in-role behaviour. As Van Dyne et al., 
(1995) argue, although classifying a specific behaviour as in role and extra role 
can, at times, be difficult, acknowledging the theoretical differences in the 
constructs adds value to research even when application of the distinction is 
problematic. Discretionary effort as extra role behaviour focuses on behaviour 
that is o f  benefit to the organisation from the organisation’s perspective.
Unlike such extra-role behaviour, there is another important aspect of 
discretionary effort as extra work effort. Some employees exert more extra work 
effort than required through simple hard work Since this effort may have a direct 
impact on performance, it is important to consider it in this research. However, 
these two aspects are not completely different constructs in the sense that 
employees with discretionary behaviour are more likely to exert extra work effort 
in tHe work context.
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There is a growing interest in substantive research on the subject. This is not 
surprising because behaviours which go beyond delineated role expectations can 
be important and even crucial to the survival of an organisation. As demonstrated 
in this research, this mechanism has considerable impact on financial performance. 
Many authors have attempted to investigate what sorts of mechanisms explain 
such discretionary behaviour and extra work effort in work context (e.g. job 
satisfaction and extra role behaviour, Bateman and Organ, 1983; organisational 
commitment, O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; perception of fairness, Farh, 
Podsakeoff, and Organ, 1990). However, there is no research concerning these 
relationships in the Korean context, since discretionary effort as extra work effort 
and extra role behaviour has not attracted much interest by academics or 
practitioners in Korea. This is because there may be a common assumption that 
most employees’ work behaviour is greatly controlled by formal rules or contracts 
based on a reward system. As Katz (1964) argues, however, dependable 
performance of one’s prescribed role is no guarantee of organisational success. It 
must be supplemented by the discretionary effort initiated by members in 
unanticipated environments.
The motivational basis for discretionary effort is likely to require more than simple 
compliance. A failure to develop this psychological attachment among members may 
require the organisation to bear the increased costs associated with more detailed and 
sophisticated control systems. This concept promises considerable benefits for 
organisations in terms of competitiveness, for their employees in terms of 
achievement and satisfaction, and for the economy as a whole in terms of wealth 
and social harmony. In particular, understanding employees’ discretionary effort in 
different cultural context in terms of its antecedents may provide fruitful results in 
understanding and managing culturally different employees in multinational 
enterprises. Hence, an investigation into the mechanisms that affect the 
discretionary effort of Korean employees is very interesting and useful for western 
managers.
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Two approaches are used to investigate the phenomenon of discretionary effort in 
Korean banks: The first is to replicate previous research done by Benkhoff 
(1994), who tested the relationships between the five less calculative motivation 
mechanisms (need theories, work disposition, intrinsic motivation, behavioural 
commitment and social exchange theory) and discretionary effort (in terms of 
extra work effort). Since discretionary effort implies less instrumental action 
towards rewards, Benkhoff has identified less-instrumental motivation 
mechanisms to explain it.
The second method is to test the relationships between group motivation 
(organisational identification and group norms) and discretionary effort. This is 
because the concept of group has strong motivational impacts on individual work 
behaviour. The framework of this research provides a basis for accounting for 
individual work efforts that are collectively oriented and cannot be accounted for 
by an individual’s calculative logic. The framework posits social identities as 
major components of the self-concept that the individual seeks to validate in 
his/her work behaviour. Perhaps the main managerial implication of our 
framework is that of modesty. This research proposition implies that, in contrast 
with expectancy theory and goal setting theory, a great deal of employee 
motivation may not be under managers’ control.
9.1.1 Motivation Mechanisms and Cross-cultural Issues
In order to investigate the antecedents of discretionary effort in the Korean 
context, this research has adopted Benkhoff s model, which was originally tested 
in the German context. The application of this model in a different cultural 
context (a Korean bank) raises the issue of the universality of motivation 
mechanisms across cultures. This has been an important issue in cross-cultural 
psychology. Social behaviour is often thought to be the most likely area in which 
to find substantial influence on human characteristics from cultural factors. 
However, there is evidence for widespread cross-cultural similarity as well as 
differences in social behaviours. While conformity and sex-role ideology are
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clearly patterned according to cultural factors, others (some shared values) are 
not. Both social and biological factors have pan-human features and can 
contribute to cross-cultural similarity. These factors, along with some basic 
psychological processes (such as perception), clearly attenuate the possibility of 
cultural variation in social behaviour. The cross-cultural co-ordination of social 
relationships may be possible only when such shared characteristics are present. 
Nevertheless, cultural factors do produce variations on these common underlying 
processes, thus suggesting some support for the assumption of many observers 
that social behaviour is where cultural variation is most widespread.
Supporting the perspective of the universality of motivation theories, this present 
research has shown that some motivation mechanisms identified in Benkhoff s 
model account for discretionary effort in Korean bank branches such as the need 
for achievement and the need for esteem and behavioural commitment. However, 
work disposition, intrinsic motivation, and social exchange theory are not 
significantly related to discretionary effort in a Korean bank. These results imply 
that although basic psychological processes are likely to be a common features of 
human life across culture/nation, there is a difference in the level of importance 
that employees attach to different needs, values, attitude or motives and how well 
these are met through work.
Employees in Korean bank branches exert discretionary effort when they have a 
need for achievement, a need for esteem and behavioural commitment. The need 
for achievement is seen as an important motive for individual work behaviour in 
the Korean context, unlike Hofstede’s assumption that the need for achievement 
may not work in strong uncertainty avoidance societies like Korea. It can be 
disputed that the need for achievement functions cross-culturally as a firm 
mechanism to account for discretionary effort.
Both the needs for esteem and behavioural commitment are responsible for 
discretionary effort in the Korean context. Employees do not perceive these two 
mechanisms as different in Korea because of the strong theoretical similarities
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between them. Two mechanisms commonly emphasise the confidence in work and 
the hard work accompanying it. The need for esteem may be one of the 
fundamental motives which are related to other motivational mechanisms (e.g. 
behavioural commitment, organisational identification). Since a generalised 
efficacy aspect of self-esteem, employees with a high need for esteem view a 
discretionary behaviours as a deserved opportunity and consequently it has an 
impact on discretionary effort.
Behavioural commitment is demonstrated to be a strong mechanism to affect 
discretionary effort in Korea. As discussed in the theoretical part of this analysis, 
behavioural commitment involves the individual need for self esteem and the 
needs to maintain one’s positive self-image, lead to behavioural consistency in 
terms of discretionary effort. Also, this behavioural consistency is related to the 
expectations of others, which affect the need for self-esteem in terms of the desire 
for reputation, prestige or recognition. Hence, employees with high behavioural 
commitment are more likely to meet others’ expectations as hard^ working 
persons by exhibiting discretionary effort in order to maintain their image as 
competent. In particular in the Korean context, discretionary effort seems to be 
greatly affected by others’ expectations in which behavioural commitment is 
operationalised. This argument is in line with Berry et al.,’s (1992) assumption 
that persons from the Far East are more externally attributed than those in 
Western countries.
However, work disposition and intrinsic motivation are not responsible for 
employees’ discretionary effort in the Korean context. The common 
characteristics of these variables are operationalised in terms of positive values or 
emotional aspects towards work. Hence it can be argued that these emotional 
aspects towards work have less impact on employees’ work behaviour, at least in 
the Korean context.
With regards to social exchange theory, this research shows that Korean 
employees’ job satisfaction is very low. This may be due to cultural influences, as 
Hui (1990) argues when he states that the degree of dissatisfaction with work
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derives from a perceived discrepancy between actual outcomes of the job and the 
job holder’s expectations. In Korea, where employees’ expectations are very high 
and the outcomes are not the desired, ones’ job satisfaction may be low (as in 
Japan and France according to DeBoer, 1978). One of the items measuring social 
exchange theory (“My initial expectations from your company before entering the 
company were met”) shows that the expectations of most of employees in bank 
branches are not met. Such dissatisfaction with their job might also derive from 
employees’ perception of the unfairness of organisational practices or policies.
9.1.2 The Analysis of Group Motivation
Group motivation is a complex and pervasive part of any working environment 
and is a crucial mechanism in any explanation of individual behaviour. While there 
does not seem to be agreement as to what exactly a group is or how important a 
group is in an organisation, there is a general consensus that it is a major 
component affecting individual behaviour. Some of the most important decisions 
in our society are made in-groups. Organisations are also increasingly structured 
around groups. For example, the quality circle has been introduced in many work 
settings to improve productivity. Despite the fact that group motivation is an 
apparently important part of organisational life, it is somewhat ignored and 
misused by researchers. This is because group motivation is more easily 
confounded than individual motivation in research because of the uncontrollable 
interaction among members in the group setting. Although recent trends towards 
increasing precision and control have conspired to make group research more 
difficult to conduct, group motivation still remains an elusive concept that seems 
to defy concrete treatment in research and application.
There have been heated debates in the social sciences not just about what groups 
are but whether, indeed, groups exist at all. These debates have turned to the 
question of the relationship between the individual and the group: is the latter 
reducible to the former, or can they both be considered as real and inter-related 
entities? Regardless of this debate, some organisational psychologists have
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emphasised the importance of group motivation, for example through 
organisational identification and group norms, because these mechanisms may 
have a significant effect on individual behaviour or organisational effectiveness. 
Along the same lines, this research has attempted to test whether these two 
mechanisms provide an independent explanation for an individual’s effort or 
performance within an industrial organisation which is distinct from other 
individual motivation theories.
The concept of a group, in this research, encompasses two elements: (1) “the 
existence of some formal or implicit social structure, usually in the form of status 
and role relationships. (Sherif, 1969, p.8), and (2) the situation in which “two or 
more individuals ...perceive themselves to be members of the same social 
category” (Tajfel, 1981, p.15; see also Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). On the 
basis of this concept of a group, it can be said that there are two principal group 
motivation mechanisms which may affect employee’s behaviour within a work 
organisation: organisational identification and group norms. First, organisational 
identification refers to “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain 
social groups together with some emotion and value significant to him of the 
group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p.31). According to social identity theory, 
individuals seek to belong to organisations with a high status or reputation 
because individuals’ group categorisation affects their social identity. Tajfel and 
his colleagues (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987) argue cogently that a 
significant part of one’s individual identity (social identity) is derived from group 
membership.
Organisational identification can be explained by social identity theory because 
people like to belong to organisations which have a high reputation in order to 
enhance their own self-esteem. For this reason, organisational identification is 
inter-linked with the need for esteem. Organisational identification can also be 
explained by social exchange theory in that if employees are satisfied with the 
rewards offered by the organisation, they are more likely to identify with that 
organisation. Nevertheless, organisational identification is treated as a different 
and independent mechanism from the need for esteem and from social exchange
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theory because the need for esteem can be satisfied in various ways apart from 
identification, and employees who are satisfied with high pay do not always 
identify with the organisation.
The second group motivation mechanism consists of group norms, which may 
have a strong impact on individual behaviour. In work groups, norms are those 
interpersonal behavioural rules which are commonly understood. In sociology, 
norms are seen as the basis of human association. They are Durkheim’s “social facts” 
and provide the data of social anthropological descriptions of culture (e.g. Radcliffe- 
Brown, 1952). Norms are sets of expectations concerning the appropriate and 
accepted playing out of roles in society (Goffinan 1959), where the contents of roles 
are themselves norms. Norms also embody the socially acceptable models of action 
designed to achieve society’s goals.
Norms can be concretised through legislation, as in the laws and rules of society, or, as 
is more often the case, they are so pervasive and so saturated in society that they are 
taken for granted and are invisible. They are the hidden agenda of everyday 
interaction, the background to our behaviour, the context within which things happen 
(GarfinkeL, 1967). A norm refers to acceptable (and unacceptable) behaviour for 
members of a group. Norms specify, more or less precisely, certain rules for how 
group members should behave and are thus the basis for mutual expectations 
amongst group members. The norms of a work group are the invisible force that 
guides behaviour. They are not the same as what the formal policies, rules, 
procedures and job descriptions provide. Rather, norms are the unwritten, often 
unconscious, message that fills in the gaps between what is formally decreed and 
what actually takes place.
Norms may affect the quality of decision-making and action-taking, which in turn 
affect individuals’ discretionary effort and performance. Despite the fact that 
group norms may affect effort or performance, most existing studies of norms 
have not demonstrated why certain types of group norms actually lead to high 
effort or performance. This research attempts to introduce certain types of group 
norms which are clearly linked to employees’ high effort and performance. These
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are: achievement norms, competence norms, innovation norms, openness norms, 
respect norms, trust norms, co-operation norms and autonomy norms. These 
norms are, in some ways, interrelated with other norms, but they have an 
independent explanatory power for individual effort or performance (e.g. through 
achievement norms and competence norms).
Group norms can be explained by social exchange theory in that one reason why 
individuals may comply with their group norms is because of the benefit derived 
from their working conditions. However, group norms diverge from social 
exchange theory in the sense that they explain and suggest proper, desirable 
behavioural patterns while social exchange theory simply emphasises the exchange 
relationships in rather vague terms. Group norms are also inter-linked with 
individuals’ needs in that norms can reinforce or change those needs. In some 
situations where individuals have satisfactory feelings about their norms, norms 
and individuals values are the same. Moreover, norms are different from 
individuals’ needs in those circumstances where norms and individuals’ needs are 
contradictory. In this case, individuals do not conform to their norms because 
individuals’ needs are so strong and norms are not beneficial to individuals.
Two group motivation mechanisms mentioned above are tested in relation to 
discretionary effort in the Korean context, where the concept of group is a 
relatively strong motivator for individual work behaviour. Statistical results show 
that there is an obvious relationship between organisational identification based on 
social identity and employees’ discretionary effort. This is because social identity 
based on the work organisation in which individual employees work strongly 
affects personal identity, and this consequently leads to discretionary effort for the 
success of organisation, which may in turn contribute to the fulfilment of their 
own interests. This results suggest important implications for understanding the 
motives of Korean employees in the sense that social identity based on work 
organisation has a considerable impact on individual work behaviour.
Organisational identification or commitment has been approached in various ways 
and the concepts used vary according to the authors’ foci. However, these
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pconcepts have not been researched in terms of social identity theory, which 
originally attempted to explain inter-group relationships. Clearly, organisational 
identification or commitment can be explained by many aspects such as 
interpersonal attraction or shared values. In particular, in the Korean context, 
where work organisation is regarded as important for self-image in terms of social 
status, a social identity approach is extremely helpful in understanding individual 
work behaviour. Traditionally, high social status has been regarded as the most 
important aspect that individuals seek to achieve in Korea. This desire tends to be 
achieved by having prestigious jobs or belonging to promising work organisations. 
Belonging to a certain group in terms of job categories tends to restrict 
individuals’ social lives and consequently affect their work behaviour.
With regards to group norms, this research has found that employees’ 
discretionary effort in Korea is affected by group norms which promote 
discretionary effort. The results of factor analysis demonstrates that, with 
particular respect to the eight specific group norms, there are two kinds of 
discretionary effort-promoting norms: (1) discretionary effort-promoting norms 
based on individual characteristics, in terms of ability and personal disposition 
such as respect, trust and competence norms; (2) discretionary effort-promoting 
norms for the process of dealing with tasks such as autonomy, co-operation and 
innovation norms. Statistical analyses (correlation analysis, and multivariate 
analysis) confirm that there are clear links between discretionary effort-promoting 
norms based on individual attributes and employees’ discretionary behaviour, and 
high branch performance both at the individual and group level. However, there is 
no relationship between these norms such as competence, respect and trust norms, 
and extra work effort at either the individual or group level. Rather, discretionary 
effort-promoting norms for the process of dealing with tasks such as autonomy, 
co-operation and innovation norms are significantly related to discretionary 
behaviour at the group level.
Even though these results are slightly different according to the unit of analysis, 
there are common norms, such as competence norms, trust norms and respect 
norms, which strongly affect the discretionary behaviour of employees. This may
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imply that employees are more likely to exert discretionary effort under the 
pressure norms that stress individual attributes (such as ability or disposition) than 
those that stress task processes (such as co-operation or innovation).
The results of this research clearly demonstrate that, in the Korean context, 
individual work behaviour is strongly affected by group motivation mechanisms 
such as organisational identification and group norms as well as the five individual 
motivation mechanisms identified by Benkhoff (1994). These results suggest that 
work group norms, as unwritten interpersonal rules, have considerable impacts on 
individual discretionary effort and branch performance in the Korean context. 
Since Korean society is more likely to be dominated by unwritten rules rather than 
formal contractual rules or laws, work group norms seems to have a crucial role 
in individual work behaviour. Conformity to these norms may not be based on 
short-term or immediate calculation about formal rewards systems, as in the 
expectation of promotion, but is more likely to be based on long-term 
relationships or rewards for the formation of long-term social networks.
9.1.3 An Integrative Approach to Motivation Mechanisms
Motivation has consistently been one of the most confusing of all the subject areas 
in industrial organisational psychology. This is because, apart from the fact that 
some of the theories are simply wrong, the various theories involve different levels 
of analysis and thus deal with different stages of the motivation process. It is 
important to stress again the definition of motivation: that which energises, 
directs and sustains behaviour. Following such a definition, it becomes apparent 
just how many divergent factors can affect the level of individual motivation. 
Several conceptual frameworks have been proposed for bringing these factors 
together for detailed analysis (e.g. Locke and Henne’s model: needs, values, 
goals, emotions, 1986; and Porter and Miles’s model: individual characteristics, 
job characteristics and work environment characteristics, 1974).
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According to Porter and Miles’ (1974) model, which is frequently used in the 
literature, work motivation theories would ideally account for variables from three 
major areas (individual attributes, job characteristics and work environment). 
Some individual characteristics (e.g. need theories) can represent a significant 
influence on employee’s effort or performance. For instance, there is consistent 
evidence that individuals who have higher needs for achievement generally 
perform better than those who have lower needs. A similar pattern emerges when 
job-related characteristics are considered. A great deal of research (e.g. on 
intrinsic motivation) indicates that variations in the nature of the task itself can 
influence performance and satisfaction. Some studies show that “enriching an 
employee’s job” by allowing him/her more variety, autonomy, and responsibility 
can result in somewhat high effort and performance. However, many of these 
findings are not conclusive. Stronger evidence concerning the impact of job- 
related variables emerges when we simultaneously consider the role of individual 
differences in such a relationship. When variations between individuals are also 
taken into account, evidence indicates that certain task attributes are more 
strongly related to performance only for specific “types” of individuals, such as 
those with a high need for achievement. In other words, it appears that not 
everyone desires an enriched job to the same degree, nor does everyone 
necessarily perform better when assigned to one job. Therefore, recognition 
should be given to the background characteristics of individual employees when 
considering job design changes.
Another significant aspect of Porter and Miles’ (1974) model is the emphasis on 
the work environment as expressed in group influences, leadership styles, and 
organisational climate. For example, group pressure can significantly influence an 
employees’ effort and performance (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). Such 
influence can occur in the two major dimensions of productivity: groups can exert 
pressure on “laggards” to contribute their fair share of output, or they can act to 
curb the high productivity of the “rate-buster.” Furthermore, it is possible that 
high group cohesion (a work environment characteristic) may be a much more 
potent influence on behaviour for a person with a high need for affiliation (an 
individual attribute) than for a person with a low need for affiliation. People with
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high needs for achievement may be less influenced by the degree of group 
cohesion and more interested in potential economic rewards. A job that lacks 
enrichment (intrinsic motivation) may be eased somewhat by a supervisor who 
shows a good deal of consideration toward his or her subordinates (respect 
norms).
Although motivation theories are divided into various categories according to 
authors’ viewpoints, it is necessary to consider these theories in terms of the 
interactive dynamics between them (e.g. the interaction between individual’s 
attributes and job-related factors or work environment) in order to understand 
motivation mechanisms better. All-encompassing theories of motivation based on 
such concepts as instinct, need drive, and conditioning have not succeeded in 
explaining human action. Such theories have been gradually replaced by more 
modest and limited approaches to motivation. These approaches do not presume 
to explain all motivational phenomena; their domains are more restricted.
The important point here is that when one considers the variables involved in 
work motivation, one must take a strong, integrative approach. Unfortunately, 
such a totally unifying theory does not appear to exist at this time. What does 
exist is a set of different theories that address themselves to one or more of these 
sets of variables, none of which, however, is completely and thoroughly 
comprehensive (in terms of both hypothesised interaction effects among variables 
and accounting for a diverse array of evidence).
From the viewpoint of an integrative approach to motivation theories, it may be 
useful and meaningful to study the interrelationships (e.g. the need for 
achievement and intrinsic motivation) between theories rather than focus on one 
specific theory. Only then can one achieve a greater understanding of the 
complexities of the motivational process. In the absence of a “master theory”, this 
present research explores several major theories, particularly less-calculative 
motivation mechanisms, in explaining discretionary effort. The theoretical 
framework of this research, which consists of seven motivation theories, is based 
on an integrative approach to examine whether they are independent or
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interrelated with each other. Many of the theoretical approaches are 
complementary rather than contradictory. Thus, it is often not just a matter of 
choosing which is the “best” theory, but rather one of deciding which approaches 
are, relatively speaking, the most helpful for understanding particular aspects of 
employee work behaviour (e.g. discretionary effort).
Motivational theories tend to be examined separately, one at a time. Only 
occasionally do two or more theories enter into the same model (e.g. Lincoln and 
Kalleberg: social norms and intrinsic motivation, 1990). Correlation analysis has 
shown that some of the motivational mechanisms (e.g. the satisfaction of esteem 
needs, the challenge provided by the job, and trust in the organisation) are inter­
linked (Buchanan, 1974). Therefore, one can not rule out the possibility that the 
various motivation theories researched by proponents who treat their own 
approach as distinct actually pursue similar motivational phenomena from 
different perspectives: from the point of view of the individual (needs and 
dispositions), the individual-task fit (intrinsic motivation, satisfaction) or social 
attribution processes (behavioural commitment).
Research tends not to see these theories as potential competitors. Comprehensive 
reviews of the literature on motivation, like that by Locke and Hennne (1986), 
treat each approach separately, but do not discuss the relationships between them. 
Since the theories overlap and in most respects do not contradict each other, each 
measure may be expected to act as a proxy for others when analysed separately. 
This will normally mean that the effect of the theoretical mechanism will tend to 
be exaggerated because the predictions made by the theories usually go in similar 
directions. These considerations lead to the following suggestion.
Each motivation theory that might explain less-calculative and less-instrumental 
behaviour at work should first be subject to a factor analysis to ensure that it 
constitutes a separate mechanism that deserves to be represented in the analysis. 
After this, one has to find out whether the various mechanisms have different 
impacts on employee’s discretionary effort. Using the existing set of theories 
allows one to consider the likely sources of motivation and to enter all of them
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into the model so that the multivariate statistical analysis does not suffer severely 
from omitted variables bias, leaving aside the fact that certain motivational aspects 
may be either not yet known or sufficiently publicised, and that the emerging 
model is hence still not fully specified.
BenkhofFs (1994) model seems to take an integrative approach in the sense that 
the five individual motivation theories are considered in explaining discretionary 
effort through a muliple-regression model. However, the author did not consider 
why some motivation theories are theoretically inter-linked and independent. The 
approach used in this present research attempts to examine the similarities and 
distinctions between the various theories to establish whether each of them 
provides different explanatory power for discretionary effort. This method 
requires multivariate analysis that allows us to hold the influence of related 
theories constant.
Factor analysis, in this research, has made contributions to identifying the 
similarities and differences between motivation mechanisms. On the basis of the 
results of statistical analysis, it is possible to make the following suggestions about 
the relationships hypothesised at the beginning of the chapter:
(1) A need for achievement has its own independent explanatory power, apart 
from a need for esteem, intrinsic motivation or achievement group norms.
(2) Social exchange theory has its own independence, ant does not overlap with 
identification or group norms.
(3) Group motivation (organisational identification and group norms) is seen as 
different motivation mechanisms from the five individual motivation mechanisms.
(4) Among group motivation mechanisms, work group norms are perceived as a 
different mechanism from organisational identification.
(5) The need for esteem is not seen as a mechanism which is independent from 
behavioural commitment.
(6)Work disposition is not proven to be a significantly different mechanism from 
intrinsic motivation.
215
In summary, although there are some similarities among the seven less 
instrumental motivation mechanisms identified in this research, most of them are 
seen to have their own independent explanatory power. However, since some 
overlap because of similar measures resulting from theoretical similarities (work 
disposition and intrinsic motivation; the needs for esteem and behavioural 
commitment), these can not be regarded as independent mechanisms. Apart from 
the relationships of motivation mechanisms identified in this research, many other 
motivation mechanisms which are frequently cited in the literature have 
similarities between them and are partly overlapping (e.g., job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment; organisational justice and job satisfaction). Since one 
mechanism can be the proxy of another mechanism (e.g. job satisfaction can be 
the proxy of organisational justice), it is essential to determine whether each has 
its own explanatory power.
Each of these mechanisms has something to offer in the attempt to explain 
motivation in the work situation. Also, as already emphasised, various parts of the 
theories are, in many ways, complementary. For example, individuals who have 
particularly strong needs (e.g. for achievement) may also be inclined to make 
equity comparisons with regard to how their peers are being rewarded in relation 
to the types and amounts of rewards that they themselves are receiving (e.g. social 
exchange theory). It seems clear that each of the major approaches to motivation 
provides an important perspective from which to view motivation, and crucially 
these perspective are not necessarily contradictory but rather provide a 
comprehensive viewpoint that permits an increased and sophisticated 
understanding. If there is an utility in studying motivation theories, it is exactly 
this fact: One can obtain more meaning about the events and situations that one 
observes or takes part in if one knows something about the theories than if one is 
not familiar with them. In this sense, improved knowledge about motivational 
processes is required not only for management, but also for the employees 
themselves if all members are to contribute more effectively to the goals of the 
organisation and simultaneously receive greater personal satisfaction.
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9.2 Measures of Group Norms
Since norms are the rules underpinning employees’ actual behaviour and tend to 
restrict or guide their behaviours and can predict what sort of behaviour is 
appropriate, they are seen as behavioural patterns that are expected o f *an 
organisation or group. For this reason, several authors (e.g. Cooke and Rousseau, 
1988) have used the idea of “other people’s expectations” to measure group 
norms through questionnaires (e.g. in phrases such as: “meet expectations in the 
organisation”, Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; and “expected and usual ways”, Allen 
and Dyer, 1980). However, this approach is problematic because expectations in 
an organisation or group may not be based purely on group norms, but may be 
contaminated by social desirability. It is likely that any desirable values would be 
expected from anyone. Therefore, the idea of using the “expectations of others” 
to measure behavioural norms is of questionable value.
In order to measure norms as a collective concept by means of a questionnaire, I 
propose to use the idea of people “meeting disapproval”. Since group norms are 
behavioural rules which are “desirable and admirable”, employees meet with 
“disapproval” when they violate these rules. Hence, group members may 
recognise their group norms by receiving certain kinds of “punishment” 
(criticisms, censure, public humiliation, and even rejection by the group) when 
they violate their own group norms. Accordingly, the phrase “meeting with 
disapproval” has been used to measure norms in this research. In addition, the 
strength of group norms has been measured by the degree of “disapproval” since 
group norms become stronger when punishments are more severe.
This present research has attempted to measure group norms through people’s 
beliefs about the consequences of norms violation, using the phrase “meet 
disapproval” from group members, including managers. The approach also 
includes managerial expectations which refer to the expectations of group leaders 
as part of group norms. Without some other members’ consensus, manager’s 
expectations about managerial rules by themselves cannot be group norms.
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However, there is no general agreement about how many members must share 
managerial rules if they are to be group norms. At least, to become group norms, 
there should be some agreement by group some members surrounding group 
leaders. It is extremely difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between group 
norms and managerial expectations. Basically, group norms may emphasise the 
consensus among members while managerial expectations can imply an 
expectation from managers without members’ consensus. In order to understand 
these differences and similarities, it may be helpful to examine how norms 
originate.
Norms basically spring from three sources; (1) the values or norms set by the 
manager; (2) the learning experiences of group members as they evolve; and (3) 
values or norms brought in by new strong members and leaders. Though each of 
these mechanisms plays a crucial role, the most important factor for the formation 
of norms may be the impact of the manager. The manager not only chooses the 
basic mission and the environmental context in which the new group will operate, 
but he/she also chooses the group members and influences the original responses 
that the group makes in its efforts to succeed in its environment and integrate 
itself Group norms do not form with a specific purpose, and are created because 
one or more individuals perceive that the co-ordinated and concerted action of a 
number of people can accomplish something that individual action cannot.
The process of norms formation is, in each case, first a process of creating a small 
group. This process will usually involve some version of the following steps:
(1) The top branch manager has ideas or values for the new bank branch.
(2)The manager brings in one or more other members and creates a core group 
that shares a common goal and vision with him. That is, all members believe that 
the idea is a good one, is workable, is worth running some risks for, and is worth 
the investment of time, money and energy that will be required.
(3)The bank branch begins to emphasise these values or ideas through meetings 
with members.
(4)A common critical event begins to be built. If the group remains fairly stable 
and has significant shared learning experiences, it will gradually develop
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assumptions about itself, its environment, and how to do things to survive and 
grow.
Managers have a major impact on how a group initially defines and solves its 
external adaptation and internal integration problems. Because managers have the 
original ideas, they will typically have their own notions, based on their own 
cultural history and personality. How do managers embed the values that they 
hold and thereby create group norms? The norms embedded in a younger group 
are transmitted through a socialisation process, but one in which most of the 
socialisation mechanisms are in the hands of the leader. In more mature 
organisations, the socialisation process takes on a different shape, but in young 
organisations one must focus primarily on leadership behaviour to understand 
norms growth.
The following mechanisms may be powerful means by which managers are able to 
embed their own values in the ongoing daily life of his group: (1) through what he 
pays attention to and rewards, (2) through the ways he allocates resources; (3) 
through the role-modelling he carries out, (4) through the ways in which he deals 
with critical incidents, and (5) through the criteria he uses for promotion.
Through these processes of the creation and formulation of group norms, a 
manager’s expectations, as managerial rules, tend to expressed as group norms. 
Particularly, on the practical level, in small groups like small bank branches 
(where this research has been conducted), the manager’s or leader’s expectation is 
likely to be the basis of group norms. Probably, in large organisations, where 
many different or heterogeneous interests exist according to various groups or 
departments, there tend to be differences between managerial rules and members’ 
group norms. For these reason, managerial expectations and members’ 
expectations are both regarded as part of group norms.
This approach, however, makes some strong assumptions (about the clarity of 
norms and the consequences of violation) whose validity is open to question. 
Hence, in order to enhance the validity of these measures, in-depth interviews 
have also been conducted.
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9.3 Limitations of the Statistical Results
There are several problems that one should bear in mind when drawing 
conclusions from statistical results: (1) causality between variables; (2) the use of 
different measuring instruments; and (3) aggregation problems when individual 
data are used at the group or organisational levels. Each of these problems will be 
considered in turn.
First, there is the issue of causality between variables. Since we are dealing with 
cross-sectional data, it is, strictly speaking, not possible to say precisely what 
causes employees to exert discretionary effort. Causation may be suggested by the 
theories, but one cannot really determine what is cause and effect. Instead of 
arguing that employees with a high need for esteem, a positive work position, an 
interesting or a high profile job, or a high level of satisfaction with working 
conditions, will work particularly hard, it is just as reasonable to assume a reverse 
process of causation: that hard working employees tend to be treated better and 
get more recognition. Three of the theories support a two-way process: social 
exchange theory by implication, and intrinsic motivation and behavioural 
commitment because they assume that behaviour may lead to particular 
attributions and to further behaviour of a similar kind. Also, one can assume that 
employees with high commitment tend to identify more with their organisation 
and conform to group norms.
The causal influence surrounding work effort may be almost impossible to 
disentangle except by using laboratory studies whose results may not be valid in 
the actual work environment. An indirect suggestion about the causes of 
discretionary effort could be derived from the stability of work behaviour. If work 
disposition and needs are of great importance, measures of discretionary effort 
should remain almost constant over time. The role of intrinsic motivation, 
behavioural commitment or social exchange should become obvious with greater 
fluctuation. It may be that the factors most critical for employee motivation vary
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across different career stages. This would be expressed in systematic changes in 
the relevant coefficients across the whole population.
Secondly, if one wants to be very confident about the results of discretionary 
effort research, it is necessary to have more accurate measures. The somewhat 
different patterns revealed in the statistical results for the extra effort and 
discretionary behaviour suggest that one must be very careful when 
operationalising the concept of discretionary effort. The two measures of 
discretionary effort also differ in their patterns of independent variables. While 
employees who demonstrate committed behaviour are characterised by a need for 
esteem they do not seem to be motivated by a positive work disposition, work 
satisfaction and intrinsic motivation. The reason for the discrepancies could be 
that the discretionary behaviour may be contaminated by non-committed 
behaviour and that the measure is therefore only partial.
Thirdly, data in this research were analysed both at the individual and group 
levels. The correlation coefficients showed different results for the relationships 
between group norms and discretionary effort at the two levels. This is because 
data may have been lost when it was aggregated. Choosing the appropriate level 
of analysis is one of the major problems in social science research, but it is 
seldom recognised (Rousseau, 1985). Even an authoritative and extensive 
textbook on behavioural research methodology (Kerlinger, 1973) does not 
mention this important subject at all. In its most general form, the problem can be 
stated as follows: the subject of the social sciences is the behaviour of individuals 
and the properties of social systems which are ultimately composed of individuals. 
The data collected in the social sciences derive from individuals (such as variables 
describing the characteristics of individual behaviour, or answers by individuals to 
questionnaires), or they may be directly collected at one of the many levels of the 
social system (as with accident rates by age category in a particular location, , or 
the presence or absence of trial by jury in a country).
r  f
The problem with the level-of-analysis question in behavioural research arises 
when conclusions applying to one level have to be drawn from data only available
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at another level. If the fact that the two levels do not correspond is not recognised 
and accommodated by the researcher, a cross-level fallacy occurs (Rousseau, 
1985). For instance, interpreting data from the social system level as if they were 
data about individuals is known as “the ecological fallacy” (the term “ecological” 
indicating something operating at the system level). This was identified by 
Robinson (1950) whose famous example was the relationship between skin colour 
and illiteracy in the United States. Using data from 1930, Robinson found that 
across nine geographical regions of the United States, the ecological correlation 
between the percentage of Blacks in the population and the percentage of 
illiterates was 0.95. Across 48 states, it was 0.77. Across 97 million individuals, 
the individual-level correlation 0.20 was significant, but weak. Data collected at 
the ecological level are more likely to be regarded with suspicion than data 
collected from individuals. Choosing the appropriate level of analysis for the 
problem at hand in social science research is more than a matter of avoiding 
fallacies. The skilled use of multi-level research allows one to disentangle 
processes at the individual-and social-system levels, thereby gaining insights 
which research at one level alone cannot produce. Multi-level research involves a 
disregard of the traditional boundaries between the various social science 
disciplines: psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology and economics.
Some authors criticise the aggregation of individual data to the social system 
level, arguing that a mean score across a number of diverse individuals has no 
reality value (the “average” human being is half man, half woman and does not 
exist). This criticism betrays an individualistic bias which tries to imagine the 
properties of a social system as properties of an individual. An aggregate score no 
longer describes an individual, but becomes an indicator distinguishing one social 
system from another. As such, it is basically no different from a lot of information 
about social systems derived from external sources, such as accident rates or 
average alcohol consumption. Accident and other rates represent an aggregate 
measure of a yes/no variable across a number of individuals in a social system. 
Average consumption quantities are an aggregate measure of individuals’ 
consumption behaviour.
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9.4 implications for Management
As demonstrated in this research, employees’ discretionary effort is explained by 
the following motivation mechanisms: need theories (a need for achievement and 
a need for esteem), and behavioural commitment and two group motivation 
mechanisms such as organisational identification and group norms. In particular, 
group motivation mechanisms are found to be significant factors which affect 
individuals’ work behaviour in the Korean context.
These results have major implications for managers who deal with their 
employees:
First managers should consider an integrative approach to understanding 
employees’ work behaviour. This is because many managers tend to deal with 
their employees on the basis of one particular motivation mechanism. For 
example, some managers try to adopt job redesign (e.g. “job enrichment”) to 
improve employees’ performance, thus emphasising the effect of intrinsic 
motivation. However, this approach may not guarantee success unless managers 
consider other factors integratively, such as individual characteristics (individual 
needs or values, disposition) and work environment (reward systems, work group 
norms). This is because some employees may not be attracted to job enrichment at 
all, even though jobs are redesigned.
Secondly, although work group norms have a significant impact on individual 
behaviour, their importance seems to have been largely ignored in the workplace. 
Many managers in the workplace have tended to understand employees’ 
motivation mechanisms in terms of individual values or work attributes or 
rewards systems. For managers to improve a company’s performance or to 
increase employees’ effort, it is necessary to look at the group process and at how 
the group and group norms are formed and at what sorts of norms exist in their 
groups. In particular, this is extremely important for managers of multinational 
companies where very different work group norms can exist. Furthermore, 
managers should recognise the importance of the role of group leader in the
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process of the formation or development of norms, For example, since branch 
managers in organisations like a bank are in a crucial position to affect group 
norms (in terms of their individual values or beliefs), it is therefore really 
important for the top management of headquarters to direct and control them.
Thirdly, branch managers may need to recognise the homogeneity of group 
members within a branch and also their distinctiveness from member of other 
branches if they are to realise and reinforce their social identities. Furthermore, at 
the organisational level, a company needs to develop and improve the image of 
the organisation in order for employees to feel prestigious and proud of their 
organisation.
Fourthly, this research also confirms that for a company to maximise employee 
motivation, managers need to concentrate on the selection of employees as well as 
the adjustment of working conditions. Since personal characteristics seem to 
contribute to discretionary effort, companies ought to make sure that they can 
identify applicants with the relevant needs and dispositions. The company would 
gain further if the job situations were capable of inducing high effort. Intrinsic 
motivation can best develop where jobs are designed to provide variation and 
challenges, and employees may be able to meet these if they are also given the 
necessary training. Managers should also give individuals due acknowledgement 
and a sense of esteem, which have clearly been shown to influence their level of 
effort. An internal labour market can be expected to contribute further to 
employee motivation since it provides the necessary positive prospects for 
employees who seek promotion. For beneficial social exchange to develop, the 
theory demands trust and a long-term relationship guaranteed by job security. For 
behavioural commitment to work, individuals need some control over the way 
they do the job. The more choice they have, the more they will feel responsible for 
their performance and the more their performance will affect their self-esteem. If 
there are no opportunities to transcend strict rules regulating job performance, 
commitment is stifled and this cannot benefit the company.
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The key message from this research is that discretionary effort is a matter of 
general motivational mechanisms. Managers can foster effort by developing 
productive group norms and making employees take pride in their membership of 
the organisation as well as by selecting certain types of employees and providing 
working conditions that create the required sources of motivation.
9.5 Recommendations for Future Research
The findings on group motivation in this research need confirmation by further 
research so that one can have confidence in the new approach. In particular, 
research is needed (1) in culturally different context such as western countries 
where “individualism” is dominant (e.g. Britain and America); and (2) in terms of 
the measurement of group norms. More detailed investigation has to be 
conducted on the conceptualisation and measurement of the strength of group 
norms. The very concept of group norms is rather difficult to operationalise. The 
concept adopted in this research is comprehensive and seeks to include both the 
informal behavioural rules that employees follow. Since, by definition, group 
norms are behavioural rules agreed by the majority of members, it is open to 
question as to whether the rules set by managers actually represent norms.
The strength of group norms, in this research, is measured by the degree of 
“disapproval” encountered if norms are not followed. (This assumes that one 
conforms to group norms not to meet with disapproval). However, some 
employees do not really conform to their group norms, but merely pretend to 
comply with them. So, it may be interesting to measure group norms in terms of 
conformity by distinguishing between compliance and group norms, although it is 
extremely difficult to measure conformity. Furthermore, the concept of group 
norms can be extended to the concepts of organisational culture and teamwork. 
Since culture can be defined in terms of behavioural norms, research on 
organisational norms is basically the same as that on organisational culture. 
Recently, organisational culture has been one of the most popular topics in the 
management literature. Thus, at the organisational level, it may be interesting to
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examine the links between organisational norms, culture and performance as well 
as the variation of organisational norms or culture across different organisations.
The analysis of teamwork in terms of group norms may also be significant. Teams 
as groups may have interpersonal behavioural rules (group norms) as well as 
individual’s roles being determined by other people’s expectations. The success of 
teamwork may depend on what sorts of group norms there are. Accordingly, it 
would be interesting to analyse the formation of norms and their role in enhancing 
group effectiveness in the process of teamwork.
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Appendix
1. Organisational Culture Inventory (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987)
Please think about what it takes for you and people like yourself (e.g. your co­
workers, people in similar positions) to “fit in” and meet expectations in your 
organisation. In other words, how things are done around here. (Response 
categories: strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree nor disagree; agree; and 
strongly agree).
1 .Point out flaws. 2. Show concern for the needs of others.
3. Involve subordinates in decisions. 4.Revolve conflicts constructively.
5. Be supportive of others. 6 . Stay on the good side of superiors.
7. Be a nice guy. 8 . Do things for the approval of others.
9.“Go along” with others. lO.Win against others.
11 .Work to achieve self-set goals. 12.Be predictable.
13.Never challenge superiors. 14.Do what is expected.
15.Stay detached and perfectly objective.
16. Accept goals without questioning them. 17.0ppose new ideas.
18.Help others to grow and develop 19.Be a good listener.
20.Give positive rewards to others. 21 .Agree with everyone.
22. Stay conscious of fashion
23 .Make sure they are accepted by others. 24. Always try to be right
25.Be seen and noticed. 26.Explore alternatives before acting
27.Take on challenging tasks. 28.Be a good follower
29. Ask everybody what they think before acting.
30. Please those in positions of authority. 31 .Be hard to impress
32.Look for mistakes. 33.Oppose things indirectly
34.Take time with people. 35.Encourage others
36.Back up those with the most authority. 37.Set goals that please others 
3 8 .Compete rather than co-operate. 39.Be the centre of attention
40.Never appear to lose. 41. Set moderately difficult goals
42.Pursue a standard of excellence.
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43. Work for the sense of accomplishment.
45.Follow orders even when they are wrong. 46.Check decisions with superiors.
48 .Remain aloof from the situation. 
50.Help others think for themselves 
52.0ut-perform their peers.
54.Maintain an image of superiority 
56.Think ahead and plan.
58.Openly show enthusiasm. 
60.Willingly obey orders.
47.Question decisions made by others.
49.Refiise to accept critics.
51 .Be liked by everyone.
53.Be a “winner”.
55.Turn the job into a contest.
57.Take moderate risks.
59.Know the business.
61.Co-operate with others.
62 .Deal with others in a friendly, pleasant way.
63. Think in terms of the group’s satisfaction.
64.Show concern for people. 65.Never relinquish control.
6 6 .Personally take care of every detail. 67.Not “rock the boat”.
6 8 . Avoid confrontations. 69.Make a “good” impression.
70.Conform. 71.Be non-committal.
72.Make “popular” rather than necessary decisions.
73.Take few chances. 74.Shift responsibilities to others
75.Emphasise quality over quality. 76.Use good human relations sklls
77.Treat people as more important than things.
78.Share feelings and thoughts. 79. Demand loyalty.
80.Use the authority of their position. 81 .Appear to work long hours.
82.Never make a mistake.
83 .Treat rules as more important than ideas.
84.Tell people different things to avoid conflict.
85.Accept the status quo.
87 “lay low” when things get tough.
8 8 .Never be the one blamed for mistakes.
89.Be concerned about their own growth.
91.Motivate others with friendliness.
93.Stay on the offensive.
95.Personality runs everything
97.Be precise even when it’s unnecessary.
8 6 .Put things off.
90.Resist conformity.
92.Be open, warm.
94 Build up their power base
96. Set unrealistically high gods.
98.Keep on top of everything
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99.Always follow policies and practices. lOO.Avoid risks.
101 .Not get involved. 102.Wait for others to act first.
103 .Be spontaneous. 104.Do even simple tasks well.
105.Communicate ideas. 106.Betactful.
107. Act forcefully. 108.Play “policies” to gain influence.
109. Be hard, tough.
110. Maintain unquestioned authority. I l l  .Do things perfectly.
112. View work as more important than anything else.
113.Appear competent and independent. 114.Persist, endure.
115.Fit into the “mould”. 116.Push decisions upward.
117. Be open about self. 118.Enjoy their work.
119.Think in unique and independent ways. 120.Maintain their personal integrity.
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2.The Norms Diagnostic Index (Allen and Dyer, 1980)
Instructions: Norms are expected or usual ways of behaving in groups or 
organisations. This survey asks for your opinions concerning the norms that exist in your 
organisation. You are to fill in the blank that best describes your agreement or 
disagreement with each of the statements in the survey. (Response Scale is (1) Strongly 
agree (2) Agree (3) Neutral (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (6) D on’t know.
It is a norm around here:
I  .to maintain the progress that is made.
2 .for people to regularly plan their work goals.
3 .for new people to be properly oriented and trained to the job.
4.for leaders to take time to follow up on the jobs they’ve assigned to people.
5.for organisational policies and procedures to be helpful, well understood, and up-to- 
date.
6 .for people to confront negative behaviour or “norms” constructively.
7.for people to avoid blame placing and concentrate on looking for constructive 
solutions.
8 .for people to feel satisfied with their pay.
9.for people to feel that the work is important.
10.for people to feel that the organisation offers good job security.
I I  .for people to feel satisfied with the benefits programs offered by the organisation.
1 2 .for people to feel responsible for doing their own jobs right.
13.for people to have some input on decisions that affect their work.
14.for job orientation for new people to be more than just “sink or swim.”
15.for leaders to be equally for people as well as results.
16.to review policies and procedures regularly and change them as needed.
17.for people to get feedback on how they’re doing so they can develop as individuals.
18.for people to feel “turned on” and enthusiastic about what they’re doing.
19.for selection and promotion practices to be fair.
2 0 .for good performance to be rewarded through increased pay.
2 1  .for people to get feelings of accomplishment from their work.
2 2 .not to have to rely on the “grapevine” as their best source of information about the 
organisation.
23.to understand the organisation’s benefits’ programs.
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24.for people to help each other with on-the-job or personal problems.
25 .for people to follow through on programs that they begin.
26.for training needs to be adequately met.
27.for people to have effective means of communication with peers and supervisors.
28.for people to share responsibility for things that go wrong in their work groups.
29.for a spirit of co-operation and team-work to be felt throughout the organisation.
30. for people to feel they are treated fairly in the area of pay.
31 .for people to like the kind of work they are doing.
32.for people to work together effectively.
33.for people to take pride in their own work and that of the organisation.
34.for work loads to be evenly distributed.
35.to care about and strive for excellent performance.
3 6 . to feel really involved in the work of the organisation.
37.to have a clear way of measuring results.
38.for leaders to help their work team members succeed.
39.to point out errors constructively.
40.for people working together to meet regularly on important issues.
41 .for improvement efforts to be based on fact.
42.for people not to treat each other as just a “pair of hands.”
43 .to use time and resources effectively.
44.for leaders to demonstrate their own commitment to what the organisation is trying to 
accomplish.
45.for leaders to make a strong effort to involve and motivate people.
46.to give and receive feedback in helpful ways.
47.for authority to be delegated appropriately.
48.for people to share responsibility for what happens in the organisation.
49.for groups to define goals clearly before a task is begun.
50.for people to get whatever training is needed to help them succeed in their work.
51.for people to feel that the organisation keeps them information on matters that directly 
affect them.
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3.Organisational Commitment Questionnaire (Porter et al., 1974)
(Response categories: Strongly disagree; Moderately disagree; Slightly disagree; 
Neither disagree nor agree; Slightly agree; Moderately agree; Strongly agree (scored 1 
to 7 respectively).
1 . 1 am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to 
help this organisation be successful.
2 . 1 talk up this organisation to my friends as a great organisation to work
3 . 1  feel very little loyalty to this organisation ®.
4 .1 would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this 
organisation.
5 .1 find that my values and the organisation’s values are very similar.
6 . 1 am proud to tell others that I am part of this organisation.
7 .1 could just as well be working for a different organisation as long as the types of 
work were similar ®.
8 .This organisation really inspires the very best in me in the way of job 
performance.
9. It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this 
organisation ®.
10.1 am extremely glad that I chose this organisation to work for, over others I was 
considering at the time I joined.
11 .There’s not too much to be gained by sticking with this organisation indefinitely ®.
12. Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organisation’s policies on important 
matters relating to its employees ®.
13.1 really care about the fate of this organisation.
14. For me this is the best of all possible organisations for which to work.
15. Deciding to work for this organisation was a definite mistake on my part ®.
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4.QUESTIONNAIRE: Evidence from the bank branches in Korea.
Section 1: Organisational identification (Responses categories: fully disagree; not 
agree; neither agree nor disagree; partly agree; fully agree).
1. At the top of the bank we have competent and sensible people.
2. The bank has good prospects for future.
3. There is good co-operation between departments and branches in the bank.
4. The bank has a series of interesting financial products.
5. The bank is bureaucratic and not open to development that would enhance its 
performance. ®
6 . The bank supports many important causes in society.
7. One cannot trust the bank because top management is capable of deceiving people. ®
8 . 1 feel that my values and norms and those of the bank are the same.
9 .1 am proud to tell others that I am part of this bank.
10. To what degree do you think you share the same goals and interests as the following 
in the bank (Response categories: Large conflict, considerable conflict, some conflict, 
minor conflict, same interest).
a) Head office b) the bank in general?
Section 2 Group norms (Response categories: Never; Rarely; Occasionally; 
Frequently, Always).
1. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not express their thoughts and opinions 
on their tasks at work.
2. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not take on challenging tasks.
3. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not show respect for their colleagues at 
work.
4. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not listen to their colleagues’ opinion.
5. Superiors meet with disapproval if they exert much control over how subordinates do 
their work.
6. Employees meet with disapproval if they always follow the same methods when they 
do their own work.
7. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not have enough skill to do jobs.
8 . Employees meet with disapproval if they do not discuss the problems they have with 
their work with their superiors.
9. Employees meet with disapproval if members do mot show respect for their 
supervisors at work.
1 0 . Employees meet with disapproval if members do not approach work in original 
ways.
11. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not behave friendly and politely to their 
colleagues.
12. Subordinates meet with disapproval if they make mistakes at work and do not 
consult with their superior.
13. Employees meet with disapproval if they shift their respomsibility to others.
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14. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not try hard to improve the past 
performance at work.
15. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not do perfect jobs.
16.Employees meet with disapproval if they do not show new ideas and make 
suggestions on work.
17. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not try to learn all the work skills that 
they need for their work.
18. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not share the work when their 
colleagues are in danger of not meeting the deadline.
19.Employees meet with disapproval if they just care about their own work without co­
operation.
2 0 . Employees meet with disapproval if they are not confident about working on their 
own.
21. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not share information that would help to 
improve the performance of the branch.
2 2 . Employees meet with disapproval if people do not try to use their own judgement in 
interpreting rules and regulations.
23. Employees meet with disapproval if they do not give advice colleagues who need 
help.
Section 3 BenkhofPs five individual motivation mechanisms
(Response categories: fully disagree; do not agree; neither agree nor disagree; 
partly agree; fully agree).
1. The need for achievement
1) It is really important for me to have the opportunity to do challenging work.
- It is fully realised in the bank.
2) It is really important for me to have the opportunity for self-development in my 
work.
-It is fully realised in the bank.
2. The need for esteem
1) I find self-confirmation and recognition at work.
2) I find my work interesting because I have the feelings that I am needed.
3) Personal approval of my work is an incentive to me to do even better.
3. Disposition
1 ) 1  regard work as the main purpose of my life.
4. Intrinsic motivation
1) My work is almost like a hobby to me.
5.Behavioural commitment
1) My superiors and colleagues regard me as a hardworking person.
2) I always deliver the result of the work expected from me.
3) Bad working conditions do not prevent me from working harder than others.
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6. Social exchange theory
(Responses categories: fully dissatisfied, not satisfied, partly satisfied, satisfied, very 
satisfied)
1) All in all, how satisfied are you with your position?
2) All in all, how satisfied are you with your task area?
3) My initial expectations from company before entering the company were met. 
(Response categories: fully disagree; do not agree; neither agree nor disagree; partly 
agree; fully agree).
4) All in all, how satisfied are you with your pay?
5) All in all, how satisfied are you with your promotion opportunities?
6 ) All in all, how satisfied are you with your training opportunities?
(Responses categories: Unimportant, moderately important, slightly important, 
important, very important)
7. How important is it for you to be in a high position?
8 . How important are your training opportunities for you?
9. How important are promotion opportunities for you?
10. How important is your pay level for you?
11. How important is your task area for you?
Section 4 Discretionary effort
1. Discretionary behaviour
(Response categories: fully disagree; do not agree; neither agree nor disagree; 
partly agree; fully agree),
a) about yourself:
1. I try to contribute the performance of the bank by suggesting improvements to my 
boss and colleagues.
2. Even if I do not like a certain changes which are to be introduced, I go along with 
them if they will help us to hold our market share.
3 .1 am always friendly and helpful to customers particularly.
4 .1 avoid taking on additional duties and responsibilities at work.®
5 .1 work harder than most others in my type of job or position.
6 . If I can get away with it, I refuse to work late or at weekends.
7 .1 try to not to let customers wait. In situations where this is unavoidable,
I apologise to them.
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b) about your colleagues.
1. My colleagues try to contribute to the performance of the bank by suggesting 
improvements to my boss and colleagues.
2. Even if my colleagues do not like a certain changes which are to be introduced, they 
go along with them u they will help us to hold our market share.
3. My colleagues are always friendly and helpful to customers, even if they do not like 
them particularly.
4. My colleagues avoid taking on additional duties and responsibilities at work.®
5. My colleagues works harder than most others in their type of job or position.
6 . If my colleagues can get away with it, they refuse to work late or at weekends.
7. My colleagues try to not to let customers wait. In situations where this is unavoidable, 
they apologise to them.
c) about your superior.
1. My superior tries to contribute to the performance of the bank by suggesting 
improvements to his boss and colleagues.
2. Even if my superior does not like certain changes which are to be introduced, he 
goes along with them if they will help to hold our market share.
3. My superior is always friendly and helpful to customers, even if he does not like 
them particularly.
4. My superior avoids taking on additional duties and responsibilities at work.®
5. My superior works harder than most others in his type of job or position.
6 . If my superior can get away with it, he refuses to work late or at weekends.
2) Extra work effort
Which of those four opinions do you most agree with?
1. I put myself out in my work and I often do more than is demanded of me. My job is 
so important to me that I sacrifice much for it.
2. All in all, I enjoy my work and every now and then I do more than is required. But 
this should not be a permanent situation.
3. In my job I do what is demanded of me. Nobody can criticise me there. But I cannot 
see why I should exert extra effort beyond that.
4. I often have to force myself to go to work. I therefore only do what is absolutely 
necessary.
264
Section 5: Control variables
(Responses categories: fully disagree; do not agree; neither agree nor disagree; 
partly agree; fully agree). *
1. Our branch pursues an active sales policy, including canvassing of new customers. 
(l)Y es (2) No
2. My superior checks and asks how far the agreed performance improvements have 
been realised.
3. My superior gives me good practical advice on how I can improve my performance.
4. When our branch has not done well in terms of certain products, my superior 
encourages us to do something about it.
5. What changes would allow you to perform better?:
More attractive building. (l)Y es (2) No
6 . “In our branch, the branch manager has excellent sales competence in canvassing 
customers.”
Section 6. Demographic variables
1 .Are you a)female ( )?
b)male ( )?
2. Are you a)married( )?
b)not married ( )?
3. In what age group are you? a) below 20 b) 20-25
c)26-30 d)31-40
d)41-50 f) above 50
4.What is your position?------------
5. How many years have you worked for the bank? 
a)below 1 b) 1 -2 c)3 -5 d)6 -10 e) 11 -15 f)more than 15
6 . In what branch are you working? ----------------
7. What level of education do you have? 
a)High school b)University degree c)MSc degree
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5.Spearman Correlation Matrix: motivation mechanisms, norms and
discretionary effort
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A need for achievement:
1. Self-development 1
2. Challengingjob .60**
A need for esteem:
3. Recognition at work .37** .31**
4. Personal approval .37** .34** .55**
5. Feel needed .33** .30** .65** .53**
Disposition:
6. Work is main purpose . .41** .38** .45** .49** .42**
Intrinsic motivation:
7. Work is like hobby
Behavioural commitment:
8. Hardworking person 
9.Other’s expectation
10. Working conditions
Social exchange theory:.
1 l.Task area 
12.Training opportunities 
13.1nitial expectation
14.Pay
15.Position
16.Promotion opportunities
Identification:
17. Identification
Group norms:
18. Achievement norms
19.Autonomy norms
20.Competence norms
21. Co-operation norms 
22.Innovation norms 
23.Openness norms
24. Respect norms
25.Trust norms
Discretionary effort:
26.Extra effort
27.Discretionary Behaviour .34** .31** .31** .27** .27** .27** .15* .35** .37** .50** .20**-.05
(Self)
28.Discretionary Behaviour .32** .27** .34** .33** .33** .38** .21** .36** .27** .44** .19** .08
(Colleagues)
29.Discretionary Behaviour .22** .23** .34** .30** .33** .37** .30** .39** .24** .46** .18** .17**
(Superior)
.15* .20** .39** .44** .44** .49**
.32** .23** .47** .32** .45** .25** .23**
.38** .33** .48** .35** .49**.26** .22** .49**
.33** .33** .40** .38** .37** .40** .17** .43**.52**
.16** .25** .43** .33** .39** .24** .24** .19** .26** .24**
.04 .02 .20** .10 .22** .17** .28** .08 .11* .11* .36**
.02 .07 .38** .21** .31** .24** .28** .11* .14* .09 ..36** .52**
.11* .06 .18** .24** .18** .21** .17** .21**.12* .30**.43** .31**
.16** .18** .37** .36** .30** .27** .24** .25**.19** .34**.63** .38**
.00 -.00 .26** .15* .20** .12* .28** .09 .05 .12* .40** .51**
.24** .31** .32** .35** .40** .32** .24** .19** .25** .22** .28** .23**,
.14* .10 .16** .13* .12* .14* .03 .14* .07 .11* .03 .08
-.06 •-.02 .04 .05 .10 .11 .23** .06 -.11 -.08 .09 .12
.20** .19** .22** .22** .20** .18** .05 .27** .15* .21** .23** .00
-.07 .01 .17** .19** .17** .17** .17** .15* -.03 .07 .18** .11*
-.01 .07 .10 .08 .13 .10 .13* .03 -.01 .02 .07 .13
.07 .06 .21** .15* .24** .15* .10 .24** .06 .08 .14* .06
.12* .09 .24** .19** .23** .12* .11* .25** .11* .15* .17** .07
.10 .15* .22** .17** .20** .19** .13* .12* .10 .12* .17** .08
.24** .34** .31** .39** .34** .28** .29** .36** .38** .37** .26** .05
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
14. PAY .30**
15. Position .35**45**
16. Promotion .38**49**47** 
opportunities
Identification:
17. Identification .25**.09 ,27**.09
Group norms:
18. Achievement .10 .05 .07 .12*.19**
norms
19. Autonomy .16* .12 .12 .20* .03 .29**
norms
20. Competence .03 .25** ,19**.02 .11* .51** .40**
norms
21. Co-operation .19**.26** .21**.26**.14*.47** .64** .49** 
norms
22. Innovation .10 .11* .04 .14* .14* .49** .57** .43** .56**
norms
23. Openness .12* .12* .15* .15* .13* .56** .12* .50** .55** .52** 
norms
24. Respect .02 .22** .11* ,16**.17**.50** .35** .59** .44** .42**.63** 
norms
25. Trust .07 .10 .15* .10 ,18**.44** .42** .54** ,53**.52** ,60**.(60**
norms
Discretionary effort:
26. Extra effort .15* .16** ,27**.06 .36** .08 .05* .14* .17** .04 .13* .1:8**.18**
27. Discretionary B .-.02 .07 .18** .00 .25** ,18**-.08 .28** .09 -.04.14* ,310**.21**.32**
(Self)
28. Discretionary B. ,17**.21**.24**.10 .32**24** .03 .32** .24**.02 .21** ,226**.25**.30**.51** 
(Colleagues)
29. Discretionary B. ,16**.22**.27**.18**.38**.28** .00 .23**. 20** .00 .15* ,2l4**.ll* .24**.44**.58** 1 
(Superior)
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6. Correlation matrix of norm items (Spearman Correlation)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12
Achievement norms:
l.Take on challenging 1 
tasks
2.Improvement of .27**
performance
Competence norms:
3. Enough skill .35** .36**
4.Perfect jobs .09 .52** .37**
5. Learning all .18** .42** .40** .43*
skills
Co-operation norms:
6.Helping peers .23** .36** .25** ,29**.39**
7.Care about .21** ,43**.32** ,34**.35** 53**
other’s work
8.Advice for .19** .39**. 19** ,28**.44** .50**.39**
peers
Autonomy norms:
9. Confident .09 .32** .23** .41** .43** ,55**.40** .18**
about works
10. Their own .14* .20** .06 .30** .27** ,45**.27** .09 .49**
judgement
Innovation norms:
11 .Not same .29** .29** .42** .22** .24** .21** .30** .21** 19** .17**
method
12. Original way .29** .29** .17** .24** .24** .43** .40** .12 .42** .42** .31**
13. Suggestion .26** .36** .23** .26** .44** .49** .32** .15* .54** .48** .26**
of idea
Respect norms:
14.Respect to .31** .38** .44** .38** .30** .17** .28** .46** .22** .11 .20**
colleagues
15.Respect to .19** .38** .37** .37** .29** .33** .35** .40** .31** .26** .20**
superior
16.Polite and .22** .52** .39** .46** .40** .36** .39** .52** .38** .21** .22**
friendly
Openness norms:
17. Express .45** .26** .25** .18** .26** 33** .32** .35** .28** .37** .21**
opinion
18. listen to .36** .40** .46** .34** .29** .23** .34** .16* .19** .13* .29**
peers’ opinion
19. Sharing .13* .31** .19** .31** .41** .45** .35** .51** .50** .43** .14*
information
Trust norms:
20. Not controlling .23** .28** .38** .25** .23** .23** .36** .20** .21** .18** .31**
subordinates
21. Discuss .31** .35** .41** .25** .31** .35** .37** .36** .32** .36** .48**
problems
22. Consult .11 .36** .32** .50** .36** .23** .36** .31** .30** .23** .16*
mistakes
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Innovation norms:
13. Original ways 1
14. Suggestion .46** 
of idea
Respect norms:
15.Respectto .26** .28*
colleagues
16. Respect to .31** .24** .37**
superior
17.Polite and .30** .40** .55** .47**
friendly
Openness norms:
18.Express .31** .30** .29** .28** .21**
opinion
19. Listen to .25** .29** .53** .32** .57** .23**
peer’s opinion
20. Sharing .33** .52** .31** .31** .49** .30** .26**
information
Trust norms:
21. Not controlling .22** .20** .30** .29** .35** .25** .50** .17**
subordinates
22. Discuss .49** .39** .33** .41** .33** .38** .34** ,2!9** .29**
problems
23. Consult .21** .25** .39** .38** .46** .19** .36** .33** .27** .31**1
mistakes
269
7. Correlation matrix between motivation mechanisms
1 2  3 4
1 .Need for achievement 1
2 .Need for esteem .46**
3.Disposition .45** .52**
4.1ntrinsic motivation .2 1 ** .47** .49**
5.Behavioural commitment .44** .54** .35** .23**
6 .Social exchange theory .13* .39** .28** .34**
5 6
.25** 1
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8. Factor analysis of the five motivation theories, identification and norms
1) Group norms
FA1 FA 2 FA 3 FA 4 FA 5 FA 6 FA 7 FA 8 FA 9
Respect norms .78 -.49 .11 .11 .08 .19 .23 -.11 -.10
Openness norms .77 -.23 .02 .26 .14 .36 .27 -.05 -.21
Respect norms .74 -.21 .09 .11 .12 .31 .23 .07 -.17
Trust norms .68 -.43 .13 .15 .22 -.08 .12 -.05 -.12
Competence norms .62 -.50 .09 .00 .25 -.05 .24 .03 -.28
|  Trust norms .58 -.16 .05 .12 .14 .32 .05 -.13 -.36
Competence norms .58 -.22 .06 .22 .44 .34 .24 .06 -.34
Respect norms .52 -.43 .18 .19 .15 .23 .20 -.16 -.41
Achievement norms .51 -.49 .15 .16 .21 .27 .32 .05 -.29
2) Group norms
Autonomy norms .26 -.77 .08 .01 -.00 .15 -.06 -.16 -.19
Co-operation norms .24 -.74 .24 .15 .06 .20 .03 -.00 -.26
Openness norms .39 -.73 .09 .01 -.00 .19 .15 -.10 .02
Co-operation norms .26 -.70 .23 .12 -.01 .26 .05 -.26 -.35
Innovation norms .30 -.69 .08 -.00 .03 .41 .00 -.05 -.03
Autonomy norms .17 -.67 .16 -.07 .11 .20 -.20 -.25 -.13
Competence norms .41 -.61 .16 .08 .33 .12 .23 .19 -.24
Innovation norms .29 -.49 .05 -.00 .03 .48 . -.05 -.22 -.32
3) Social exchange theory
Promotion opportunities .03 -.17 .77 .14 -.09 .10 .11 -.26 -.17
Position .15 -.10 .75 .33 .24 -.12 .28 -.23 -.14
Task area .22 -.05 .73 .33 .26 -.12 .23 -.15 .03
Pay .11 -.18 .70 .09 .10 -.05 .37 -.04 -.33
Training -.06 -.10 .70 .20 -.02 .21 .06 -.23 .21
Initial expectation -.04 -.17 .65 .28 .02 .25 .11 -.32 .20
4) Identification
Good co-operation .05 -.00 .30 .80 .14 .05 .24 -.13 .00
Good prospects .18 -.01 .19 .76 .17 .03 .17 -.18 -.06
Competent people .27 -.03 .10 .70 .21 .02 .24 -.19 -.01
Pride in membership .10 -.03 .29 .70 .34 .10 .26 -.29 -.09
Interesting products -.00 -.12 .17 .68 .13 .28 .20 -.08 .03
Shared values .01 -.10 .16 .61 .46 -.01 .12 -.20 .03
Trust top manager -.20 -.13 -.29 -.58 -.17 -.02 -.27 .09 .19
5) Need for achievement
Self-development .10 .02 .07 .29 .77 .05 .26 -.16 -.06
Challenging jobs .13 .02 .11 .22 .75 -.01 .44 -.13 .12
6) Group norms
Achievement norms .31 -.19 -.02 .17 .11 .76 .06 .06 -.05
Openness norms .27 -.39 .22 .06 .04 .62 .01 -.10 -.22
Trust norms
7) Behavioural commitment/
Need for esteem
.38 -.42 .11 .16 .28 .56 .04 -.21 -41
Hardworking person .25 -.14 .18 .25 .22 -.11 .81 -.14 .02
Bad working condition .13 .04 .22 .26 .35 .02 .77 -.13 -.26
Others’ expectation .18 .09 .21 .30 .33 .07 .77 -.22 .05
Recognition at work .29 -.07 .41 .36 .37 .01 .58 -.45 .16
Feel needed
8) Intrinsic motivation/ 
Work disposition
.29 -.16 .36 .44 .31 .00 .56 -.53 .15
Intrinsic motivation .02 -.12 .29 .20 .13 .00 .18 -.83 -.03
Work disposition .08 -.11 .28 .34 .51 '04 .36 -.57 -.15
Personal approval .18 -.09 .32 .41 .47 -.00 .48 -.51 -.11
9) Group norms
Co-operation norms .43 -.49 .17 .18 .00 .23 .17 -.11 -.62
Innovation norms .32 -.26 -.02
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.14 .42 ..44 -.07 -.20 -.45


